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Abstract
We are, it seems, able to know a wide range of our own thoughts, beliefs, 
desires and emotions in a special immediate, authoritative way in which we are not 
able to know the mental states of others, nor indeed a certain range of our own such 
states. How is this possible? What is this special way we have of knowing a certain 
class of our own mental states? What, in fact, is the class of states of which we are 
able to have such knowledge, and, what is it about this class that enables us to know 
them in such a distinctive, authoritative way?
The broad aim of this thesis is to bring out, in answering these questions, an 
important point of intersection between issues about world-directed consciousness, 
self-consciousness and introspective self-knowledge.
More specifically, starting from the problem of authoritative self-knowledge, 
the aim of the thesis is threefold: to motivate, to articulate, and to expand upon a 
particular Sartrian solution to this problem, based on a view of our world-directed 
conscious states as being in some sense at the same time states of implicit or ‘pre- 
reflective’ self-consciousness.
In accordance with this threefold aim, the thesis divides into three parts as 
follows:
Part I begins with the problem of authoritative self-knowledge and the 
standard solutions on offer in the literature: inferential models, perceptual models, and 
constitutive accounts. It then suggests how a close examination of the shortcomings of 
these standard approaches ultimately points towards a solution along the above 
Sartrian lines, ie. based on an understanding of first-order consciousness as involving 
already itself an implicit form of self-consciousness.
Part II then focuses more narrowly on this notion of implicit self- 
consciousness, proceeding (a) to distinguish it first from other similar-sounding 
notions in the literature (ie. notions of ‘non-conceptuaT self-consciousness, higher- 
order-thought conceptions of consciousness, and constitutive accounts of self- 
knowledge), moving on then (b) to show how the notion introduced here, contra these 
others, can indeed provide the basis for a solution to the initial problem of 
introspective self-knowledge meeting all the desiderata on a successful such theory.
Finally, Part III takes on the more concrete issue of how such a form of 
implicit self-consciousness might, in practice, be seen to be involved in our two main 
categories of world-directed states, ie. in our cognitive states on the one hand 
(thoughts, beliefs, perceptual experiences), and in our emotions on the other (desires, 
fears, hopes, etc). This section of the thesis goes beyond mere concerns about the 
relation between an implicit form of self-consciousness and the problem of self- 
knowledge, drawing on both other parts of the philosophical literature and on various 
parts of the current psychological literature, to make not only more concrete sense of 
the view of world-directed consciousness here advocated, but to thereby show it to be 
also plausible independently from the theoretical considerations about self-knowledge 
initially driving it in this thesis.
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Introduction: The problem of introspective self- 
knowledge
Unlike most other animals, we are not only able to have thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, and a wide range of emotions, but we are also able to know that we have 
them. Moreover, in the case of a wide range of these states (ie. our in some sense 
conscious ones), our knowledge of them is immediate, first-person authoritative, and 
immune to certain types of error, in a way that our knowledge of other people’s states 
is not, and indeed in a way that our knowledge even of a wide range of our own states 
is not (eg. our unconscious or repressed beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, etc). As I sit 
here in the library for instance thinking to myself ‘self-knowledge is non- 
observational in character’ or visualizing with desire a cup of coffee I will be having 
later on, I am immediately able to know that I am reflecting on the nature of self- 
knowledge, and that I would like a cup of coffee, in a way that I am not able to know 
whether anyone else around me is engaged in a similar reflection or has a similar 
desire. Determining the latter would require my spending some time observing the 
behaviour of those around me, looking over to see what books they have laid out in 
front of them and ultimately, in the case of relatively complex states such as these, 
having to ask them. Similarly, gaining access to a wide range of my own mental 
states, that is, to my repressed or otherwise unconscious beliefs, desires and emotions 
may also require paying close attention to my behavioural patterns, if not years of 
psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, though clearly not all our knowledge of the contents of 
our own minds is in any way different from our knowledge of the minds of others, it 
still remains that in some cases we are able to know our own mental states in a way
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that is distinctive, that is, in particular, in a way that is immediate, first-person 
authoritative, and immune to certain types of error. How is this possible?
To put things differently, the problem of introspective self-knowledge is this: 
we seem to have a way of knowing the contents of our own conscious minds that is 
unlike our way of knowing the minds of others, unlike our way of knowing our own 
unconscious minds, and indeed unlike any of the normal ways we have of acquiring 
knowledge whether of minds or of anything else, namely by inference and/or through 
our five senses. And yet, the possibility of this special kind of self-knowledge cannot 
be denied. I have no doubt for instance that I am now entertaining the thought of 
leaving this room to get a cup of coffee; it does not seem to me that I inferred this 
from any other beliefs of mine or from my behaviour (I was not looking at myself); 
and surely no one else here is better placed than myself to judge that I am entertaining 
this thought. Scepticism is not truly an option,1 and the problem of self-knowledge 
thus not that of explaining whether but how it is that we are able to know a certain 
range of our own thoughts, beliefs, desires and emotions immediately, non- 
inferentially, authoritatively, and in a way that is immune to certain types of error.
In order to solve this problem, we will need to get clearer first about what 
exactly is at issue, in particular by considering the following questions: (1) In what 
sense and to what extent is our knowledge of our own minds immediate, authoritative, 
and not subject to error? (2) What is the exact class of states of which we are able to 
have such knowledge? and (3) What theoretical options are available to us for 
explaining this knowledge? Leaving aside the task of laying out the theoretical 
options available to us until the next chapter, the aim of this introduction will be to 
take on the preliminary task of articulating the problem itself, by considering 
questions (1) and (2) in turn. Thus, to begin with: what are the distinctive features of 
our knowledge of our own minds?
0.1 Immediacy, first-person authority, and immunity to non-cognitive error
1 Even the most extreme o f sceptics is going to have to provide some account o f the distinctiveness o f  our 
knowledge o f  our own minds, perhaps not by explaining how this knowledge can be immediate and authoritative 
as a kind o f knowledge, but at least why it might be so as a matter o f degree by comparison to our knowledge o f  
other things (eg. the minds o f  others, the outside world, etc.). This view, ie. Ryle’s (1966), will be returned to in 
the next chapter.
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0.1.1 Immediacy. Our knowledge of our own mental states is, first of all, 
immediate, at least in that coming to know introspectively1 what we are currently 
thinking or what we believe or what we desire, or indeed in many cases how we feel 
about something, only seems to require that we ask ourselves the question. If I am 
asked for instance whether I am now thinking about my work or instead about what I 
am going to do later on, I only need to consider the matter in order to know which it 
is. That is, I do not seem to need to consult any evidence -  at least not any evidence 
directly regarding my mental states (eg. behavioural evidence, psychological 
evidence, etc).
Having said that, I may in some cases need to consider evidence about how 
the world is, or at any rate I might need to attend to the world, in order to make a 
mental self-ascription. For instance, if asked whether I believe that it is raining, I may 
need to look out the window, that is, I may need to consider whether it is or is not 
raining in order to be able to say whether or not I believe that it is.2 However, if no 
window is in the near vicinity, I am immediately able to say, not having any evidence 
either way (and hence not being prepared to say either that it is or that it is not 
raining), that I have no view on the matter. Similarly, if offered a slice of cake, I may 
first need to take a minute to contemplate the cake I am being offered in order to say 
whether or not I would like some. However, once I become drawn to (or repelled by) 
the cake upon looking at it, I am immediately able to say that I would (or would not) 
like a slice. In other words, once I have formed an attitude towards something, or once 
an object towards which I already had an attitude has come to my attention, no further 
step in most cases seems required for me to be able to say that I have the attitude in 
question towards it. Thus, although considering various facts or objects may be 
needed in order to come to know what mental states we are in, these will generally not 
be, on the face of it, facts about ourselves (ie. psychological or behavioural) but rather 
the facts or objects towards which we have particular attitudes. Admittedly, in many 
such cases, self-ascribing our own mental states will be far from immediate in the 
sense of ‘instantaneous’. For example, if asked whether I like someone, I might need 
to go through a quite lengthy process of deliberation, of recounting and considering
1 ‘Introspectively’ should at this stage just be taken as an intuitive label for ‘in that special way we seem to have o f  
knowing a certain class o f  our own mental states’, whatever this way may in the end turn out to be (eg. a form of  
inference or perception), if  indeed it turns out to be a way o f  knowing at all (cf. constitutive accounts o f self- 
knowledge).
2 See (Evans 1982, chapter 7, especially p.225)
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various factors about this person’s recent behaviour and personality. Even here 
though, the process of self-ascription would remain unmediated by any explicit 
consideration of myself or of my mental states.
In other words, in many cases of self-knowledge, ie. in the most puzzling 
cases (here referred to as the ‘introspective’ cases) our knowledge is, if not 
instantaneous, nonetheless somehow direct, in that we do not seem to need to consult 
any evidence explicitly about ourselves or our states of mind in order to know what 
states of mind we are in. Instead, we effect a direct move from contemplating the 
objects (loosely speaking)1 towards which we have (or may have) an attitude, to the 
conviction that we do or do not have that attitude towards them. No intermediate step, 
that is, seems required between our attending to a particular aspect of the world 
towards which we have an attitude, and our being able to say whether we do or do not 
have that attitude.
Before moving on to the second distinctive feature of our knowledge of our 
own minds, it should be noted here that from this direct and non-inferential character 
of our introspective judgements it does not follow that these judgements are 
necessarily epistemically ungrounded or baseless. A judgement or a belief can in fact 
be both non-inferred from any other state yet rationally based on one. This may for 
instance be the case of our ordinary perceptual beliefs. My perceptual belief that there 
is a table in front of me is not inferred from my perceptual awareness of it, but may 
nonetheless be thought of as epistemically based on this state of awareness. My 
perceptual experience of the table may constitute the evidence on which my belief is 
based, and may thus in this sense be said to constitute a reason for my believing or 
judging that there is a table in front of me, although my coming to this belief on that 
basis involved no process of inference. Put differently, as I did not reason my way to 
this belief (ie. I did not come to it by way of any argument) it might make no sense to 
ask me to defend my belief that there is a table in front of me, yet this belief would 
still not be, from within my perspective on the world, rationally ungrounded. The 
mere fact therefore that our introspective judgements about our own thoughts, beliefs, 
desires, etc. are not the result of an inference from explicit premises regarding our 
mental states, and therefore may not admit of nor require any defence, cannot be taken 
in itself to count against reason-based approaches to self-knowledge in favour of non
1 For immediate purposes, the objects o f our attitudes can be thought o f as either states o f  affairs, or as states o f 
affairs as described in one way or another, or indeed as actual physical objects, imagined objects, and so on.
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reason-based approaches. Claiming that our introspective self-ascriptions are 
rationally ungrounded (ie. not based on any evidence at all) is something that would 
require further argument.
0.1.2 First-person authority. Turning now to the second distinctive feature of 
our knowledge of our own minds, it is often noted that we also stand in a position of 
authority with respect to the contents of our own minds, that is, that we are somehow 
better placed (or at least significantly differently placed) than other people, to say 
what mental states we are in.
Yet, at the same time, our judgements about our own states of mind are neither 
infallible nor it seems incorrigible. Both minor mistakes and complete failures to 
know what we believe, desire, fear, etc. are possible, as testified for instance by 
common cases of self-deception. I may discover for example by suddenly catching 
myself behaving in a certain way, or by having this pointed out to me by a friend or 
an analyst (who might here be in a more authoritative position than I am) that I have 
an attitude of which I was completely unaware. More specifically, I may discover, 
say, through noticing my strong reaction at the mention of someone’s name, that I 
have strong feelings towards this person, which I was either completely unaware of 
having (never having even considered the matter), or which I downright believed I 
didn’t have, and hence had been self-deceived about. In yet other cases, I might 
misjudge my own attitudes as a result of some form of irrationality, or simply as a 
result of a failure to fully grasp the concepts I am using, or indeed on purpose, as in 
cases of lying. Our knowledge of our mental states is thus clearly neither infallible nor 
incorrigible, nor indeed always first-person authoritative. Mismatches between our 
first-order states and our second-order judgements are both possible and frequent. It 
still remains though that in some cases -  those of interest to us here -  we do seem to 
stand in a position of authority with respect to the contents of our own minds. This 
phenomenon will therefore still need to be explained. For example, if the thought is 
now occurring to me that space is not Euclidean, I seem to be far better placed to 
know that this thought is occurring to me than anyone else around me, no matter how 
attentive they might be to my behaviour. Or, suppose that I am consumed with anger 
at the person I am talking to, and, suppose additionally that I am quite good at 
controlling my outward behaviour. The person I am talking to might in such a 
situation be completely unable to tell that I am angry at them, while it would remain
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entirely obvious to me. What might explain this? How should we understand this 
position of authority we seem to stand in with respect to certain contents of our own 
mind? In what sense, that is, or in virtue of what, might our knowledge of our own 
mental states be in some cases first-person authoritative?
What the fallibility of our mental self-ascriptions suggests is that the 
authoritative character of our introspective judgements cannot be a feature of these 
judgements considered merely as such, that is, considered just as particular kinds of 
judgements or statements -  ie. as statements with either a certain form (the self- 
ascriptive form) or with a particular type of subject matter (ie. our mental states). 
Given that a self-ascriptive judgement with the same form and content (eg. 41 dislike 
Jones’) can in some instances be authoritative (eg. when based directly on my 
contemplating Jones’s character) and in other instances not be authoritative (eg. when 
reached inferentially on the basis of my having observed my own hostile behaviour 
towards Jones), the authoritative character of those of our self-ascriptive judgements 
that are authoritative, can clearly not arise out of their form and content alone, but 
must arise instead out of the particular way in which they, but not other self-ascriptive 
judgements with the same form and content, were reached.1 Put differently, given the 
possibility and indeed existence of both authoritative and non authoritative 
judgements about our own minds, there can be nothing about self-ascriptive 
judgements in general that makes them authoritative. Rather, there must be something 
distinctive about the way in which some of them are arrived at -  unlike, say, 
judgements of the form 4I am hereby thinking that p’ which might count as 
authoritative simply in virtue of their self-verifying form. Our non cogito-like 
judgements about our own conscious states however, if authoritative, must it seems be 
so in virtue of being made on a certain special basis, or reached in a certain special 
way not available to others.
0.1.3. Immunity to non-cognitive error. Finally, the third often noted 
distinctive feature of our introspective judgements is that they are, though not 
infallible (even when authoritative), nonetheless immune to certain kinds of errors, in 
particular non-cognitive errors, or as Burge puts i t 4brute’ errors -  ie. errors not due to
1 For this kind o f line o f attack on the idea o f the incorrigibility o f a judgement considered as such, discussed 
though specifically in relation to perceptual judgements, see (Austin 1962, lecture 10)
11
any kind of cognitive deficiency (eg. irrationality, division of the mind, confusion, 
etc.) or conceptual deficiency (ie. the misapplication or incomplete grasp of a 
concept).1 If I am consciously thinking to myself ‘My keys are on the table’ for 
example, I cannot it seems fail to know that I am thinking this. That is, if I consider 
the matter, I can first of all not fail to know that a thought is occurring to me, nor can I 
mistake this occurrent thought that my keys are on the table for, say, an occurrent 
thought that there is a book on the floor. In fact, if in these circumstances I were to 
assert ‘My keys are on the table but I do not believe that they are’, or if I were to 
believe that I am thinking about a book being on the floor when in fact I am thinking 
about my keys being on the table, there would seem to be reason to question either my 
rationality or my understanding of the terms I am using or my sincerity. There would 
not however seem to be any reason to question my rationality or conceptual 
competence if I were to say ‘My keys are on the table but Jones does not believe that 
they are’, or if I were to judge that Jones is thinking about a book being on the floor 
when she is in fact thinking about a set of keys being on the table (I may just not be 
very good at interpreting people). In other words, there appears to be a certain range 
of our own thoughts and other attitudes about which we cannot, without irrationality 
or misunderstanding, be mistaken about whereas we can be so mistaken about the 
attitudes of others, and indeed even about a certain range of our own attitudes (ie. our 
unconscious ones -  in the Freudian sense).
Why this is so however may initially seem somewhat mysterious, as is perhaps 
best illustrated by Moore’s paradox. If we hear someone make a statement of the 
form ‘p, but I do not believe that p’ or ‘I believe that p, but not-p’, we tend to feel that 
the person in question is somehow contradicting themselves, even though, on the face 
of it, their utterance does not have the form of a straightforward contradiction -  ie. ‘p, 
but not-p’. Similarly, though perhaps even more puzzlingly, upon hearing someone 
say something like ‘That chocolate cake is calling my name, but I do not want any’ 
(ie. upon hearing them express a desire; yet deny that they have the desire just 
expressed), or upon hearing them self-ascribe a desire by saying ‘I would love some 
of that cake’ while at the same time looking at it with disgust and perhaps exclaiming 
‘yuk!’ (directly expressing lack of desire for the cake), we would probably also tend
1 See (Burge 1996)
2 See (Moore 1942, pp.540-543 and 1944, p.204)
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to feel that the speaker was either somehow contradicting themselves, or being 
irrational, or caught up in a conflict of desires -  the desire for cake on the one hand 
and the desire not to eat it on the other. Formally however, again, no contradiction or 
conflict of any kind would be involved. How then are we to make sense of the strong 
intuition we nonetheless have that some kind of conflict or contradiction is involved 
in such cases? The sense we have that Moorean utterances (and by extension cases 
such as the above, involving the expression of a desire/emotion followed by the denial 
that one has the desire/emotion just expressed) involve some kind of contradiction, 
appears to be just another side of our earlier sense that our judgements about our own 
states of mind, whereas not our judgements about the states of mind of others, are 
immune to non-cognitive error. If someone misjudges what mental states they have, 
there must be, we feel, something cognitively wrong with them. A strong desideratum 
therefore on any satisfactory theory of introspective self-knowledge, or of second- 
order judgement, will be that it be able to account for this phenomenon -  ie. either by 
solving Moore’s paradox (ie. showing the above statements to amount to formal 
contradictions), or by explaining how/in virtue of what our introspective judgements 
might be immune to non-cognitive error.
Having said that, brute error does seem to be possible in some cases of mental 
self-ascription -  eg. in cases of the self-ascription of unconscious states. Our 
judgements about our own unconscious states are generally arrived at inferentially 
from observations of our own behaviour, which seems to leave wide open the 
possibility of error not due to any cognitive deficiency, but, say, simply due to a 
failure to notice some crucial aspect of our own behaviour, or perhaps due to a failure 
to correctly interpret the behaviour observed. How should such cases be fitted into our 
picture of our introspective judgements as being immune to non-cognitive error?
There are, it seems, two possible ways of doing this. On the one hand, one 
could argue that the phenomenon of Freudian unconsciousness is a cognitive 
deficiency, and thus that although brute error seems to be possible when self-ascribing 
an unconscious state, this is only because the cognitive breakdown (ie. a division of 
the mind) ultimately underlying this possibility has not been taken into account. On 
the other hand, given that strictly speaking errors of misperception (or of 
misinterpretation -  say, due to the application of an erroneous psychological theory) 
of one’s own behaviour are not themselves cognitive errors, one might want to grant 
instead that some mental self-ascriptions are indeed not immune to non-cognitive
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error, but point out that this still does not show our introspectively-based judgements 
not to be so immune. In fact the possibility of brute error when self-ascribing an 
unconscious state (ie. on the basis of inference from observation) only seems to 
confirm a point made earlier on: that the special status of some of our second-order 
judgements (ie. as immediate, first-person authoritative, and immune to non-cognitive 
error) should not be thought of as holding in virtue of some special feature of our 
second-order judgements considered as such (that is, as judgements with a particular 
form and/or content), but in virtue of the special basis, or special way in which they, 
but not other second-order judgements with the same form and content were reached. 
It is only because we are not able to come to judgements about our own unconscious 
states in any such special way that we have to resort, when self-ascribing these states, 
to ways of knowing (eg. inference from observation) that are not immune to non- 
cognitive error. Our ‘introspectively’ based judgements remain however so immune, 
and the problem of introspective self-knowledge is confirmed again to be that of 
identifying not some special feature of our second-order judgements, but some special 
way we have of knowing certain contents of our own minds. Before trying to identify 
what this special way of knowing might be however, one further preliminary question 
remains: what is the exact class of states of which we are able to have such 
knowledge?
0.2 Conscious, non-conscious, and unconscious mental states
The discussion so far has revealed that we are only able to know a restricted 
class of our own mental states in a way that is immediate, authoritative, and immune 
to non-cognitive error. Most obviously, this class appears to include our occurrent 
conscious states or phenomenally conscious states,1 that is, our perceptual experiences 
(visual, auditory, etc.), occurrent thoughts (ie. acts of ‘thinking to ourselves in words’ 
or perhaps in images), conscious processes of reasoning, acts of assent, pangs of 
desire, episodes of emotion, episodes of visualization, etc. -  in other words states that
1 This term is introduced by Block in (Block 1995) where he distinguishes ‘phenomenal consciousness’ from 
‘access consciousness’. Though I will not be dividing mental states up quite in the same way as Block does, I will 
to some extent be borrowing his term ‘phenomenal consciousness’ in order to speak o f mental states which, 
amongst other things, there is ‘something it is like’ for us to be in (see Nagel 1974).
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are occupying our attention, or the objects of which are somehow present to our 
attentive minds.1
Less obviously, we also seem to be able to know immediately, authoritatively, 
and in a way that is immune to non-cognitive error a wide range of our «on-occurrent, 
not phenomenally conscious, dispositional states, such as our ordinary beliefs (eg. the 
belief that my name is Isabella), desires (eg. to have a good life), and standing 
emotional states (eg. love for our family, dislike of a particular person, fear of spiders, 
etc.). Despite their differences with our phenomenally conscious states, these states 
can it seems still be thought of as conscious in the Freudian sense. They are, we might 
say, How-conscious but not wwconscious, in that although not occurrent, they are 
nonetheless rationally integrated with the rest of our mental states, both conscious and 
non-conscious. They dispose us, that is, to behave in ways that make sense to us from 
our phenomenally conscious point of view, as well as from the point of view of our 
other non-conscious (but not wwconscious) beliefs, desires and emotions. Moreover, 
although again not themselves conscious episodes, they can (and often do) come to 
manifest themselves in such episodes upon our merely turning our attention to their 
objects. My underlying fear of spiders for instance might come to manifest itself in 
my perceptual experience of a particular spider upon encountering it -  eg. in this 
spider’s coming to strike me as to be avoided? Or, your underlying belief that London 
is the capital of the United Kingdom might come to manifest itself in this 
proposition’s (ie. that London is the capital of the UK) coming to strike you as true 
upon your contemplating it in thought.
The states we are able to know in a special immediate, authoritative way thus 
appear to be unified in essentially two ways: (1) in their forming together a causally 
and rationally integrated point of view on the world; and (2) in being, if not 
themselves conscious episodes, states that can nonetheless come to manifest 
themselves in such episodes simply upon our turning our attention to their objects. 
Importantly, we have seen that in the case of our non-conscious dispositional states,
1 I have left out mention o f sensations, essentially on the grounds that the correctness o f an account o f our 
knowledge o f our own sensations will vary greatly with what account one chooses to adopt o f the nature o f  
sensations themselves (ie. as mere phenomenal feels, as perceptual experiences o f one’s body, or indeed as some 
kind o f  world-directed states, etc.). Providing a full account o f the nature o f bodily sensations being beyond the 
scope o f this thesis, the focus here will be only on our knowledge o f  our world-directed states, o f which one may 
or may not want to think o f  sensations as constituting a part.
2 How exactly we should understand the manifestation o f emotions (or for that matter beliefs and desires) in first- 
order consciousness will be addressed in more detail as we proceed, and in particular in the third part o f this thesis.
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they must come to manifest themselves in such phenomenally conscious episodes (or 
we must at least turn our attention, be it in thought, perception, or imagination, to 
their objects) if we are to access them in any special, non-inferential, authoritative 
way. All the examples considered so far in fact seem to suggest that it is only via our 
attending to the objects of our non-conscious beliefs, desires, and emotions (and thus 
via some occurrent episode of perception, thought, imagination) that we are able to 
come to self-ascribe these states with authority. If asked whether you believe that 
London is the capital of the UK, or if asked whether you would like a slice of cake, or 
whether you are in love with someone, you will at the very least have to turn your 
attention to British geography, to the cake you are being offered, and to the person in 
question, in order to be able to say whether you do (or do not) have these mental 
states. On the face of it therefore, and for reasons that will of course need to be 
explained in what follows, the primary objects of our introspective awareness seem to 
be our occurrent conscious states, and only through having such states are we able to 
come to know our wow-occurrent conscious states in a similarly special way.
In contrast to both of these types of states however (ie. conscious and non- 
conscious, or occurrent and non-occurrent) we also have states that are wwconscious in 
the Freudian sense. These are states that are completely inaccessible to us except in 
the non-authoritative ways in which the states of others are accessible to us, and 
which moreover, in sharp contrast again to the states so far considered, are neither 
rationally integrated with any other of our mental states (whether conscious, non- 
conscious or indeed wwconscious), nor capable of manifesting themselves in our 
occurrent experiences, thoughts, etc. upon our simply turning our attention to their 
objects. Suppose that I have a repressed feeling of resentment towards Mary for 
example (this feeling being repressed, say, because I feel guilty about feeling 
resentment). Upon turning my attention to Mary, I will in all likelihood not view her 
any differently (eg. as ‘to be blamed’, as ‘to be hit’, etc.) than I would if I had no 
unconscious negative feelings towards her. Or, suppose that I unconsciously believe 
that the butler committed the murder (this belief being repressed, say, because the 
butler is a good friend of mine, whom I would hate to think of as a murderer). Again, 
upon considering whether the butler did it, I would probably tend to feel that he did 
not, and may also be inclined not to view the available evidence as actually 
incriminating him. My desire not to think of my friend as a murderer might in fact 
have so transformed my view of the situation that I might find myself reading every
16
piece of evidence as, say, part of a plot to falsely incriminate the butler. Deep down 
however (ie. unconsciously) I may still believe that he did it, as would be manifest, if 
not in my conscious grasp of the situation, nonetheless in my outward behaviour. In 
order to come to know that I unconsciously believe that the butler did it therefore, or 
that I have a repressed grudge against Mary, I would have to pay attention primarily 
to any unusual patterns of behaviour that I might be exhibiting, or to any other 
potential outward manifestations of resentment (towards Mary) or of suspicion (about 
the butler) that might reveal to me that I have these states -  eg. particular facial 
expressions, verbal slips, and so on. Turning my attention to the butler or to Mary or 
to any facts surrounding them alone would not be enough. Moreover, even when 
finally uncovered, such unconscious states would still stand apart from my conscious 
and non-conscious states, in that they would still remain somehow alien to me in the 
way that other people’s states remain alien to us even when known -  ie. in our still 
being unable to directly control or influence them through reasoning alone.
With these contrasts in mind between conscious/ non-conscious/ and 
unconscious mental states, together with a clearer understanding of the senses in 
which our introspectively based judgements can be said to be immediate, authoritative 
and not subject to error, we are now equipped to move on to ask and address the more 
substantial question with which we started and which is to guide much of the rest of 
this investigation: what is this special ‘introspective’ way we have of knowing certain 
contents of our own minds? Or, more precisely: how is immediate, authoritative, 
immune to non-cognitive error knowledge of our own conscious/non-conscious minds 
possible?
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Chapter 1: Inference and inner sense
The recent literature on self-knowledge divides the theoretical options 
available to us as follows:1 we must either know the contents of our own minds 
inferentially from observing our own behaviour, or we must do so directly 
observationally through some form of ‘inner sense’, or we must do so not in any way 
or on any special epistemic basis, but rather in virtue of the holding of some 
essentially constitutive link between our first-order conscious states and our second- 
order self-ascriptive judgements.
In the next two chapters, the aim will be to review these three standard 
theoretical options in their various forms, to consider their many virtues, yet 
ultimately to argue that none of them succeeds in the end in providing a fully 
satisfactory account of the kind of knowledge we actually have of our conscious 
states, that is, a kind of knowledge that exhibits all three of the distinctive features just 
discussed in the introductory chapter, and understood in the ways there specified. 
Having said that, a close examination of both the virtues of these three approaches 
and of the specific ways in which each of them fails, will prove invaluable in the path 
towards a more plausible account, not just by narrowing down the options (and 
revealing that the three standard ones are not in fact exhaustive), but also by bringing 
out more clearly the desiderata that any satisfactory theory of self-knowledge will 
have to fulfil, and in the end, we will see, by actually revealing to us the very kind of 
account that will be able to do so.
Taking therefore these three standard approaches in turn, the first two (ie. 
inferential and ‘inner sense’ models) will be examined in the present chapter, leaving
1 See for instance (Boghossian 1989)
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the complexities of third (constitutive accounts) to be examined in the next. So, to 
begin with: why might one want to think that our knowledge of our mental states is 
based on inference from observation of our behaviour?
1.1 Self-knowledge by inference
Clearly, we do sometimes come to know our own mental states on the basis of 
inference from observation of our behavioural patterns, much in the same way as (it is 
often assumed) we come to know the mental states of others. This is so in particular 
when coming to know our repressed or otherwise unconscious beliefs, desires and 
emotions. The important question for present purposes though is that of whether this 
might be how we come to know our own mental states in all cases, that is, even in 
those cases where no inferential process seems to be involved or where we do not 
seem to consult any behavioural evidence regarding our mental states in order to come 
to know that we have them.
According to Ryle,1 inference from observation of our behaviour is how we 
come to know our own mental states even in the so called ‘introspective’ cases -  eg. 
when self-ascribing an occurrent experience of a table, a simple thought about the 
weather, a desire for coffee, a feeling of irritation towards someone blocking our view 
at the cinema, and so on. If such an account is to be plausible though, it of course has 
to come with an explanation of why, if we do not in fact come to know our own 
mental states in any fundamentally different way from the way in which we come to 
know the mental states of others, it nonetheless seems to us that we do. Ryle explains 
this as follows. He acknowledges that there is a difference between our knowledge of 
our own mental states and our knowledge of the mental states of others, but, he 
suggests, it is a difference only in degree (ie. in how well we know our own mental 
states) not in kind (ie. in the way in which we know them). It is then this difference in 
degree, he suggests, that creates the illusion of a difference in kind. More specifically, 
the idea is that since we have observed our own behaviour for far longer and far more 
closely than we have anyone else’s, we have become far quicker at recognizing 
patterns in what we do and say (creating the illusion of immediacy), far more accurate 
in our interpretation of these patterns (creating the illusion of immunity to error), and
1 (Ryle 1966)
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ultimately therefore on the whole more authoritative in our judgements about the 
contents of our own minds than in our judgements about the contents of the minds of 
others.
In other words, we are not on this view able to know our own mental states in 
any special way that is not available to others; but rather, given our greater proximity 
and familiarity with our own patterns of behaviour, we tend to be much faster, more 
skilled, and ultimately therefore more accurate in our deployment of the one way of 
knowing available to us (ie. inference from observation of our behavioural patterns) 
when applied to ourselves than when applied to others.
This account clearly has a number of advantages: it is simple, it is able to 
dispel the air of mystery surrounding the process of so called ‘introspection’, and, 
importantly, it is able to accommodate the fallibility of our knowledge of our own 
mental states even in so called ‘introspective’ cases. Despite these advantages though, 
it is ultimately unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.
For one thing, we are often able to know our own mental states even when no 
behavioural evidence is available to us for interpretation, let alone actually consulted. 
I am for instance clearly able to know that I am now thinking that there are nine 
planets in the solar system, or that I would like a cappuccino and a ham sandwich, 
although I am merely sitting at my desk, displaying no behaviour from which I could 
possibly infer that I have either of these mental states. In fact what kind of behaviour 
would that have to be? In most cases, the only behaviour that could possibly be fine­
grained enough to allow us to know with precision what mental states we are in is 
verbal behaviour, yet clearly we are able to know much of what we believe, desire 
and feel, even when we are silent.
Secondly, this type of approach to self-knowledge leaves us without any clear 
explanation of why in some cases we are actually not authoritative in our judgements 
about the contents of our own minds although we have plenty of behavioural evidence 
available to us for interpretation. How is it, for instance, that although I may be 
behaving in a consistently hostile manner towards a colleague, I might not believe that 
I have any negative feelings towards them, while someone else, having observed me 
for far less than I have myself, would immediately be able to tell that I do not like this 
person? This cannot have to do with my not exhibiting sufficiently fine grained 
behaviour from which I could infer that I had this attitude, since by hypothesis, I am 
behaving in a manner consistently suggestive of my having the attitude in question.
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In other words, in a number of cases, the authoritative or non authoritative 
character of our mental self-ascriptions appears to be entirely unrelated to the amount 
of behavioural evidence available to us for interpretation, let alone to our actual 
engagement or not in a process of inference from this behavioural evidence. 
Interestingly in fact, given the objections just raised, Ryle’s suggestion that we engage 
in a process specifically of inference from observation of our behavioural patterns 
appears to be the least of his problems. The more fundamental problem with Ryle’s 
view lies instead in his claim that observation of externally available behavioural 
evidence is required for self-knowledge -  whether as the starting point of a process of 
inference, or as, say, a more direct ground for self-knowledge.
To make this latter point clearer, consider one of the background assumptions 
of Ryle’s denial of a first-person/third-person asymmetry between our way of 
knowing our own minds and our way of knowing the minds of others: the assumption 
that, at the very least, our knowledge of other minds is based on inference from 
observation of their behaviour. But, is this so? Do we not (sometimes at least) come to 
know the mental states of others far more directly than that? One could it seems argue 
that although knowing the mental states of others requires observing their behaviour, 
it does not require engaging in any process of inference from these observations. 
Upon seeing someone smile for instance, we do not refer back to any beliefs we might 
have about the likely causal connection between smiling (physicalistically described) 
and being happy. Rather, we seem to perceive their smiling directly as suggestive or 
as expressive of their being happy, or perhaps even more strongly, directly as 
meaning that they are happy. People just look happy to us. Some forms of behaviour 
just seem to have come (be it through observed constant association, cultural 
conditioning, or as a result of innate hard-wiring) to immediately evoke, mean, or 
designate directly (ie. not by way of any additional assumption about their causal 
origin) certain types of mental states or indeed that someone has these mental states. 
The move from perceiving the behaviour of others to attributing mental states to them 
on that basis in other words may be a distinctively non-inferential one.1
Now, perhaps one could argue that our knowledge of our own mental states is 
also non-inferential in this way -  ie. is arrived at not on the basis of inference from
11 am sympathetic to this view o f  our knowledge o f  other minds and will return to it in further detail later on in the 
thesis in the context o f discussing our knowledge o f our own/others’ emotions. For more on this, see Chapter 7 
below.
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observing our own behaviour but directly on the basis observing our own behaviour, 
already mentalistically grasped. Although this may initially appear to be a more 
plausible view than Ryle’s original inferential one, it does not seem to be sufficiently 
different from Ryle’s proposal to escape the difficulties raised earlier on. In fact, in 
adopting this ‘new and improved’ version of a Rylean model, we would still be 
retaining the most problematic of Ryle’s claims, namely the claim that we come to 
know our own mental states essentially on the basis of observing our own behaviour 
(even if perhaps more directly than Ryle thought) and that we therefore do not come 
to know our own mental states in any special way not available to others (though we 
may well be better at directly ‘reading off our own mental states from our own 
behaviour than the mental states of others from their behaviour). This, we have seen is 
problematic in that it leaves entirely unexplained (a) how, in numerous cases, we are 
able to know our own mental states with great accuracy despite clear lack of sufficient 
(if indeed any) behavioural evidence available to us -  whether to be directly ‘read’ or 
as the starting point of a process of inference -  and (b) why, in other cases, despite the 
abundance of behavioural evidence available to us, we are not authoritative in our 
judgements about our own minds (cases of ‘denial’ or self-deception).
Leaving aside therefore any account of self-knowledge according to which 
coming to know our own mental states requires, in one way or another, observing our 
own behaviour, let us turn to consider instead the more plausible suggestion that we 
might come to know our own mental states not on the basis of observing our own 
behaviour with the use of our external senses, but directly on the basis of observing 
our mental states through some form of inner sense or ‘perceptual self-scanning 
mechanism’
1.2 Self-knowledge through inner perception9
The etymology of the term ‘introspection’ certainly suggests that, when 
‘introspecting’ we are aware of our own mental states through some form of ‘inner 
perception’. To ‘introspect’ is in some sense to Took inside’. But, one might ask, in 
what sense? The verbs ‘to perceive’ and ‘to see’ are pre-theoretically used in a variety 
of ways, in particular to mean quite generally to ‘know’ or to ‘understand’, as when 
speaking of ‘seeing’ the truth of a mathematical proposition, or ‘seeing’ what 
someone means. Similarly, to Took’ may be used to mean ‘to consider’ or ‘to think
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about’, as when saying that one is ‘looking into some matter’. In its modem 
theoretical sense however, ‘perception’ refers fundamentally to external sense 
perception. Speaking therefore of ‘introspection’ in the theoretical context of 
philosophy can be seen to establish a (possibly false) analogy between so called ‘inner 
perception’ and external sense-perception, or between the knowledge we have of the 
contents of our own mind on the one hand and the knowledge we have of that which 
lies outside it, through sense perception, on the other. Asking whether this analogy is 
legitimate, is indeed the real philosophical question about whether or not introspective 
self-knowledge can be said to be perceptual, and will accordingly be our guiding 
question in this section.
The question before us is thus this: does our knowledge of our own mental 
states have the features distinctive of the kind of knowledge we have of the world, or 
even of ourselves, through sense-perception? In fact, what are the essential features of 
sense perception and of the knowledge we thereby gain? The discussion here will 
proceed in two stages. First, the question of whether the analogy between 
introspection and perception holds will be considered purely from the point of view of 
the first-person phenomenology of these two ways of knowing (introspection and 
external sense perception). From this perspective, it will be suggested that they do 
indeed have important features in common, giving the analogy between them an 
initial appearance of overwhelming intuitive plausibility. Then, the question of what 
more precisely is to be understood by ‘perception’ in this context will be turned to, 
that is, the question of what features of the kind of knowledge we gain through 
external sense-perception are essential to its qualifying as distinctively ‘perceptual’, 
and are therefore those to which introspective self-knowledge must conform if the 
analogy with perceptual knowledge is to have any content. On a number of these 
points, it will be argued that the analogy actually fails, some of which, it will be seen, 
are only damaging to some versions of the perceptual approach to self-knowledge, 
and others ultimately fatal to any perceptual account of self-knowledge.
Thus, in brief, the discussion here will be guided by the three following 
questions: (1) Why might one be initially drawn to thinking of introspective self- 
knowledge as perceptual? (2) What features must our knowledge of our own mental 
states in fact have if it is to properly count as perceptual? And finally, (3) does our 
knowledge of our own conscious mental states actually have these features? In the 
end, it will be argued that it does not, and that our knowledge of our own mental
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states through so called ‘introspection’ is in certain very distinctive ways wow- 
perceptual.
1.2.1 Starting from the purely phenomenological point of view, introspective 
self-knowledge appears to bear a number of striking similarities to perceptual 
knowledge.
To begin with, just like our knowledge of the world through sense perception, 
our knowledge of our own mental states is immediate and non-inferential.
Next, our judgements about our own conscious states appear to be, like our 
perceptual judgements about the world, somehow rationally grounded despite not 
resulting from inference. We do not, that is, seem to just ‘find ourselves’ in certain 
circumstances with a sudden impulse to self-ascribe a particular mental state. Rather, 
when self-ascribing a conscious attitude (or a consciously manifested attitude, in the 
case of dispositional states), our doing so appears to make rational sense to us from 
within our own first-person self-ascribing perspective.
Moreover, not only do we seem to make our judgements about our first-order 
conscious states on the basis of some sort of rational grounds, but we seem to do so 
specifically on the basis of some kind of awareness we have of ourselves as being in 
these states. For example, I might be thinking to myself ‘it is a nice day’ or ‘I should 
get some work done’, or I might be engaged in some process of reasoning about how 
to resolve some practical problem, etc., when suddenly, it occurs to me that I am 
thinking these thoughts or engaged in this process of reasoning (eg. I might just 
suddenly ‘catch’ myself in the act,1 or actually turn to consider the question of what 
mental states I am in). Interestingly, when this happens, the information that we are 
thinking such and such does not usually strike us as a surprise. We tend to feel instead 
that we were somehow aware all along of ourselves having these thoughts or trying to 
resolve some practical problem; we were just not explicitly thinking about the fact 
that we were. Put differently, we do not generally feel that we just come up with our 
beliefs about what we are thinking, experiencing, feeling, etc. from nowhere. Rather, 
these beliefs seem to us to be based on our being (or having been) aware of ourselves 
as having the attitudes in question at the time of attending to their objects.
1 See (Boghossian 1989, p.l 1)
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Importantly, we not only seem to base our judgements about what we are 
currently thinking, feeling, etc., on some sort of awareness we have of ourselves as 
doing so, but we also seem to base our judgements about what we were just a moment 
ago (or much longer ago) thinking or doing or feeling, etc., on this same kind of 
awareness we then had of ourselves as being in these states. I may for example 
remember being engaged in a conversation with someone, or I may remember 
thinking that p, or being angry at X, although at the time I was not thinking about 
myself at all, but only about the topic of the conversation I was engaged in, or about 
the possibility that p might be the case, or about person X. In retrospect however, I 
may feel that I can immediately and authoritatively state what I was thinking, feeling, 
or doing at the time because I remember thinking, feeling, doing so, much in the way 
that I might later remember there being a green car parked outside my front door, 
although at the time I was not thinking about the car being there. I was however 
perceptually aware of the car, and, similarly it seems, at the time of conversing with 
my friend, or thinking that p, or feeling angry at someone, I was also (or so it 
intuitively seems) in some sense aware of myself as doing so/being so.
In sum, there appears to be on the face of it more to the idea that our 
knowledge of our own mental states is perceptual than a mere ambiguity in the verbs 
‘to look’ and ‘to see’. Having said that, appealing to a perceptual account of self- 
knowledge may not be the only possible way of explaining the above 
phenomenological features. It will in fact be suggested in chapter 4 that there is 
another way in which this might be done. It remains though that close attention to the 
phenomenology of mental self-ascription, ie. to our first-person subjective standpoint 
as self-knowers, is essential to fully understanding the phenomenon of introspection. 
Any account therefore that turns out not to be able to explain or otherwise 
accommodate the above considerations, ought, at best, to be regarded with some 
scepticism. In this respect therefore, perceptual approaches to self-knowledge 
certainly have at least one strong intuitive advantage. This however, is by no means 
sufficient for drawing the conclusion that introspective self-knowledge is, in fact, a 
form of perceptual knowledge. Other crucial criteria need to be met.
1.2.2 Amongst the may distinctive features of our knowledge of the world 
through sense perception, the following seem to be some of the most essential, and 
potentially most threatening to the analogy between perception and introspection.
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(1) First, it is sometimes claimed that perceptual beliefs are beliefs only about 
the intrinsic, non-relational properties of that which they are about, or at least that this 
is so when that which they bear a relation to is not also being perceived or otherwise 
known. To borrow an example from Boghossian, we can tell, by merely looking at a 
coin, that it is of a certain size, has a certain shape, is made of a certain type of metal, 
has a certain colour, etc. but cannot for instance tell what monetary value it has.1 This 
knowledge needs to be inferred from some other information about how the coin’s 
intrinsic features relate to the possession of monetary value. Or, to borrow an example 
from Davidson, we cannot tell just by inspecting a bum on someone’s skin whether or 
not it is a sw^bum.2
Following on this idea, a recent objection against perceptual accounts of self- 
knowledge has it that we cannot possibly know the contents of our own minds 
perceptually, since, given a plausible extemalism about mental content, the contents 
of our world-directed attitudes are not intrinsic, non-relational properties of these 
states. In immediate response to this however one might point out that this objection 
assumes both a very narrow conception of what an attitude is, and a very narrow 
conception of what ‘inner sense’ might be. It assumes first of all that a mental attitude 
is an internal state of a person that happens to also have certain relational ‘content’ 
properties, rather than something that is intrinsically a relation to the world, and 
therefore the content properties of which could, conceivably, be perceived. Secondly, 
it assumes that ‘inner sense’ is necessarily to be thought of as ‘inner’ in the sense of 
being directed inward towards our heads, rather than inward towards our perspective, 
a perspective that may also be thought of as ‘reaching out into the world’.4 If looked 
at in this way, the relational nature of our attitudes need not it seems pose any 
imminent threat to the conception of self-knowledge as perceptual.5 A different
1 (Boghossian 1989, p. 16)
2 (Davidson 1986)
3 See for instance (Shoemaker 1996) and (Boghossian 1989)
4 Shoemaker considers, in a footnote (1996, p.212), the idea that ‘instead o f thinking o f a belief as something 
internal to the person, and its contents as constituted by its relations to other things, one could think o f it as 
‘reaching out into the world” . However, he then dismisses the thought that this might make inner sense models 
more plausible, because, it seems, he continues to assume that ‘inner sense’ is ‘inner’ in the sense o f  being directed 
inward towards our heads, that is, that ‘inner sense’ must be a way o f seeing internal states o f a person -  he writes 
‘...how  could inner sense reach out into the environment?’ Why, one might reply, could it not?
5 The more serious threat thought to be posed by extemalism is not one that applies restrictedly to perceptual 
accounts, but to the authoritativeness o f self-knowledge in general -  thereby motivating Rylian types o f  positions.
I will not be going into this issue here, essentially because, in agreement with (Burge 1988; 1996), I take the issue
26
feature of perception, however, that does seem to make the analogy with introspection 
somewhat more problematic, is the following:
(2) In perceptual knowledge, there is, one might argue, always an intermediate 
perceptual state, or sense-impression (visual, auditory, proprioceptive, etc.) distinct 
from the perceptual belief or knowledge it gives rise to, as well as distinct from the 
object of perception that causes it.1 My perceptual belief that there is a cup of coffee 
in front of me, for instance, is based on my being perceptually aware (through sight, 
and perhaps also smell) of there being a cup of coffee in front of me. My awareness of 
the coffee, is in turn somehow caused (let us assume) by the presence of the object. 
Similarly, my knowledge through proprioception that I am leaning forward rather than 
standing upright, is based on a distinctive sensation (a sense of a particular kind of 
imbalance; an impression of leaning forward), that is itself somehow caused by my 
body’s being in a certain position. In other words, in both proprioception and more 
straightforward cases of external sense-perception, our perceptual beliefs seem to 
always be based on some intermediate informational state of awareness of that which 
they are about, distinct both from our belief and from their object. One might in fact 
argue that there must be such a distinction if such things as the possibility of 
misperception and the possibility of disbelief in one’s senses are to be accommodated. 
Insofar as it is possible to disbelieve one’s own senses, ie. to see something without 
believing it, one’s beliefs and one’s sense experiences cannot possibly be one and the 
same state; they must be distinct. Likewise, given the possibility of misperception (eg. 
the brute misidentification of an object, or the misperception of some of its 
properties), one’s perceptual experiences and the objects thereby perceived must also 
be distinct. No mismatch between them would otherwise be possible.
But now, if this is an essential feature of perceptual knowledge, we have here 
an important point of dis-analogy between perceptual knowledge and introspective
o f extemalism/intemalism about mental content to be somewhat orthogonal to the debate about a certain kind o f  
self-knowledge. Extemalism, it seems to me, may be relevant to questions about whether we are authoritative in 
our knowledge o f  what the meanings o f  our words consist in, but not so much to that o f whether we are 
authoritative in our knowledge o f  what we are thinking, what we believe, how we feel, etc. understood in our own 
terms. In the former sense, we may well not be authoritative, and in the latter sense, although we are authoritative, 
the truth or falsity o f  extemalism is to a great extent irrelevant to this being the case. To take an example, whether 
my term ‘water’ refers to water (H 20) or twater (XYZ) does not take away the fact that I am authoritative in my 
statements o f the form ‘I would like a drink o f  water’, or ‘I am thinking that water is wet’. Whatever my use o f the 
term ‘water’ picks out in my first-order thoughts, etc., this same ‘stuff will be picked out by my use o f the term in 
my second-order judgements.
1 See (Shoemaker 1996, p.205)
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self-knowledge. In self-knowledge, most would agree, and this despite some of the 
phenomenological features mentioned earlier, that there is no separate informational 
state (an experience of our first-order states) in between our first-order states and our 
second-order judgements about them, caused by the former and rationally grounding 
the latter.1
There are however two ways in which one might try to bypass this dis- 
analogy: (a) one might deny that there actually is a dis-analogy with introspection 
here, and argue that our introspective beliefs are based on a kind of experience of our 
conscious states, namely on the ‘phenomenal feels’ or ‘what it is like’ properties 
associated with having them, by which we might be able to ‘sense’ that we have them. 
Or, (b) one might deny that perception actually involves the existence of any 
perceptual states distinct from our perceptual beliefs.
To start with (a), this idea, if correct, would have the great virtue of providing 
us with an account of what it is about an attitude of ours being conscious (or 
consciously manifested in the case of dispositional states) as opposed wwconscious, 
that enables us to know that we have it in a special way in which we are not able to 
know our unconscious attitudes (these not being accompanied by any phenomenal 
feel by which we could sense them). On closer examination though, this view turns 
out to be unsatisfactory for the simple reason that it is not clear at all how there could 
be a recognizable, and sufficiently fine-grained phenomenal feel associated with each 
attitude which could allow us to know that we had it. Consider my present thought 
that space is not Euclidean. This thought would have to always be associated with a 
specific kind of phenomenal feel which would be recognizably the same on each 
occasion in which this thought occurred to me, and which I would recognize even on 
the first occasion on which I thought it. It is not clear at all however that any purely 
phenomenal feel associated with any such complex thought -  let alone with the 
conscious manifestation of a complex underlying desire or emotion (eg. guilt about 
having said X to Y) -  could possibly be focused enough, or fine-grained enough, to 
ground a belief that I have exactly that attitude and no other.
Turning therefore to option (b), on some views of perception, in particular 
Armstrong’s,2 what is central to a beliefs being perceptual is not that there be some
1 See for instance (Shoemaker 1996, p.207) and (Burge 1996, p. 105)
2 (Armstrong 1968)
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intermediate experience between this belief and that which is believed, but simply that 
there exist a reliable, contingent, causal mechanism linking the objects perceived to 
one’s beliefs about them. On this view, perception amounts to nothing more than the 
acquiring of beliefs through a reliable causal mechanism. And, if so, holding a 
perceptual view of self-knowledge does not require being committed to the existence 
of separate phenomenal experiences of our conscious states on which our 
introspective beliefs could be rationally based. Armstrong himself in fact holds such a 
reliabilist view of self-knowledge (in addition to holding a reliabilist view of 
perception).1
The central claim of this model of self-knowledge is that there exists a 
reliable, but contingent, causal mechanism in our brain, a ‘self-scanning process’, that 
can be thought of as analogous to many of our other perceptual mechanisms (sight, 
hearing, etc.) and whereby our first-order conscious states directly cause us to have 
second-order beliefs about them. If one accepts this account of self-knowledge, 
combined with a purely reliabilist approach to perceptual knowledge, one can hold on 
to a view of self-knowledge as perceptual, despite its non-conformity to the above 
feature of having to occur via an intermediate informational state of ‘awareness’ of 
one’s first-order states. Having said that, two questions remain: should we accept a 
purely reliabilist approach to perception? And, even if we do (or do not for that 
matter), what might be the advantages of thinking of our knowledge of our own minds 
on this model?
To start with the first question, a general problem with this whole approach to 
perception is that it does not seem to allow for the possibility of disbelief in one’s 
senses. This is particularly problematic when thinking about ordinary cases of object 
perception, where disbelief in one’s senses clearly does seem to be possible. I may in 
certain circumstances mistrust what I see (perhaps because I believe that I have been 
given some drug), and may therefore not form any beliefs corresponding to my 
perceptual experiences. Seeing, in this case, would not involve believing. Moreover, a 
purely reliabilist approach to perception seems unable to make room for the fact that, 
from the phenomenological point of view, when we make a perceptual judgement 
about something, we do not seem to just find ourselves with an impulse to make it, in 
the way that we just ‘find ourselves’ having perceptual experiences through no
1 (Ibid)
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rational choice of our own. Our perceptual judgements are judgements that, we 
generally feel, make rational sense to us. They are judgements that we feel we could 
withhold were we to have reason to mistrust our senses, in a way that we could not, 
out of any rational motive, withhold a perceptual experience if our eyes are open. A 
purely reliabilist account of perception thus seems unable to make room for the 
important phenomenological differences between seeing and believing, and is thus 
perhaps not the best way of thinking about perception.
Of course, even if this is granted, pure reliabilism might still be the right 
approach to mfrospection. Upon further consideration though, it is also unclear what 
advantages there might be to thinking of our knowledge of our own minds on this 
model, even if it could be thought of as a genuinely perceptual model. As seen above, 
the main appeal of thinking of self-knowledge as perceptual was that it made it come 
out as reason-based (in the sense of making rational sense to us from our own point of 
view)1 in accordance with the phenomenology of many common cases of 
introspective belief. But now, if to adopt a perceptual model of self-knowledge is to 
adopt a purely reliabilist, non reason-based account (in the relevant sense), we are left 
without any clear reason for preferring a perceptual model of self-knowledge to a 
non-perceptual one -  other than, perhaps, the fact that perceptual accounts, whether 
reason-based or purely reliabilist, seem to be better able to accommodate the 
fallibility of self-knowledge than (we will see) certain non-perceptual accounts are. 
This however can only constitute a reason for preferring a perceptual account if it 
turns out that the kind of fallibility to which our knowledge of our own minds is 
subject can be properly likened to the fallibility of our senses. Let us therefore 
consider next the analogy between perception and introspection on the question of 
fallibility.
(3) In perception, the objects of perception and perceptual knowledge (eg. a 
table) bear no constitutive, conceptual or rational relation to anyone’s awareness of 
them or perceptual beliefs about them (eg. one’s experiences or beliefs about the 
table). That is, in perception, the relation between awareness and object of awareness
1 One might hold a view o f reasons according to which reasons are just to be reduced to probabilistic links between 
beliefs formed and facts the beliefs concern, in which case pure reliabilism could be thought o f  as a reason-based 
account. I am not sure however how this could possibly capture the intuitive idea behind our concept o f a reason, 
and, more to the point, how it could capture the sense we have when making a judgement about the world, or when 
self-ascribing a mental state, that we do not just ‘find ourselves’ making this judgement, but that doing so 
somehow ‘makes sense’ to us from within our own point o f  view. For a more in depth discussion o f  what we 
should understand by a ‘reason’ or ‘rational ground’ in this context see the beginning o f chapter 3.
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is a purely causal relation between two ontologically distinct and conceptually 
independent existences. Brute errors of identification, due to no cognitive failure of 
'our own, are therefore always possible.
Now, according to perceptual accounts of self-knowledge, we have, in 
addition to our external sense perceptual mechanisms, an ‘inner’ (and also purely 
causal) perceptual mechanism in our brain by which we can directly perceive our own 
mental states, in an analogous way to the way in which, through our external senses, 
we can directly perceive outside objects. Brute error, on such a model, is thus also 
possible in self-knowledge. But, as seen in the introductory chapter, brute error of the 
kind possible in perception is not possible in introspective self-knowledge. It seems 
impossible that one could for instance mistake one conscious thought for another, or a 
belief that p for a desire that q, or say happiness about having finished one’s exams 
with anger at person X, in the way that one might, due to no cognitive failure or 
perceptual malfunction, perceptually mistake one object for another (completely 
different one), say some clothes hanging on a chair in the dark for a seated person. 
Similarly, it seems impossible that one might (again due to no cognitive deficiency, 
confusion, etc.) fail to be able to say what, or whether anything at all, is currently 
going through one’s own mind, in the way that one might fail altogether to be able to 
say what, or whether anything at all, is directly in front of one, due to some very thick 
fog for instance.
To sum up, given on the one hand that it seems to be of the very essence of 
perceptual knowledge that brute non-cognitive error be possible, yet precisely 
distinctive of introspective self-knowledge that it is immune to such error, self- 
knowledge cannot it seems be a form of perceptual knowledge. The perceptual 
approach to self-knowledge in other words collapses when it comes to 
accommodating the third distinctive feature of our knowledge of our own minds 
discussed in the introductory chapter, ie. its immunity to non-cognitive error.
A perceptual theorist of self-knowledge could of course try to reply that self- 
knowledge is only immune to non-cognitive error because our inner scanning 
mechanism is far more accurate and reliable than any other of our perceptual 
mechanisms, and because, moreover, there just happen to be no external factors (the 
equivalent of lighting conditions, etc. in the case of visual perception) in our heads, 
that might interfere with our perception of our mental states. The difficulty with this 
response though is that it is unable to explain why all errors in self-knowledge are due
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to some cognitive failure or other: irrationality, division of the mind, etc. and never 
occur in the absence of such failures.
Consider the following examples of failures in self-knowledge. People with 
split personality disorders might fail, in one of their personalities, to be aware of a 
conscious thought had by them when in another personality, yet we would clearly not 
diagnose these failures as cases of benign misperception, but rather as cases of 
division of the mind, that is, as cognitively pathological cases. Or, consider cases of 
schizophrenics who complain of ‘thought insertion’, that is, who deny that they are 
responsible for the thoughts they are having, or who deny that it is they who are the 
authors of the thoughts they are introspectively aware of. Again, although we would 
seem to have here cases of downright failure to identify oneself as the subject of one’s 
thoughts, we would not classify such failures as mere errors of identification made by 
perfectly rational subjects who, say, were not looking closely enough. Instead, we 
would attribute such errors to serious failures in their rational thought processes. More 
common examples of error in self-knowledge may also be found in ordinary cases of 
self-deception. Leaving in fact aside cases which we already know to be pathological, 
if someone were to come up to us and sincerely assert such things as ‘It is 12 o’clock 
but I do not believe that it is’, or ‘Someone wants a cup of coffee but I do not know 
whether it is I who have this desire’ or ‘I am not sure whether it is now occurring to 
me that it is raining or whether I am wondering about the nature of self-knowledge’, 
we would immediately assume that there was something wrong either with the 
rationality of their thinking or with their understanding of what they were saying. We 
would not take such errors to be cases of misperception without irrationality or 
conceptual deficiency.
In other words, in self-knowledge, we do not seem to have any cases which we 
would classify as simply failures of some inner scanning mechanism without 
irrationality or other cognitive breakdown, whereas in sense perception, almost all 
cases of failure in perceptual mechanism that lead to erroneous belief, we would not 
classify as involving any irrationality, conceptual incompetence, or other cognitive 
deficiency. If there is an inner scanner therefore, its proper operation is far more 
closely tied to the ascription of rationality than in the case of sense perception. This in 
fact suggests that there must be, in introspective self-knowledge, a rational relation 
between our conscious states and our self-ascriptive judgements about them, in 
addition to whatever underlying causal mechanism may or may not also be involved
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at the sub-personal level. That is, having a first-order state must somehow constitute 
or give rise to a prima facie reason for believing that one has it, as only this could 
seemingly explain why a failure to believe that one has it should count as a rational 
failure.
(4) A fourth and final point of disanalogy between introspection and 
perception lies in the fact that speaking of perception or observation (understood as 
external sense-perception) generally implies the idea of a perspective or point of view 
on something, on something that lies outside the observing perspective. If so however, 
one might wonder whether it actually makes sense at all to think of our knowledge of 
the contents of our own minds, that is, of the contents of our own knowing 
perspective, on the model of a kind of knowledge that is, of its very essence, 
knowledge only of that which lies outside our knowing perspective. This worry is 
very much related to point (3) just made above.
How, one might wonder, could we perceive a mental state of ours from the 
inside so to speak, that is, from the very same point of view from which we have it? 
If perception involves having a point of view on something, looking into our own 
mind or into our own point of view, would it seems have to involve having a point of 
view on our own mind, thereby creating an immediate distance between our observing 
perspective and the perspective of the states observed. And, if we then tried to look 
into our observing perspective, another dissociation would occur between this 
perspective and the new observing perspective, and so on ad infinitum.1 This is a 
problem that many of us may feel the pull of, yet it is somewhat obscure what we 
should make of it. What would it be in the first place to know one’s own mental states 
as the subject of these states or ‘from the same point of view’ as these states or ‘from 
the inside’? And, why could such knowledge not be perceptual? One way of getting at 
this idea is by first considering the notion of a ‘mind’ or a ‘perspective’.
A ‘mind’ or a ‘point of view’ might, in this context, be taken to consist 
essentially in a coherent system of rationally related attitudes, that is, in a system of 
states that form together a single unified picture of (and stance towards) the world, 
and that not only fill the same logical space (in the way that two different people’s 
attitudes may also do) but that are also causally and/or in some other way
1 For a discussion o f this phenomenon/intuition, although not specifically in relation to perceptual accounts o f self- 
knowledge, see (Sartre 1969, chapter 2, section III)
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explanatorily related. Particular beliefs, desires and emotions within the same system, 
and with appropriately related contents, will in other words immediately explain, 
affect, or give rise to actions and other attitudes with relevantly similar contents, 
within this system. Given this basic understanding of a mind or a perspective, 
knowing one’s own attitudes from the inside, or having direct knowledge of one’s 
own knowing perspective, might be understood as a case of having a belief about an 
attitude, where one’s belief and the attitude it is about form part of the same point of 
view in the above sense, that is, form part of the same rational/explanatory system, 
and bear therefore (amongst other things) a direct internal rational relation to each 
other.1
But now, if this is what introspective self-knowledge amounts to, then it 
cannot it seems be perceptual, since, as seen earlier, the relation between a perceptual 
experience and its object must be a purely causal, wow-rational relation, if brute non- 
cognitive error of the kind that clearly is possible in perception is indeed to be 
possible. To put things differently, if the objects of our perceptual experiences formed 
part of the same point of view as our perceptual experiences or perceptual beliefs 
about them, they would have to bear some kind of reason-giving relation to these 
perceptual beliefs (in addition to any causal relation), characteristic of what it would 
be for them to occupy the same point of view, or for the transition between them to 
occur from within one same point of view. If so however, a failure to perceive these 
objects, or to form a belief corresponding to them, would constitute a failure to take 
account of one’s reasons, that is, a failure of rationality. From this it would follow that 
error without irrationality would not be possible, yet being subject to such error is, we 
have seen, of the very essence of perceptual knowledge. Knowledge had from and 
about the same cognitive perspective can therefore not be perceptual.
But, perhaps we never do have knowledge of ourselves from the inside in this 
very strict sense, and if so, what we call se/^knowledge or introspective knowledge,
1 O f course, not all pairs o f states within such a system will be directly related in any way. My belief that there is a 
table in front o f me for instance and my belief that there is a chair in front o f me are not directly rationally or 
causally related, yet they can still both be understood as being held from within the same point o f view, say, by 
virtue o f the fact that they both arise/are rationally grounded in one same perceptual experience I am now having 
o f a table and a chair. Having said that, the relation between our first-order states and our second-order self- 
ascriptive judgements must it seems be a more direct relation than that. In fact, whatever one’s views on self- 
knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that our first-order states (ie. the objects o f our second-order beliefs) are 
somehow involved in the causal history o f our second-order beliefs about them. And, if this transition from first- 
order states to second-order beliefs about them is to be additionally understood as occurring (being made) from 
within one same point o f view (in the above sense), it will also have to be understood as being an internal rational 
relation, ie. one that it ‘makes sense’ to us to make from within our own self-ascribing point o f view -  and not one 
that we just ‘find ourselves’ undergoing.
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may well still turn out to be just a kind of perceptual knowledge. A perceptual theorist 
could argue that our knowledge of our own mental states is a kind of knowledge that 
is somehow distanced from the perspective of our first-order states, that is, a kind of 
knowledge where our mental states are objectified as if they were someone else’s 
states. One could in fact argue following Armstrong that ‘...it is only an empirical 
fact that our direct awareness of mental states is confined to our own minds. We could 
conceive of a power of acquiring non-verbal non-inferential knowledge of current 
states of minds of others. This would be direct awareness, or perception, of the minds 
of others. Indeed, when people speak of ‘telepathy’ it often seems to be this they have 
in mind’.1 In other words, the idea is that there is nothing inconceivable about the 
possibility of knowing the mental states of others through some contingent, non- 
rational, brutely causal telepathic perceptual mechanism, so why would there be a 
problem with supposing that our knowledge of our own states is perceptual in this 
way? In fact wouldn’t this make more sense than to think otherwise? Why should we 
think that our knowledge of our own mental states is a special kind of knowledge of 
these states had from the inside, that is, had in virtue of some direct rational relation 
holding between these conscious states and our judgements about them?
Well, there does not seem to be any problem with the supposition that we 
might be able to know some of our own mental states perceptually through some form 
of extra-sensory perception, such as some of our unconscious states for instance. 
However, the crucial question here is whether the knowledge we actually have when 
we ‘introspect’, given its peculiar features (eg. the fact that only certain types of errors 
are possible and not others), and given the uses to which we put it (eg. in reflective 
reasoning) could be of this kind. That is, do we in actual fact have knowledge of some 
of our own mental states from the inside, or is all self-knowledge had from a different 
perspective from that which it is knowledge about, and so a kind of knowledge that 
we could conceivably also have of the minds of other people?
There are, it seems, at least three reasons for thinking that introspective self- 
knowledge is knowledge of our own attitudes had from the inside. First, if it were not, 
it would be difficult to explain why, in self-knowledge, error is so closely tied to 
irrationality. Secondly, if self-knowledge were not truly ‘inner’ in this way, it would 
be difficult to explain why when we non-inferentially self-ascribe a conscious
1 (Armstrong 1968, p.325). See also Churchland’s discussion o f telepathic knowledge in (Churchland 1991,
pp.610-611).
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attitude, say, a belief that p or a feeling of hatred towards someone, we generally do 
so with a certain commitment to the view that indeed p (eg. when saying ‘I believe it 
is time to go’), or with a certain hostility in our voice (eg. when saying ‘I hate you’). 
In such cases, we do not seem to just be reporting a belief or emotion in the non­
committed way in which someone other than ourselves might do so by saying ‘She 
believes it is time to go’ or ‘She hates you’. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, 
actual examples of knowledge of our own mental states had from the same 
perspective from which we have them (ie. from the inside in the above sense) can be 
found in our practices of critical reasoning.1 To illustrate this latter point, let us 
digress for a moment and consider what it is to reason critically.
Following Burge, critical reasoning is essentially reasoning where a thinker:
(1) recognises her attitudes, reasons, and reasoning as attitudes, reasons, and 
reasoning,
(2) reasonably evaluates these attitudes, reasons, and reasoning by reference to 
rational norms, and
(3) where these reasonable evaluations constitute immediate reasons, and 
immediately rationally result in, explicit confirmation, review, or 
supplementation of the attitudes, reasons and reasoning reasoned about.2 
Now, if I start thinking about the various beliefs I hold about the nature of
introspective self-knowledge (stage 1), and begin evaluating them and considering 
whether they are reasonable beliefs to hold, thereby reaching the conclusion that one 
of my beliefs is unreasonable (stage 2), this evaluation, that is, my conclusion that one 
of my beliefs is unreasonable, will constitute an immediate reason for my dropping 
this belief (stage 3), in a way that my coming to this conclusion about someone else’s 
beliefs would not itself alone, constitute an immediate prima facie reason for them to 
drop their belief. In fact consider the following situation: I am listening to a 
philosopher expressing her views on self-knowledge, and I thereby start reasoning 
about her views as a result of which I come to the conclusion that one of her views is 
unreasonable. My merely coming to this conclusion is clearly not in itself enough to 
make her have an immediate reason to change her belief. In order for my evaluation to
1 See especially (Burge 1996). See also Shoemaker’s discussion o f reflective reasoning in (Shoemaker 1988)
2 As Peacocke points out (1996), we do not always reason fully reflectively in this manner, and other animals most 
likely never do. The only relevant point here however (not that Peacocke denies it) is that we do sometimes engage 
in this kind o f reasoning, or are at least able to.
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result in a reasonable change in her views, I would first have to convince her of the 
truth of my evaluation. My coming to think it alone would not immediately rationally 
result in her changing her mind, in the way that my coming to this conclusion would 
itself have an immediate effect on what views I  hold. My reasoning about her views 
would therefore not constitute a process of genuine critical reasoning in the sense 
defined above.
In other words, the point to take from this is that genuine critical reasoning 
seems to involve there being a certain rational integration of our first and second- 
order attitudes. They must immediately rationally influence each other. That is, the 
first and second-order states involved in critical reasoning must form part of the same 
point of view, since the two levels (first and second-order) in such reasoning, if such 
reasoning is to be possible, must stand in immediate reason-giving relations to each 
other.1 If this is right, then it looks as though we do sometimes have knowledge of our 
own mental states from the inside, that is, from the same perspective as the states 
thereby known. Moreover, given that the judgements we make when we introspect are 
the very judgements we use in critical reasoning, our introspective self-knowledge 
must be of this kind, and so cannot it seems be perceptual.
To conclude, we have seen in this section that the terms ‘introspection’ and 
‘inner sense’,2 in suggesting an analogy between our knowledge of our own minds 
and our knowledge of the world through sense-perception, capture certain important 
aspects of the phenomenology of introspective self-knowledge, yet are ultimately 
misleading for a number of reasons. First of all, any perceptual account of self- 
knowledge that is not committed to the existence of inner sense experiences, distinct 
from both our first-order states and our second-order judgements about them, ends up 
turning into an intuitively implausible, purely reliabilist account, which cannot even 
so clearly be thought of as perceptual. Secondly, given on the one hand the nature of 
perception as essentially involving a dissociation between the observing and the 
observed perspectives, and given, on the other hand, the notion of ‘inner’ knowledge 
as a way of knowing the contents of our own observing perspective, we end up having
1 I will return to discuss in more detail the relevance o f critical reasoning to our purposes in chapter 3, in the 
context o f discussing Burge’s views on self-knowledge.
2 ‘Inner sense’ is not always used to refer to a form o f inner perception in the sense discussed in this chapter. Kant 
for instance, in speaking o f ‘inner sense’ in the first Critique does not seem to have anything like a perceptual 
model o f self-knowledge in mind. Despite the misleading term ‘sense’, ‘inner sense’ in Kant just seems to mean 
‘self-consciousness’, or that primitive unifying self-awareness that comes with all other conscious states including 
perceptual states; a ‘sense’ so to speak that accompanies all others but which is not itself one o f them.
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to choose between taking introspective self-knowledge to be truly ‘inner’, and taking 
it to be truly perceptual, that is, between taking it to be knowledge had from the inside 
or knowledge had by looking. It cannot be both. Since its immunity to non-cognitive 
error together with the actual existence of practices involving a rational integration of 
our first and second-order states show it to be ‘inner’ in this sense, it follows that it 
cannot be perceptual.
Having seen that our knowledge of our own minds, given its distinctive 
features, can neither be based on observation of our behaviour, nor on direct 
observation of our mental states, the next option to consider is whether it might be 
distinctive specifically in not being based on anything at all, that is, in lacking 
reasons.
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Chapter 2: Non reason-based accounts
The view that self-knowledge is not reason-based is shared by a number of 
positions in the literature, ranging from strong constitutive accounts, according to 
which it is somehow ontologically constitutive of believing that one has a particular 
mental state that one actually does have that state, all the way, via conceptually 
constitutive views, to purely reliabilist views, according to which our first and second- 
order states are both ontologically and conceptually independent, although somehow 
causally linked at the sub-personal level. The very different positions within this 
range share however a common commitment to the view that our immediate 
introspective avowals are not based on reasons, that is, that they are not rationally 
grounded in any way: they are neither based on other beliefs, nor on observation 
(whether of our behaviour or directly of our mental states), nor even on our self­
ascribed states themselves.1 Rather, on each of these accounts, there is something else 
(if anything at all) in virtue of which our mental self-ascriptions have their distinctive 
features of immediacy, authority, and immunity to non-cognitive error.
Having already discussed (and dismissed) pure reliabilism in the context of 
talking about perceptual accounts of self-knowledge, the focus in this chapter will be 
instead on the various lines of constitutive non reason-based approaches to mental 
self-ascriptions, to be divided here essentially into two categories as follows: (1) 
artefact o f grammar views or strong constitutive views, according to which it is in one 
way or other ontologically constitutive of having a second-order belief that one
1 In the case o f reliabilism, this is o f course only true o f certain types o f  reliabilist positions, in particular not o f  
those which hold reliabilism across the board, and therefore according to which to be reason-based is just to be 
produced by a reliable purely causal mechanism.
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actually does have the corresponding first-order attitude or vice-versa, and (2) weak 
constitutive views, according to which it is conceptually constitutive of having a first- 
order attitude that one will generally tend to form a correct second-order belief about 
it.
Ultimately, it will be argued in each case that the position offered is 
unsatisfactory, and that an epistemological (ie. reason-based) approach to mental self­
ascriptions must be returned to, though neither an inferential nor a perceptual one. 
Through a close examination nonetheless of the non reason-based approach in its 
various forms, a more plausible fourth approach (ie. additional to the three standard 
ones of ‘inference, inner sense, or nothing’ so far considered1) will be seen to emerge, 
intermediate between the second (ie. perceptual accounts) and the third (ie. non 
reason-based views). This is an approach that will be seen to be capable of solving our 
initial problem of introspective self-knowledge -  ie. in being able to adequately 
accommodate all three of the distinctive features of our knowledge of our own 
conscious minds discussed in the introductory chapter. In so doing though, this 
‘intermediate’ reason-based approach will also be seen to give rise to a new and 
deeper explanatory puzzle, which it will be the task of much of the rest of the thesis to 
address.
First though, let us run through the various possible non reason-based attempts 
to solve the traditional problem of self-knowledge, and see how none of these 
attempts, as they stand, are ultimately able to do so.
2.1 Artefact of grammar views
The fundamental claim of these views is that the immediacy, authority and 
immunity to error of our knowledge of our own minds is just the artefact of a 
grammatical misconstrual, a misconstrual either of expressions of mental states as 
truth-evaluable assertions about them, or of a mere language game as reflecting a 
language-independent reality and special way of knowing it upon which this language 
game is consequential, or finally, the misconstrual of what are in fact self-verifying 
second-order judgements as reflecting a special way of knowing the first-order states 
they are about.
1 The slogan ‘inference, inner sense, or nothing’ is taken from Boghossian in (Boghossian 1989).
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To be more specific, according to the first kind of artefact of grammar view, 
the ‘expressivist view’ as it will be called, we sometimes, though not always, say 
things like T am in pain’ or ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I am angry’, etc. simply as 
alternative ways of saying ‘ouch’ or ‘p’ or shouting (ie. directly expressing anger).1 It 
is in these cases, according to this view, that our mental self-ascriptions are 
immediate, authoritative, and immune to certain kinds of error. When our mental self­
ascriptions are used as actual assertions on the other hand, they do not, on this view, 
have any of the special features we generally associate with first-person avowals, but 
are just as indirect, and based on exactly the same kind of evidence, as our 
judgements about the mental states of others are. The problem of how it is that we can 
have immediate, authoritative, and immune to non-cognitive error knowledge of some 
of our own mental states is thus on this view just an illusion that arises from mistaking 
uses of ‘I believe that p’ or T love X’ as expressions for uses of them as assertions.2
According to the second kind of artefact of grammar view alluded to above, 
there is actually nothing there to be explained about why our first-person avowals 
have the distinctive features they have, or nothing there to be said about that in virtue 
of which our avowals have these features; they just do. That is, it is just part of our 
practices with the words ‘believe’, ‘desire’ ‘love’, ‘anger’ etc. that a person’s 
immediate claims about her own mental states are taken as correct and authoritative in 
all cases in which there are not strong overriding reasons for rejecting them. That is, 
on this view, what someone believes, desires, intends, feels, etc. is not to be inferred 
from her avowals (as one might infer from someone’s shouting that they are angry), 
but indeed in part to be identified by what this person (when sincere) claims to 
believe, desire, etc.
On the third type of view listed above, held in particular by Burge, although 
solely with respect to strict cogito-like judgements, our judgements of the form ‘I am
1 This approach is sometimes taken to be Wittgenstein’s (Wittgenstein 1953), and is defended amongst others by 
Heal (1994). Wright (1998) however denies that this is actually Wittgenstein’s view. Whether or not Wittgenstein 
held this position though is not important for the purposes o f  the present discussion. For present purposes, it only 
matters that this is one possible non reason-based view, and one which is not without certain advantages.
2 There are many ways in which this approach might be made to look more plausible, such as by saying, following 
Heal (1994), that these expressions o f mental states are not only expressions, but are at the same time to be taken 
as self-descriptions o f oneself as satisfying certain behavioural criteria. See (Heal 1998, p.21). Whatever the details 
might be however o f any particular account along these lines, what I am interested in here is only the particular 
strategy that such accounts appeal to in order to explain the distinctive features exhibited by our non-inferential 
utterances or thoughts o f the form ‘I believe that p’, ‘I am angry at Y ’, etc., and whether this strategy works.
3 For a discussion o f this position, which Wright calls the ‘default view ’, see Wright (1998)
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hereby thinking that p’ are immediate, first-person authoritative and immune to error 
simply in virtue of their self-verifying form. I cannot indeed be thinking to myself ‘I 
am hereby thinking that there are physical objects’, without in fact thereby thinking 
that there are physical objects.1
In sum, on one kind of strong constitutive view (the ‘expressivist view’), it is 
constitutive of someone asserting non-inferentially, say, that they believe that p, that 
they do actually believe that p, because asserting this is just another way of expressing 
their belief. On another such view (call it the ‘default’ view), it is a basic unanalysable 
fact about our practices with the words ‘believe’, ‘desire’, ‘anger’ etc. that if someone 
non-inferentially, sincerely, and with understanding asserts that they believe that p or 
that they desire X or are angry at Y, then they do, in virtue of that very fact, count as 
believing that p, desiring X, being angry at Y. That is, on this view, uttering or being 
disposed to utter, say, ‘I believe that p’ is constitutive of believing that p. Finally, on 
yet another strong constitutive view (call it the ‘self-verifying’ view), thinking a 
higher-order thought involves quite literally thinking the corresponding lower-order 
thought. These being the basic claims underlying the various types of strong 
constitutive accounts of self-knowledge, let us now consider what some of the 
advantages might be of adopting one or other of these positions.
(1) To begin with, strong constitutive views have the advantage of providing a 
straightforward account of why it is that our mental self-ascriptions (or at least some 
of them) exhibit the features of non-inferentiality, authoritativeness, a kind of 
transparency, etc. If to assert that one has a particular mental state is also in some 
sense to express that very mental state, or if to believe that one has a mental state 
constitutes in one at the same time the having of that state, then obviously no 
inference from first-order state to a self-ascription of it is needed, nor can any third- 
person judgement about the same state equal the authority of first-person self­
ascriptions of it.
(2) Next, the strong constitutive approach fits well (in its various forms) with 
the fact that when we sincerely and non-inferentially say such things as ‘I believe that 
this is the right thing to do’ or ‘I hate X’, we do so with a certain commitment to the 
view that this is indeed the right thing to do, or with actual hostility, which we do not 
do when saying such things as ‘Jones believes that this is the right thing to do’ or ‘She
1 See (Burge 1988)
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hates X’. On strong constitutive views, according to which asserting things like ‘I 
believe that p’ or ‘I hate X’ either constitute in one the mental states self-ascribed (the 
‘default’ view), or are expressions of these mental states (the expressivist view), there 
is no difficulty in explaining this. This in fact links up with our previous discussion 
(in the section on perceptual accounts)1 about our first and second order states being 
held from within the same point of view. Adopting a strong constitutive view of self- 
knowledge according to which our first and second-order attitudes are not truly 
distinct attitudes, provides us with a simple explanation of how they can both be held 
from within the same point of view: insofar as they are not truly distinct attitudes, 
they cannot but be held from within the same point of view.
(3) Concerning the expressivist proposal more specifically, this view has the 
added virtue of providing an appealing solution to one of Moore’s paradoxes that 
other strategies might seem unable to deliver. It can provide an explanation of why 
one seems to contradict oneself (or appears irrational) when asserting things like ‘I 
believe that p, but not p’ although it is perfectly possible that one may believe that p, 
and yet for it not to be the case that p, and moreover for there to be nothing 
necessarily irrational or contradictory about someone else’s judging this to be the 
case.2 If the expressivist proposal is right though in suggesting that judging ‘I believe 
that p’ is in some cases just an alternative way of asserting ‘p’, it becomes 
immediately clear why, in these cases, these Moorean utterances are contradictory: 
they amount to asserting ‘p, but not p’.
(4) Finally, a closely related advantage of this kind of non reason-based view 
(ie. the expressivist view again), is that taking our immediate avowals of the form ‘I 
believe that p’ to be mere substitutes for assertions of the form ‘p’, fits well also with 
the datum pointed out by Evans, drawing on a remark by Wittgenstein, that when 
asked whether we believe that p, what we do is not look at ourselves and consider any 
evidence regarding our beliefs, but rather, we look out at the world and consider
1 See chapter 1 section 1.2.2 point (4)
2 See (Heal 1994). Moore’s other paradox concerns statements o f the form ‘p, but I do not believe that p’. This 
paradox, Heal grants, could be dealt with by appealing to the consciousness o f our self-ascribed thoughts (where a 
thought’s being ‘conscious’ is taken to consist in, or just to somehow involve, one’s being aware o f  oneself having 
it). In this way, the utterance ‘p’, expressing a conscious belief that p, can be expanded into ‘I believe that p’, 
thereby generating the contradiction ‘I believe that p, but I do not believe that p’ which is o f the basic form ‘p, but 
not p’. Using this strategy to explain the second paradox ‘I believe that p, but not p’ however does not work. It 
only generates ‘I believe that p, but I believe that not p’ which is not itself a contradictory statement, or necessarily 
an irrational statement to make, but only an acknowledgement o f the fact that one has contradictory beliefs.
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whether or not p.1 That is, if I am asked whether I believe that it is raining, I will look 
not at myself but out the window, and consider whether it is or is not raining. And 
indeed, if, following the expressivist, to say ‘I believe that it is raining’ is essentially 
to say ‘It is raining’, nothing should seem more obvious than that the evidence 
appealed to in order to make this avowal should be evidence regarding the weather.
In brief, artefact of grammar approaches to avowals seem to have much to 
recommend themselves. Having listed their many virtues however, it is now time to 
re-examine these points with a more critical eye.
(1*) Concerning the first supposed advantage of these views, it should be 
noted that the mere fact that strong constitutive views are able to provide some kind 
of account of the distinctive marks of first-person avowals (of their immediacy, 
authoritative character, and immunity to certain types of error) is not enough to tip the 
balance in their favour. It only puts them, for the time being, on a par with all other 
approaches that are also able to do so.2
(2*) Next, concerning the fact that asserting non-inferentially that one believes 
that p, or that one hates X, tends to be done with a certain commitment to the view 
that indeed p, or with hostility towards X, this again does not need to be explained by 
reference to any constitutive principle. Insofar as the belief that p or feeling of hatred 
one is self-ascribing is a belief/emotion one actually has, then of course one will tend 
to display, in self-ascribing it, a certain commitment to the view that indeed p, or a 
degree of hostility, without this commitment or emotion having to be constitutive of 
one’s self-ascriptive judgement.
(3*) Concerning now the third virtue listed above of the strong constitutive 
approach, and of the expressivist view in particular, namely that of its being able to 
provide an explanation of why Moorean utterances of the form ‘I believe that p, but 
not p’ seem to be contradictory (or seem to involve some degree of irrationality), we 
have here again only a negative advantage if it turns out that the contradictoriness or
1 See (Evans 1982, p.225)
2 In their own ways, inferential models and perceptual models also had ways o f  explaining how our mental self­
ascriptions have (or appear to have) the above distinctive features. Their ways o f  doing so though turned out not to 
be entirely satisfactory in the end. The same may yet be discovered to be true o f the explanations provided by 
various versions o f the strong constitutive approach, not to mention that there may turn out to be yet other accounts 
that are also able to accommodate these features, and perhaps to do so better. We will come to one such account at 
the end o f this chapter.
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oddity of such Moorean utterances can also be generated without appealing to any 
strong constitutive link between second and first-order states. Heal claims that it 
cannot, and is indeed lead to embracing an expressivist account of avowals essentially 
as a result of her attempt to solve this Moorean paradox.1 Two points however can be 
made here to suggest that this advantage might not be quite so decisive.
(i) First, there is it seems another way in which this Moorean paradox could be 
dealt with, indeed a way that Heal herself briefly mentions but does not pursue in her 
paper.2 The idea is that, given the datum that the evidence we appeal to in order to 
self-ascribe some of our mental states is not evidence explicitly about these states but 
evidence about the world, then, insofar as we self-ascribe, say, a belief that p on the 
basis of evidence we have for p, it follows that to say ‘I believe that p, but not p’ is in 
effect to be asserting ‘not p’ (the second part of the utterance) in spite of the fact that 
we are in possession of evidence for p, and have therefore immediate reason to assert 
‘p \  To take an example, a certain contradiction or at least irrationality (ie. failure to 
take account of the evidence one possesses) would indeed be involved if one were to 
sincerely assert ‘it is not raining’ (ie. the second part of the Moorean utterance) while 
looking out the window and clearly seeing that it is raining (ie. the evidence one 
supposedly appealed to to assert ‘I believe that it is raining’). Thus, insofar as things 
are as they seem (ie. that we turn to the world for evidence about what we believe), 
the apparent contradiction or irrationality involved in making Moorean utterances of 
the form ‘I believe that p, but not p’ could, potentially, be also explained by way of an 
epistemological account of self-knowledge, according to which the way the world 
appears to us can actually provide us with direct grounds for making truth evaluable 
judgements not just about the world, but also about our beliefs about the world. The 
virtue that the expressivist approach to mental self-ascriptions therefore has of being 
able to solve this Moorean paradox is not again necessarily exclusive to it.
(ii) Next, not only does the expressivist view appear not to be the only one 
able to offer a solution to the above Moorean paradox concerning cases of belief self­
ascription, but it is not clear whether it is able offer any solution at all to many
1 See (Heal 1994)
2 (Ibid, p. 19)
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parallel such paradoxes that arise in cases involving the self-ascription of desires and 
emotions.1
Consider for example a case of someone who is, say, caught up in a heated 
argument, and, upon being asked to calm down, shouts back: ‘I am perfectly calm!’ -  
thus simultaneously self-ascribing an emotion and (amusingly) expressing clear lack 
of the emotion just self-ascribed. Now, just as upon hearing someone utter ‘I believe 
that p, but not p’ (ie. self-ascribe a belief, then express clear lack thereof), we would 
tend to feel here (would we not?) that a rational person, one who is ‘thinking straight’, 
or in full grip of their cognitive faculties (ie. not subject to some, albeit temporary, 
cognitive/rational or conceptual failure) should know better, and indeed would not 
make such a blatant error about their current emotional state, even though they could 
well it seems, without any irrationality or other cognitive failing, make such an error 
about someone else’s emotional state in uttering ‘She is perfectly calm’ immediately 
followed by (or simultaneously with) the ‘she’ in question (and/or indeed oneself) 
shouting (ie. expressing clear lack of calm).
So, how might the appearance of irrationality involved in someone’s shouting 
‘I am perfectly calm!’ be accounted for by way of an expressivist construal of the 
mental self-ascription here involved? Well, with great difficulty it seems. The 
problem is essentially this:
Being careful not to formulate Moore’s paradox in a way that presupposes 
already a particular strategy for solving it, there are generally speaking two possible 
ways of approaching it: (1) by trying to show the speaker to be (despite surface 
grammar) somehow contradicting themselves in self-ascribing a certain mental state
1 One might object here that the expressivist approach (as put forward by Heal for instance) was never intended to 
solve paradoxes concerning the self-ascription o f any states other than belief. It should be remembered though that 
our main concern here is not with any particular philosopher’s use o f the expressivist approach to avowals but with 
the expressivist strategy itself, as offering a possible way o f solving the problem o f introspective self-knowledge 
before us in this thesis -  a problem which, as it turns out, does arise both for the case o f certain self-ascriptions o f  
belief and  for the case o f many self-ascriptions o f  desire and emotion. This, recall, is the problem o f  explaining 
how it is that some o f  our mental self-ascriptions can be (1) direct (ie. unmediated by any explicit consideration o f  
ourselves or o f our metal states, but seemingly based, if  on anything, on considerations about (or attention to) their 
objects), (2) authoritative, and (3) immune to non-cognitive error -  an immunity particularly well illustrated by our 
reaction to Moorean type utterances, and by our similar reaction to parallel cases involving the self-ascription o f  
desires and emotions.
2 In uttering ‘but not p’, as in shouting, one is o f course doing more than just expressing one’s lack o f the belief 
that p, or lack o f  calm. One is also making a positive  claim (ie. that the contrary o f p is the case), and expressing a 
positive emotion (ie. anger or agitation). What needs to be brought out though, if  the appearance o f irrationality or 
contradiction involved in doing such things is to be explained, is a sense in which in saying ‘but not p’ or in 
shouting, one is going against something that one said (or against something that was involved in one’s coming to 
say) ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I am perfectly calm’. It is thus what one is denying or displaying lack o f in saying ‘but 
not p’ or in shouting, rather than what positive belief/emotion one might be expressing, that is most relevant here.
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simultaneously with (or immediately prior to) expressing lack of the mental state just 
self-ascribed -  ie. the ‘artefact of grammar’ strategy; or (2) by trying to show the 
utterer to be irrational (ie. to be failing to take account of the evidence they possess, 
given the evidence they do possess in such cases) or cognitively failing in some way, 
in believing that they have a particular mental state (as exhibited by their self­
ascription of this state) when clearly they (consciously at least -  in the Freudian 
sense) do not have the state they believe themselves to have (as exhibited by their 
direct expression of lack thereof) -  ie. the epistemological strategy.1
Now, adopting an expressivist approach to avowals in order to account for the 
appearance of irrationality or contradiction involved in our example of someone 
shouting ‘I am perfectly calm!’ would it seems have to involve: (a) adopting the first 
strategy, ie. showing the utterer of ‘I am perfectly calm!’ to actually be (despite 
surface grammar) contradicting themselves (ie. expressing something of the form ‘p, 
but not p’) in self-ascribing the feeling of calm simultaneously with shouting, and (b) 
showing them to be doing so (ie. to be contradicting themselves) in virtue of the fact 
that in uttering ‘I am perfectly calm’ they are not making a truth evaluable judgement 
but merely expressing the feeling of calm. The problem however is that, first of all, 
insofar as expressing lack of calm through shouting does not (plausibly) constitute 
making a judgement (ie. stating that something is or is not the case), there is no way in 
which it could be shown that doing so (ie. shouting) amounts to contradicting (ie. 
literally ‘stating the contrary o f) what one stated in self-ascribing the feeling of calm. 
Next, if one adds to this the expressivist claim that in self-ascribing the feeling of 
calm by saying ‘I am perfectly calm’ one is not making a truth evaluable judgement 
either but merely expressing calm, the problem gets even worse. Insofar as directly 
expressing calm does not again (plausibly) reduce to judging something to be the 
case, there is no way in which the expressivist construal of this self-ascription of 
emotion could help generate a contradiction between one’s self-ascribing the feeling 
of calm and one’s shouting.2
1 Moore’s paradox, recall, was brought in in chapter 1 primarily as a way o f illustrating, or as an alternative way o f 
capturing, the sense we have that our ‘introspectively-based’ (ie. immediate, authoritative) mental self-ascriptions 
(such as those made in Moorean type cases) are immune to non-cognitive error. This left open the possibility that 
our uneasiness about Moorean type utterances might in the end be due either to some underlying formal 
contradiction being involved in making Moorean type utterances, or to the fact that the error made in such cases 
(given the grounds one has available when non-inferentially self-ascribing a mental state) must be a rational or (in 
some other way) cognitive error.
2 It might be possible in some cases to let out an emotion through an act o f judgement. This however would not 
make it the case that to be expressing this emotion just is to be saying that something is or is not the case. For a
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In other words, the only way it seems in which the expressivist approach to 
avowals could be used to successfully solve Moorean type paradoxes involving the 
self-ascription of emotions and desires is by making a highly controversial cognitivist 
assumption about the nature of our direct expressions of emotion, and thereby about 
the nature of emotions themselves, ie. as being, or as being essentially reducible to, 
types of beliefs or judgements.1 Anything short of making this assumption would 
leave us here (with regard to our example) with a mere case of combined expression 
of two contrary emotions (eg. calm and anger or agitation); not with a Moorean 
paradox.
Of course, one could try to argue that cases such as the above are not genuine 
Moorean type cases of the kind here under discussion (ie. cases where we feel, despite 
surface grammar, that the person is somehow contradicting themselves or being 
irrational in what they are saying), but just cases where we feel (and perhaps find 
surprising) that the speaker is subject to two contrary emotions simultaneously 
(love/hate, calm/anger, etc.). Upon brief reflection though, it is clear that this is not 
what is going on in our example. Compare in fact our case of someone shouting ‘I am 
perfectly calm!’ while caught up in a heated argument, with a clear case of someone 
expressing (and subject to) both calm and anger. A scene from one of Coppola’s 
Godfather films springs to mind here, where a figure of authority, while remaining 
perfectly calm (as expressed by their soft and controlled tone of voice) utters: ‘You 
have disappointed me’ or ‘This has made me very angry’ (or some other statement 
along these lines). Upon hearing such words, uttered in this manner, we would no 
doubt be far from amused. We would not take the person in question to be 
contradicting themselves or to be making a mistake about their current state of mind 
(eg. believing themselves to be angry when in fact they are not), let alone to be 
subject to some blatant form of self-deception, irrationality or other amusing cognitive 
lapse. They are both calm and angry. Our example of the person spontaneously 
shouting ‘I am perfectly calm!’ on the other hand could not be more different. In that 
example the speaker is clearly not calm despite their self-ascription, and, we feel, they 
ought to have known better. It remains therefore a clear instance of the above
detailed discussion o f the various ways in which (and vehicles through which) emotions are expressed see chapter 
7 o f this thesis.
1 The cognitivist theory o f emotions will be discussed further (and dismissed) in chapter 6 below.
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Moorean type paradox and not a case of simultaneous contrary emotions. The above 
difficulty for the expressivist view thus remains.
(4*) Finally, turning to the last virtue listed above (ie. point (4) above), this 
was, recall, the virtue that the expressivist view had of fitting well with Evans’s datum 
about where we turn to for evidence when coming to self-ascribe a belief. If to self- 
ascribe a belief about the world is just to express that belief, then of course looking 
out at the world will be the right way of going about making a mental self-ascription. 
Two parallel concerns to those just raised in point (3*) above however can it seems 
also be raised here, suggesting that this advantage might not be quite so decisive 
either -  in being neither exclusive to the expressivist view, nor transferring well to 
cases involving the self-ascription of emotions and desires.
(i) First, concerning Evans’s datum for the case of belief self-ascriptions (ie. 
the datum actually discussed by Evans), it is not clear that expressivism is again the 
only view supported by this datum. As mentioned a few paragraphs back, it might be 
possible to find an epistemological account of self-knowledge according to which 
turning to the world also comes out as being the right way to go about coming to 
determine what world-directed beliefs one has. One such epistemological account will 
in fact be considered further below, namely a possible intermediate position between 
a perceptual account and a strong constitutive non reason-based view, according to 
which our mental self-ascriptions are ontologically distinct from our first-order states, 
yet rationally based on these first-order (world-directed) states, and thus according to 
which having a world-directed state (or a conscious manifestation thereof -  and so in 
any case attending to the world) itself constitutes an immediate reason for believing 
that one has it.
(ii) More puzzling though again is how the expressivist view might be able to 
accommodate at all the fact (noted already in the introductory chapter) that we also 
seem to turn to the world for evidence about what desires and emotions we have. If 
asked for instance whether I would like a slice of cake, or whether I miss person X, I 
will tend to turn my attention primarily to the cake in question (perceptually) or to 
person X (in memory, imagination) rather than to myself, be it to my behaviour, or to 
facts about my psychology. How might this datum be explained on a strong 
constitutive view according to which utterances of the form ‘I desire a slice of cake’ 
or ‘I miss person X’ are just expressions of desire and emotion rather than truth 
evaluable judgements about these mental states? Again, it seems, at great cost.
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If we are to turn to the world for evidence when making a self-ascription of 
emotion essentially in virtue of the fact that in self-ascribing this emotion we are not 
actually making a truth evaluable judgement about it, but merely expressing it, it must 
be assumed (implausibly again) that in expressing an emotion in this way we are in 
fact making a judgement about the world, ie. stating that something is or is not the 
case, that is, doing something that can actually be supported by evidence. 
Alternatively, an expressivist might argue that, in turning to the world to self-ascribe 
an emotion, we are turning to it not so much for evidence, but just to trigger an 
emotion which, having triggered it, we then come to spontaneously express in uttering 
something of the form ‘I am angry’, ‘I am afraid’, etc. The cost however of adopting 
this alternative expressivist explanation is not negligible either -  it involves going 
against the very datum in need of explanation (ie. that we seem to turn to the objects 
of our emotions/desires for evidence or confirmation when making a mental self­
ascription), and indeed against an important feature of the phenomenology of 
‘introspectively-based’ self-ascription mentioned earlier, namely that when non- 
inferentially self-ascribing a mental state (be it a belief or an emotion) we do not just 
‘find ourselves’ doing so, but doing so is something that, we generally feel, makes 
sense to us from within our own self-ascribing and outward looking point of view.1
To recapitulate, the virtues of the artefact of grammar views of avowals 
discussed here appear to be (a) neither exclusive to them with respect to cases of 
authoritative belief self-ascriptions; nor (b) to transfer well to cases involving the self­
ascription of emotions and desires. In order therefore to decide in favour of, or to 
definitively rule out, any such accounts we will have to look elsewhere. In particular, 
we will have to turn away from considerations strictly about what decisive virtues 
various ‘artefact of grammar’ theories might have, and turn instead to consider the 
fundamental tenets of these theories themselves, and see whether they can stand up to 
scrutiny. Let us take them in turn.
Starting with the expressivist view of self-knowledge, one simple 
consideration seems to count decisively against it. We are able to know non- 
inferentially, authoritatively, and in a way that is immune to non-cognitive error, a 
number of our thoughts, beliefs, desires and emotions even if we are silent, in a dark
1 See our earlier discussion o f perceptual accounts o f self-knowledge and o f the phenomenology o f the process o f 
introspective mental self-ascription -  ch. 1 section 1.2.1, as well as the end o f section 1.2.2.
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room, and, say, unable to move. This, recall, was a consideration that counted also 
against Rylean accounts of self-knowledge according to which we come to know our 
own mental states in no different way from the way in which we come to know the 
mental states of others, namely from observing our own behaviour (verbal or 
otherwise). The expressivist proposal may of course be seen to be an improvement on 
Rylean type positions in that it is actually able to accommodate the distinctiveness of 
our mental self-ascriptions at least in some cases, namely in those cases in which our 
mental self-ascriptions are being used as mere alternative ways of expressing the 
mental states thereby self-ascribed. Having said that, if our knowledge of our own 
mental states is taken to only have the distinctive features of immediacy, first-person 
authority and immunity to certain types of error in cases where this so called ‘self- 
knowledge’ is not actually knowledge, but mere expression of mental states, the 
awareness we are able to have of mental states of ours which we are not actually 
expressing still remains entirely unexplained.
So much therefore for the expressivist proposal. But, more interestingly, what 
about this whole general idea that there is an ontologically constitutive link between 
making an attitudinal avowal and having the corresponding first-order attitude? The 
problem with this approach more generally, is that it does not seem to leave any room 
for the phenomenon of error or self-deception about what we believe, desire, feel, 
etc., that is, for the fact (mentioned already in the introductory chapter -  section 0.1.2) 
that our first and second-order attitudes can, and often do, come apart. Despite the 
immunity to certain types of error of a wide range of our self-ascriptive beliefs, we 
can sometimes have second-order beliefs without having the corresponding first order 
attitudes.1
One might try to reply to this objection by arguing, following Bilgrami for 
instance, that cases of error and self-deception are not actually cases where we believe 
that we have an attitude which we do not in fact have, but rather, cases where we 
happen to have both the attitude self-ascribed and an attitude which is inconsistent 
with it. To say however that the self-deceived son in Bilgrami’s example,2 who 
behaves consistently and only contemptuously towards his father (the only evidence 
of his believing his father to be a fine person being his asserting that he does),
1 This point is emphasised amongst others by Boghossian (1989) and Martin (1998)
2 See (Bilgrami 1998, in particular p.218)
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believes both that his father is a fine person and that his father is not a fine person, is 
just, it seems, either to deny the obvious (ie. the possibility of self-deception), or 
simply to reiterate in different terms that he believes that he believes that his father is 
a fine person, but in fact does not believe that his father is a fine person, and hence is 
self-deceived.
Another possible line of defence of the strong constitutive thesis might be to 
argue that it is only constitutive of our self-ascriptions of our conscious (or non- 
conscious) attitudes that we have the attitudes self-ascribed, thereby leaving room for 
the possibility of being mistaken about a wide range of other beliefs, desires and 
emotions of ours (ie. our wrcconscious ones). The problem with this approach though, 
is that it seems to force us to say that it is ontologically constitutive only of some 
second-order beliefs of ours that we have the first-order states they are about, whereas 
it is not ontologically constitutive of other such beliefs of ours with the same content.1 
That is, for example, we end up having to say that in some instances, it is constitutive 
of my believing that I believe that it is raining that I actually do believe that it is 
raining, and that in other instances it is not. But now given that there seems to be no 
difference in the nature of the second-order beliefs in these two kinds of cases (other 
than the ad hoc difference that some are infallibly correct in virtue of some 
constitutive principle which does not happen to apply to the others), and given that the 
whole difference was supposed to hang on the (conscious or unconscious) nature of 
the first-order states self-ascribed, a more sensible approach at this point would be to 
say that our first and second-order sates are actually distinct states, and to try to see 
what it might be about a first-order states’ being conscious (as opposed to 
Hwconscious) that connects it particularly intimately to second-order beliefs about it. 
This however is almost by definition not a line that defenders of a strong constitutive 
theory of avowals would want to take. Not doing so however, at this point, just seems 
to be to insist without argument that the constitutive thesis is right (perhaps because 
no better account seems to be at hand) , and in effect just to say that our second-order 
judgements about our mental states are infallibly correct in all cases (ie. those in
1 This point is emphasised by Martin in (Martin 1998)
2 In fact, if  it turns out that none o f the more explanatory theoretical options work, we may have to just admit 
defeat and resort to a quietist position o f just describing how things are, and admitting that there is nothing more 
illuminating to be said. As Wright points out however, his view, which he calls the ‘default view’ is indeed a 
default view, that is, a view we can only be satisfied with if it is shown that no better or more illuminating account 
o f avowals can be given. See (Wright 1998, especially pp.44-45)
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which our second-order states constitute in us at the same time the states self­
ascribed) except in those in which they are not infallibly correct (ie. those in which 
having the second-order beliefs does not constitute in us the having of the first-order 
attitudes self-ascribed).
This whole problem in the end links back, as anticipated in the introductory 
chapter, to an issue raised there about the exact sense in which our self-ascriptive 
judgements can be said to be immune to error (or for that matter immediate and first- 
person authoritative). It was argued, recall, that in light of the fact that some of our 
second-order judgements do not exhibit the special features of immediacy, first- 
person authority and immunity to non-cognitive error, these features cannot be taken 
to be features of our second-order judgements considered merely as such (ie. as 
judgements with a particular form and content), but must instead be thought of as 
features of some special way we have of knowing some, but not all, of our mental 
states. It is, it seems, a fundamental mistake of artefact of grammar approaches in 
general, to take the problem of introspective self-knowledge to be a problem about 
certain kinds of statements, namely ‘avowals’, or about knowledge with a certain type 
of subject matter, ie. our own minds.1 The basic idea behind these views is that 
judgements about our own mental states are problematic because we take them to be 
authoritative, incorrigible, we do not ask people to defend them, etc. However, it is 
unclear that statements about our mental states taken as such actually are problematic, 
since in many cases (eg. when these statements are, say, about unconscious attitudes 
which we have come to know inferentially on the basis of behavioural evidence) there 
is no difficulty in explaining how they are possible. It is only in certain specific cases 
that our avowals are problematic, in that in these cases they appear to be non-inferred, 
authoritative, and it does not seem to make sense to ask us to defend them. The 
distinctiveness of these judgements therefore in certain cases, given that in other cases 
these same judgements (ie. judgements of the exact same form and with the same 
content) are not in any way distinctive, must therefore be a matter of how, in some 
cases and not in others, we are able to make them non-inferentially, authoritatively, 
and in a way that is immune to non-cognitive error. And, insofar as the question of 
competence arises, the possibility of authoritative self-knowledge raises traditional
1 See in particular the way in which the problem of self-knowledge is set up by Wright (1998), as a problem about 
‘avowals’, rather than as a problem about the way in which some o f them are arrived at.
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epistemological issues which cannot be dealt with through a purely metaphysical 
account.
Nonetheless, adopting a strong constitutive approach to attitudinal avowals 
might be appropriate when dealing with the narrower category of strict cogito-like 
judgements. Insofar as strict cogito-like judgements of the form ‘I am hereby thinking 
that p’ are self-verifying, their being non-inferred, first-person authoritative, etc. can 
be taken to be a feature of these judgements considered as such, rather than as reached 
in a certain way. However, following Boghossian,1 it is clear that such an account is 
not sufficiently general. It takes us nowhere nearer understanding the immediacy, 
authority, and immunity to non-cognitive error of our knowledge of other attitudes of 
ours which are either not strictly contained in our self-ascriptions of them, or not 
strictly simultaneous with these self-ascriptions. If I was just a moment ago thinking 
to myself ‘It is cold in here’ I am immediately and authoritatively able to say that just 
a moment ago I was thinking this. Or, when I non-inferentially judge ‘I would like a 
cup of coffee’, my desire for a cup of coffee is in no way contained in my self- 
ascriptive judgement. I could be lying, or indeed I could be wrong. It may in fact turn 
out that once I get the coffee I realise that what I actually wanted was a beer.
Adopting a strong constitutive approach to avowals might thus be the right 
approach to some cases of self-knowledge, namely strict cogito-like cases, just as 
adopting an inferential account of self-knowledge may well be the right approach to 
other cases, eg. cases of knowledge of our own unconscious states, and indeed just as 
adopting a perceptual model of self-knowledge might be the right way of dealing with 
yet other cases, namely cases, were they to exist, of ‘telepathic’ knowledge of some of 
our own mental states. The problem however is that none of these approaches seems 
able to deal with the most common and most problematic cases of self-knowledge, 
namely those where we are able to know what we believe, desire, feel, etc. 
authoritatively, without having to infer this from explicit data regarding our mental 
states, and in a way that is, although not infallible, nonetheless not subject to certain 
kinds of error. Our initial problem of introspective self-knowledge therefore still 
remains, as does however one further possible standard line of approach to it: the 
‘weak constitutive’ non reason-based approach.
1 (Boghossian 1989)
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2.2 The weak constitutive view
On this view, sometimes also called the ‘weak special access functionalist 
theory’,1 it is conceptually (though not ontologically) constitutive of having a first- 
order state that one will generally tend to form a second-order belief about it when 
one considers the matter (ie. of whether one has it). In other words, the idea is that, 
following a functionalist theory of mind, according to which mental states are to be 
individuated by way of their functional role, that is, by reference to their relations to 
other mental states and to behaviour, self-ascriptive higher-order beliefs are amongst 
the mental states a lower-order state’s relations to which are constitutive of it. For a 
state to be a belief, for instance, it must first of all tend to give rise to other beliefs, 
and tend to combine with desires and other attitudes with appropriately related 
contents to give rise to yet other attitudes and actions. The claim about self- 
knowledge then is that such first-order beliefs or indeed other first-order attitudes, not 
only have conceptually constitutive dispositional links to other first-order attitudes 
and to behaviour, but also to second-order beliefs about themselves. That is, for one to 
qualify as having, say, a certain first-order belief or simple emotion or desire, one 
must not only be disposed to form other appropriately related first-order beliefs and 
other attitudes, but also, in certain circumstances, to non-inferentially self-ascribe this 
belief/emotion/desire itself, that is, to form a second-order belief about it.
At first, this idea might seem to make a lot of sense, given that we would not 
generally be prepared to ascribe to someone, without thorough consideration of any 
overriding evidence, a mental state which they themselves did not believe themselves 
to have. In addition, this kind of constitutive view seems to have the advantage over 
strong constitutive views of leaving plenty of room for the possibility of error and 
self-deception, given its commitment to the ontological distinctness of first and 
second-order states, combined with the thought that it is constitutive of first-order 
states only that they tend normally (in circumstances of full rationality, reflectiveness, 
etc.) to give rise to second-order beliefs about themselves. There is therefore it seems 
something very appealing about this approach to introspective self-knowledge. It 
seems able to accommodate all three of the distinctive features of our knowledge of
1 See (Fricker 1998)
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our own minds without being subject to the problems faced by the other available 
standard accounts. Nevertheless, two features of it seem worthy of notice:
First, the supposedly constitutive feature of mental states that they tend to give 
rise to second-order beliefs about themselves needs to be relativised it seems to 
conscious mental states,1 since many psychological states of ours never give rise to 
non-inferential self-ascriptions of them (eg. our unconscious states). It can therefore 
surely not be conceptually constitutive of these states, namely the unconscious ones, 
that they be dispositionally linked to second-order beliefs about themselves, although 
we would certainly still want to count them as genuine beliefs, emotions, desires, etc. 
In other words, the weak constitutive functionalist thesis can it seems only apply to 
conscious states, that is, it can only be conceptually constitutive of having a conscious 
state that one will tend to form a second-order belief about it. The basic idea behind 
this view therefore has to be that it is not conceptually constitutive of having mental 
states that they be dispositionally linked to second-order beliefs simply in virtue of 
their being beliefs or desires, but essentially in virtue of their being conscious beliefs, 
desires, etc. But now this might tempt one to ask what it is about a state’s being 
conscious (as opposed to wwconscious) that makes it the case that if one has it, one 
will tend not only to form other first-order states with appropriately related contents, 
but also to self-ascribe it. The importance of this question will become clearer as we 
proceed.
A second, and not unrelated noteworthy point is that when we consider the 
nature of the first-order states to which a certain other state’s relations are 
conceptually constitutive of it, it is striking that these are all states that have relevantly 
similar contents to the one being individuated. That is, on most functionalist theories, 
the conceptually constitutive functional role of, say, a belief that p, is its tending to 
give rise to yet other beliefs and actions with relevantly similar or appropriately 
related contents. It is, for instance, part of the functional role constitutive of my 
believing that there is ice-cream in the refrigerator, that this belief will tend to 
combine with my desire for ice-cream, to give rise to an action of going to the 
refrigerator and getting the ice-cream. In other words, a functionalist individuation of 
mental states, on a theory according to which it is conceptually constitutive of mental
1 Unless otherwise specified, by a ‘conscious’ state I will mean from here onward an ‘occurrent or non-occurrent’ 
conscious state as distinct from an ‘unconscious’ state until we reach Part III o f the thesis where more subtle 
distinctions will be relevant (the occurrent/non-occurrent distinction).
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states qua mental (and not, say, qua physical) that they be related to other mental 
states and to behaviour, seems to be in effect an individuation of them by reference to 
what states are good reasons for having them, and what states they themselves are 
good reasons for having.1 Thus, the idea of mental states having constitutive 
dispositional links to other mental states and to behaviour is the idea that mental states 
are to be individuated essentially in terms of what are typically good reasons for 
having them, or what attitudes they themselves are typically good reasons for having, 
and, these reason-giving relations can be made sense of, it seems, by reference to 
certain appropriate relations holding between their contents -  eg. my fear of spiders 
will combine with certain beliefs about how to get away from spiders, to give rise to 
effective courses of action taking me away from spiders. It will not combine in this 
way with beliefs about, say, what there is in the refrigerator, or give rise to actions 
with regard to ice-cream.
The problem however now with the weak constitutive functionalist view of 
self-knowledge is the following. If the above is what it is for it to be conceptually 
constitutive of a mental state to be dispositionally related to other mental states and to 
behaviour, the next question is: given the unrelatedness of first and second-order 
contents, how are we to make sense of the thesis that it is conceptually constitutive of 
having a first-order attitude that it will tend to give rise to a second-order belief about 
itself? Or, how are we to make sense of the idea, lying at the very basis of the weak 
constitutive theory of self-knowledge, that this constitutive link is on a par with the 
constitutive link our first-order states bear to other first-order states and to behaviour? 
There are, it seems, two ways in which one might go from here:
(1) One could try to explain how a first-order conscious state can stand in the 
same kind of relation to a second-order state as it does to other first-order states in 
relation to which it is conceptually individuated (ie. in some kind of internal rational 
relation), and this could be done perhaps by explaining what it is about a state’s being
1 The notion o f a reason-giving transition will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. For present purposes 
though the idea is, briefly, that the notion o f a reason-giving transition between two states can be understood 
roughly by reference either to logical relations (particularly when dealing with reason-giving relations between 
beliefs), or to some appropriate overlap, holding between their contents. For example, my believing that there is 
ice-cream in the refrigerator combined with my desire for ice-cream will not constitute an immediate reason for 
my starting to read a book on self-knowledge, although it will constitute a reason for my going to the refrigerator 
and getting the ice-cream. Similarly, my believing that p, combined with my believing that q, will not constitute an 
immediate reason for my believing that z, although it may well constitute an immediate reason for my moving on 
to believe that (p and q).
2 First-order states are about the world, while second-order states are about mental states.
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conscious that allows it to stand in such a relation to a second-order belief about itself. 
That is, one could try to explain how a first-order conscious state can stand in a 
rational or internal reason-giving relation to a second-order state despite the 
unrelatedness of first and second-order contents. To do this however would be to drift 
away from a non reason-based account.
(2) One could hold onto a non reason-based view, and argue that although the 
conceptually constitutive connection a first-order state bears to other first-order states 
happens to be associated with reason-giving relations holding between them, this just 
simply happens not to be the case of the constitutive connection between a first-order 
state and a self-ascription of it. If so, however, that is, if our first and second-order 
states are both ontologically and rationally unrelated, then it is not clear how the 
relation between them can be conceptually constitutive of having them. That is, at the 
very least, it cannot be constitutive of a first-order state qua mental state that it will 
tend to give rise to a second-order belief about it, though it may perhaps be 
constitutive of its physical realization in the brain.
If this however (ie. the latter) is what the view amounts to, it ceases to be clear 
how it is any better than an entirely non-constitutive purely reliabilist view of self- 
knowledge, given that it will end up being just as incapable as non-constitutive 
theories are of explaining, amongst other things, why we intuitively feel that it is a 
matter of conceptual necessity that one cannot have a conscious state without being 
disposed to self-ascribe it, or of explaining why Moorean utterances of the form ‘p, 
but I do not believe that p’ are conceptually odd, or indeed contradictory. In other 
words, if this (ie. (2)) is what the weak constitutive view amounts to, it is no more 
plausible than a purely reliabilist view of self-knowledge -  which we have already 
rejected. If on the other hand it amounts to more than this (ie. (1)), then it is no longer 
a non reason-based view.
We have now reached the conclusion that introspective self-knowledge can 
first of all not be based on any of the normal ways we have of gaining knowledge, 
namely by inference from observation (or direct observation) of our behaviour or 
through direct ‘inner observation’ of our mental states. And, in this chapter, we have 
seen that the issue of the distinctiveness of our introspective second-order judgements 
cannot be a purely metaphysical issue regarding a certain class of judgements, as 
suggested by strong constitutive non reason-based accounts. A certain version of the 
weak constitutive approach however appears to be somewhat more promising, in that
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it seems less subject to the problems faced by its stronger counterparts. However, this 
turns out to be so essentially in virtue of its not actually being a non reason-based 
view after all, but a view implicit in which is the idea that our mental self-ascriptions 
are based on reasons, not however on inference or observation, but directly on the 
mental states thereby self-ascribed. In other words, in spite of the failure of the three 
standard options of ‘inference, inner sense or nothing’, we seem to have here a 
possible intermediate position between the second and the third. This position 
however seems to immediately give rise to a further problem, which any satisfactory 
account along these lines is going to have to resolve, namely that of explaining how 
having a first-order conscious state can itself constitute a reason for self-ascribing it.
To put things differently, we are now faced with the following question, which 
is to guide much of the rest of this thesis: how can having an attitude towards the 
world constitute an immediate reason for believing something about our mental states, 
given that nothing about what mental states we are in follows directly from how 
things are in the world?
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Chapter 3: Our grounds for self-knowledge: an 
explanatory puzzle
The central task of this thesis has shifted. Our analysis of the non reason-based 
approach in the last chapter, and through it the discovery of the only type of account 
seemingly able to offer a satisfactory solution to our initial problem of authoritative 
introspective self-knowledge (ie. the ‘intermediate’ reason-based approach), has 
moved our main task from that of coming up with an account of self-knowledge that 
can accommodate the features of immediacy, first-person authority and immunity to 
non-cognitive error, to the more specific task of explaining how an experience/ 
episode of thought/ episode of visualization/ etc. of the world (or of some aspect of it) 
can constitute the direct evidential basis or reason for making a judgement not just 
about the world (or relevant aspect thereof) but also about the mental episode itself (or 
about some mental disposition one may have towards that same aspect of the world). 
Put differently, the process of uncovering a satisfactory solution to the traditional 
problem of authoritative introspective self-knowledge has led us to a deeper puzzle 
about self-knowledge than the one with which we started.
The first aim of this chapter will be to articulate this puzzle further, and to 
establish whether, and why, it must be addressed head-on. The rest of the chapter will 
then consider how successful two recent attempts to uphold such an ‘intermediate’ 
reason-based view of self-knowledge might be at generating an answer to it.
3.1 Justification and self-knowledge
How can having a first-order (ie. world-directed) state itself constitute a direct 
rational ground, or personal level reason, or direct epistemic basis for believing
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something about our mental states? In fact, what in the first place is it for a mental 
state to stand as a reason for believing anything at all -  be it about our mental states or 
about the world?
There are broadly speaking two questions about the epistemic justification of a 
belief that one could ask, corresponding to two different ways of individuating 
beliefs: (1) What makes a particular proposition believed (or belief content) justified; 
and (2) What makes someone’s believing that proposition justified. The two are not 
unrelated.
A proposition that p can be said to be justified, roughly, when there is 
(impersonally speaking) reason to believe it. Someone’s belief that p, on the other 
hand, can be said to be justified when this person has adequate reasons or grounds for 
believing it. More precisely, answering a question of the form ‘What makes the 
proposition that p justified?’ or ‘What reasons (impersonally speaking) are there for 
believing that p? involves providing an argument for p (or pointing to directly 
suggestive aspects of the world), that is, providing a story (or direct evidence) which 
entails or makes probable (or directly suggests) that p. For example, answering a 
question such as ‘What makes the proposition that Mary is in the library justified?’ or 
‘What reasons are there (impersonally speaking) for believing that she is in the 
library?’ would involve mentioning, say, (1) that Mary goes to the library almost 
every day, (2) that she said she was going to be in the library today, (3) that she 
usually does what she says. Or, alternatively, it might involve just drawing attention 
(say, by pointing) to (4) her standing in what is visibly a library. In other words, 
answering a question of the first type involves pointing to available evidence for a 
particular proposition, that is, to facts, other propositions, ways the world might be or 
appear which either entail, or make probable, or are directly suggestive of p.
On the other hand, answering a question of the form ‘What makes S’s belief in 
proposition p justified?’ or ‘What reasons/grounds does S have for believing that p?’, 
involves considering first why the proposition that p is justified, or what reasons 
(impersonally speaking) there are for believing that p (ie. answering the first 
question), then restricting one’s answer only to those facts (or to those ‘reasons’ or 
‘grounds’ in the first sense) to which the believer has access. To apply this to our 
example, answering a question such as ‘What makes John’s belief that Mary is in the 
library justified?’ or ‘What reasons/grounds does John have for believing that she is in 
the library’ would involve mentioning, for instance, that John heard her say that she
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would be in the library and that he believes that she usually does what she says. If, 
however, John was neither aware of her daily habits nor heard her speak of her plans 
for the day, or did hear her but did not take her to be trustworthy, he would not count 
as justified in his belief, although in this case the proposition that Mary is in the 
library would still be justified. There would still be (impersonally speaking) reason to 
believe it, although John himself would not have reasons or grounds for believing it. 
Or, put differently, there would still be evidence for p available, though John himself 
would not possess or have access to any such evidence.
Thus, in sum, in the first sense, a ‘reason’ or a ‘rational ground’ is essentially a 
fact, proposition or way the world might be. In the second sense, it is a state o f mind 
of a particular person. And, someone’s having a particular mental state can be said to 
constitute an immediate reason or ground in the second sense for their coming to 
believe that p, if their having this state somehow involves (perhaps amongst other 
things) their having access (loosely speaking)1 to evidence for p, that is, their having 
access to reasons in the first sense, ie. to facts, propositions, ways the world might be 
or appear which either entail, or make probable, or are directly suggestive of p being 
the case.
Now, given the specific puzzle before us, it is clearly the second sense of 
‘reason’ or ‘rational ground’ (ie. understood as an internal psychological basis for 
believing something) that is relevant. The puzzling question left to us from chapter 2 
was a question about how the transition between two mental states can be directly 
reason-giving, and indeed how it can be reason-giving in an essentially internalist 
sense. We were left, that is, with the need to explain how moving directly from having 
an attitude towards the world to self-ascribing a mental state could be something that 
it ‘makes rational sense’ to us to do from within our own point of view.2
1 Insofar as we are here concerned only with reason-giving transitions between two mental states or between an 
initial set o f states and a subsequent belief (ie. independently o f what other states one might have, and 
independently o f  the origin or grounding o f  the initial state(s)) this so called ‘access’ need not be veridical. In the 
sense relevant here, we can count a person as having reasons for believing that p, or as having ‘access’ to evidence 
for p as long as they perceive, or believe, or have experiences as o f  (even if  not actually of) certain facts, or ways 
the world might be which entail, or make probable, or are directly suggestive o f p.
2 There are o f course other possible accounts available o f  what constitutes a rational relation, in particular to be 
found in reliabilist and other externalist accounts o f justification. These however seem to go clearly against the 
phenomenology o f belief formation, and more to the point, against the phenomenology o f  second-order belief 
formation in cases o f so called ‘introspection’ (For our earlier discussion o f this, and rejection o f purely reliabilist 
accounts o f the relation between our first-order conscious states and our authoritative self-ascriptions o f them see 
chapter 1, sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, as well as much o f the end o f chapter 2). More generally, when making a 
judgement -  be it about the world or about our mental states -  we do not seem to just find ourselves, as Evans 
would put it, ‘with a yen to apply some concept’ (1982, p.229). Rather, doing so (ie. coming to form a conscious 
belief -  whether first or second-order) is something that makes rational sense to us from within our own personal-
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So, a mental state is to count, in the sense relevant here, as a reason or rational 
ground for believing that p, if the content of this state is either directly suggestive of p 
being the case, or potentially figures as a relevant premise in a possible argument 
which either entails or makes probable that p, that is, in an argument from which it 
follows either deductively or inductively that p.1
Consider thus again the puzzling question that chapter 2 left us with: how can 
having a first-order wor/c/-directed state constitute or give rise to an immediate reason 
for believing something about our mental states? In light of the understanding just 
laid out of what it is for one mental state to stand as an immediate reason or rational 
ground for moving on to hold a particular belief, the puzzle implicit in this question 
(or the explanatory problem faced by the approach to self-knowledge according to 
which there is a direct reason-giving relation between our first and second-order 
states) becomes apparent: given that from facts about how the world is nothing either 
follows, or is directly suggested, about what mental states we are in, how can having a 
conscious attitude towards the world constitute an immediate reason for believing 
something about our mental states?
To illustrate this problem, consider first the following simple transition 
between two initial states (1 & 2) and a subsequent resulting belief (3):
1. John heard (that) Mary say (said) that she would be in the library today
2. John believes that Mary usually does what she says
3. John believes that Mary is in the library
Here, John’s reasons or rational grounds for believing that Mary is in the
library (ie. states 1 & 2) have as contents the possible premises of an argument or
level point o f view. We turn to the world for evidence or confirmation -  not just to ‘trigger’ beliefs -  be it about 
the world or about our mental states.
1 I am taking it here that perceptual experiences, and not just beliefs, can constitute reasons or rational grounds for 
beliefs, although o f course they cannot constitute inferential grounds. It is sometimes held however that beliefs can 
only be justified by other beliefs because perceptual experiences are not subject to revision; they are not something 
we are responsible for, and so it does not make sense to say that one ought to believe that p if  one perceives that p. 
This however does not seem entirely right, given that we would actually judge someone to be irrational if  they 
saw that it was raining but did not believe that it was (assuming o f course they had no reason to mistrust their 
senses). Moreover, given the possibility o f disbelief in one’s senses, a perceptual experience can surely be taken to 
constitute an evidential ground, or count as a reason amongst others, for believing something. A perceptual 
experience is moreover a clear form o f  ‘access’ that a believer might have to a justifying fact.
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direct pieces of evidence (on the right hand side), which are suggestive of p being the 
case, or which make it probable that p, or from which it follows (although not strictly 
in this case) that p. So far so good.
Now, contrast this with another simple case of a mental transition, this time 
between a first-order state (1) and a self-ascription of this first-order state (2):
1. John believes that Mary usually does what she says
2. John believes that John believes that Mary usually does what she says
Clearly, in this case, the conclusion of the possible argument on the right hand 
side (from the content of 1 to the content of 2) in no way follows from the premise, so 
how can John’s believing the premise constitute an immediate reason from him to 
move on to believe the conclusion? And, this is just the simplest of examples. Even 
more mind boggling is the question of how a transition between a world-directed 
emotion or desire and a subsequent self-ascription of it could be directly reason- 
giving in the above sense, since emotions and desires are on the face of it not forms of 
‘access’ to anything at all, let alone to the right types of facts -  ie. to facts about our 
mental states.1
There are essentially two ways in which one could try to respond to this 
problem: (a) one could take it to constitute an actual problem for the ‘intermediate’ 
reason-based approach to authoritative mental self-ascription, and hence a reason to 
reject it, or (b) one could take this puzzle as an explanatory challenge that must be 
and can be addressed.
In the next two sections, two such ‘intermediate’ reason-based accounts of
'y
self-knowledge (those of Burge and Peacocke) -  ie. accounts according to which 
there is indeed some form of direct reason-giving relation between our first-order 
states and our second-order self-ascriptive judgements -  will be considered in turn. 
These would seem to offer us ways of taking line (b). Neither account however will in
1 To avoid over-complicating things from the outset, the case o f our self-ascriptions o f  emotions and desires will, 
although touched upon here, returned to in greater detail in chapter 6. The focus in this chapter will be primarily on 
the puzzle as it arises for cases o f transitions between world-directed cognitive states and second-order beliefs 
about them.
2 Unless otherwise stated, all references in this chapter will be to (Burge 1996). For Peacocke see (Peacocke 
1992; 1996; 1998)
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the end be seen to have the resources to fully explain this relation (independently of 
whether it was their aim to do so), though a close analysis of their discussions will 
reveal that such a relation must hold, and allow us furthermore to uncover the form 
that a fully explanatory account of this relation will actually have to take. More than 
that, identifying the limitations of Burge’s and Peacocke’s approaches to this issue 
will, we will be see, ultimately narrow down the options available to us for explaining 
this reason-giving relation between first and second-order states to the extent of 
revealing exactly how our puzzle is to be solved, and indeed the only way in which it 
could be solved.
More specifically, Burge’s account of our entitlement to self-knowledge will 
be considered first. It will be argued in the next section that, although Burge’s account 
turns out to be unsatisfactory given our present explanatory aim (ie. the aim of 
explaining how a first-order state can constitute an immediate reason for self- 
ascribing it), his account can be used to generate a reductio ad absurdum of the view 
that our introspective second-order judgements might not be directly and rationally 
related to our first-order conscious states. An intermediate reason-based approach to 
self-knowledge, it will thus be suggested, must be adopted, thereby making approach 
(a) above no longer viable. Approach (b) will therefore have to be taken, and the 
question of how a conscious first-order state can constitute an immediate reason for 
self-ascribing it will have to be addressed. Next, Peacocke’s account will be turned to. 
This account, it will be argued, ultimately faces much the same predicament as 
Burge’s. Its specific limitations however will be seen to narrow down the options 
even further, to the point of revealing the only possible way in which our puzzle could 
be solved, and thereby the possibility of immediate authoritative introspective self- 
knowledge in the end fully accounted for. Let us begin with Burge’s account of our 
entitlement to self-knowledge.
3.2 Burge
According to Burge, the following claims hold:
(1) We have, and are entitled to, a distinctive non-perceptual, epistemically special 
kind of self-knowledge (by which he means, in the end, knowledge had from and 
about the same cognitive perspective -  understood in the sense defined in chapter 1
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above1 -  and so knowledge that stands in an immediate rational relation to that which 
it is about).
(2) This entitlement to this special kind of self-knowledge arises essentially from the 
role of this knowledge in critical reasoning.
In support of the first claim, Burge puts forward a transcendental argument to 
the effect that critical reasoning requires being entitled to a special kind of self- 
knowledge, and, since we are critical reasoners, it follows that we must be so entitled. 
More specifically, the argument runs as follows:
(1) We are able to reason critically. That is, we are able to reason in the fully 
reflective way spelt out in chapter 2 above.
(2) Critical reasoning requires the following:
(i) that we be epistemically entitled to certain judgements about our
attitudes and reasons
(ii) that these judgements constitute knowledge (ie. that they be 
normally true and not just accidentally so)
(iii) that this knowledge be distinctive in being directly rationally related 
to the attitudes it is about.
(3)Therefore, by (1), we must be entitled to this distinctive kind of self-knowledge. 
Concerning (i) it is clear that we could not possibly reason critically if we
were not entitled to our judgements about our own attitudes, that is, if we were not 
being reasonable in making them. In fact, if we were not reasonable in our reflective 
judgements about our own attitudes, we could not be reasonable in our conclusions 
derived from reasoning based on these judgements, nor could we be reasonable in our 
reviews of our attitudes based on these conclusions. Critical reasoning would 
therefore not be possible, given its nature as reasoning which involves reasonable 
confirmation, change, or supplementation of our attitudes based on our reflection on 
these attitudes. If we were not entitled to our second-order beliefs about our first-order 
attitudes, this would mean that reviewing or confirming our attitudes on the basis of 
rational reflection on these attitudes and on our reasons for holding them, would not 
actually be a reasonable enterprise to engage in, and so, insofar as we are rational, we 
would not engage in it.
1 See chapter 1, p. 34
2 See chapter 1, p.36
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Concerning (ii), the basic idea is, once again, that if these judgements to which 
we are entitled did not constitute knowledge, then genuine critical reasoning would 
not be possible. In fact, we engage in critical reasoning essentially for the purpose of 
arriving, through reflection on our attitudes, at more reasonable beliefs and at a 
rationally more coherent set of attitudes. That is, the point of reasoning critically is to 
control or guide our beliefs and other attitudes in such a way as to further their 
reasonability and rational coherence. If, however, our second-order judgements were 
either never true or only accidentally so, then changing our attitudes on the basis of 
conclusions derived from reasoning based on these judgements would not be a case of 
rationally controlling or guiding our attitudes, even if it somehow accidentally 
resulted in the promotion of their rational coherence.
Finally, concerning point (iii), as already suggested in chapter 1 by way of an 
example, critical reasoning seems to require that the knowledge we use in reasoning 
critically be had from and about the same cognitive perspective, and must therefore be 
directly and rationally related to the attitudes it is about. In other words, the idea is 
that our first-order conscious attitudes must constitute immediate reasons for judging 
that we have them, and similarly, that our second-order evaluative judgements about 
these first-order attitudes (eg. a judgement that a first-order attitude of ours is 
unreasonable), must constitute immediate reasons for confirming, reviewing or 
supplementing them.
At this point however, given the explanatory puzzle that this kind of view of 
the relation between our first and second-order states has given rise to, one might be 
sceptical about just going along with this argument. In fact, the only kind of argument 
that could give us a good reason to accept, rather than reject, an intermediate reason- 
based approach to self-knowledge in light of the clear problem it gives rise to, would 
be one which could somehow show us that critical reasoning would be impossible if it 
were done from and about a different cognitive perspective. In this way, given that we 
clearly are able to reason critically,1 our conscious attitudes and our self-ascriptions 
of them must be held from within the same cognitive perspective, and so must stand in 
immediate reason-giving relations to each other.
1 I am for instance critically reasoning right now in considering and evaluating my beliefs about self-knowledge, 
with the aim o f coming through this process o f reasoning at more reasonable beliefs on this topic.
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It seems to me that such an argument can indeed be provided, namely the 
following reductio ad absurdum of the view that the immediate self-ascriptive 
judgements we use in critical reasoning could be held from a different cognitive 
perspective from that of the attitudes they are about.
Let us start by assuming, for the sake of argument, that the self-ascriptive 
judgements we use in critical reasoning are made from a different perspective from 
the perspective of the attitudes reasoned about, and that they are therefore entirely 
independent from these attitudes, to which they are related only by a reliable, but 
purely contingent, non-rational, causal mechanism. Let us then ask whether on these 
assumptions genuine critical reasoning, as defined in chapter 1 above,1 would be 
possible.
For the sake of clarity, let us consider a case in which the relevant dissociation 
of perspectives is a dissociation between the perspectives of two different people. In 
fact, let us imagine that my beliefs about your attitudes and your attitudes are linked 
by some reliable causal mechanism, and, moreover, that I decide to engage in critical 
reasoning about your attitudes, and begin to reflect on them and on their reasonability, 
and that I thereby come to the conclusion that you are not being reasonable in one of 
your beliefs. What would happen next? The process of critical reasoning would seem 
to be blocked at this stage. The problem is that in critical reasoning, the conclusions 
arrived at from reasoning based on reflection on one’s attitudes, should immediately 
and rationally result in an explicit reasonable change or confirmation of the attitudes 
reasoned about. So, if I were genuinely reasoning critically, then my coming to the 
conclusion that you were being unreasonable in one of your beliefs should make it 
immediately rational for you to change your beliefs, which it does not seem to do. In 
order for my process of reflection on your attitudes to result in your explicitly and 
reasonably changing your beliefs, this process would somehow first have to result in 
your coming yourself to believe that a belief of yours is unreasonable. This could 
happen indirectly, for instance, if I were to somehow succeed in convincing you of the 
unreasonableness of your belief by making you go yourself through the reflection I 
just went through about your attitudes. In this case however, the reasonable review of 
your attitudes would end up ultimately resulting from your reflection on your own 
attitudes, and not directly from mine. Alternatively, a direct way in which you could
1 See chapter 1, p.36
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come to hold the belief that a certain belief of yours was unreasonable as a result of 
my reflection on your attitudes, would be via some direct (contingent, non-rational) 
causal mechanism linking the conclusions of my reflections to your beliefs. The 
problem with this however would be that this causal mechanism could not be the 
same kind of mechanism by which my second-order beliefs are related to your first- 
order beliefs, since such a mechanism would only entitle you to the belief that I  
believe that you are being unreasonable in one of your beliefs, but not to the belief 
that you actually are being unreasonable. It would therefore again not immediately 
follow that there would be reason for you to change your belief. The relevant kind of 
mechanism would have to be one whereby whatever conclusion I arrived at from 
reasoning based on my judgements about your attitudes, would immediately, and non- 
rationally, cause you to hold this same belief. Of course now the problem would be 
that critical reasoning would still be impossible, given that such reasoning involves 
review or confirmation of one’s attitudes based on conclusions derived rationally 
from reasoning about one’s attitudes, whereas in this case, although my conclusion 
that a certain belief of yours is unreasonable would be directly and rationally derived 
from reasoning about your attitudes, your belief that a belief of yours is unreasonable 
would not be directly rationally derived from any such reasoning.
For critical reasoning to be possible, in other words, all the reflective beliefs 
about your attitudes as well as the reasoning about them and the conclusions thereby 
reached would have to be ultimately held by you, that is, by the same person whose 
attitudes are being reasoned about. And, to return to the case of single individuals, this 
means that in order to reason critically, all our reflective second-order beliefs about 
our attitudes must be held from the same rational, cognitive perspective as our first- 
order attitudes.
In sum, our nature as critical reasoners requires that our introspective 
knowledge of our own conscious states be had from and about the same cognitive 
perspective as the conscious states thereby known, and, by definition of a cognitive 
perspective,1 that there must be a direct rational relation between our first and 
second-order states, in addition to whatever underlying causal relation may or may 
not also hold between them. In other words, if our introspective self-knowledge were 
not of this kind we could know our own mental states and reason about them, but
1 See chapter 1, p.34
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could not thereby immediately rationally influence them, just as, if we had telepathic 
knowledge of someone else’s mental states, this would not give us any kind of 
immediate rational control over them. But, since in reasoning critically, our reflective 
judgements do immediately rationally influence our first-order states, these 
judgements must be of the above distinctive kind. Any judgements about our own 
attitudes which are not based in this direct rational way (such as, for instance, 
judgements about our own unconscious attitudes), could not be part of a genuine 
process of critical reasoning. Since, however, the immediate introspective, 
authoritative judgements we ordinarily make about our states are the very judgements 
we use in critical reasoning, these judgements must be of this distinctive kind, which 
however just leads us straight back to our initial problem about how this can be. The 
only difference now is that the problem is even more pressing, since we can no longer 
respond to it by simply rejecting the approach to self-knowledge that generates it. The 
only way forward is thus to try to provide a head-on answer to it. Can such an answer 
be extracted from Burge’s account of our entitlement to self-knowledge?
According to Burge, our entitlement to this special kind of self-knowledge is 
to be found essentially in our nature as critical reasoners. That is, the role of self- 
knowledge in critical reasoning is supposed to be the very source of our entitlement to 
it. However, in reading Burge’s (1996) paper, one might find that nothing beyond the 
earlier mentioned transcendental argument is put forward in support of the claim that 
the role of our introspective judgements in critical reasoning is the source of our 
entitlement to them. Yet, all this argument seems to show is that critical reasoning 
presupposes that we are entitled to a special kind of self-knowledge, but it does not 
tell us why we are so entitled, or how it is that we can be so entitled. One might 
therefore argue, following Peacocke,1 that Burge’s account gets things the wrong way 
around. If critical reasoning requires being entitled to self-knowledge, then one must 
first be entitled to self-knowledge if one is to be able to reason critically. Critical 
reasoning can therefore not possibly be the source of our entitlement but only a 
consequence of it.
In a sense, Peacocke is right in his objection to Burge. To be fair to Burge 
however, it is not clear that he is speaking of ‘entitlement’ or ‘source’ of entitlement
1 (Peacocke 1996)
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in the same sense as Peacocke. In fact, by way of an example, we can distinguish the 
following two notions of entitlement:
(1) The sense in which I may, for instance, be entitled to use the concept of a cause 
(as opposed to just that of constant conjunction) because without it, following Kant’s 
second analogy,1 objective experience would be impossible. The very existence of 
experience itself therefore warrants me in my use of it. This, however, says nothing 
about
(2) What grounds I have on a particular occasion for saying that A caused B. What 
was the basis for my judgement? Did I infer it from some information I already had? 
Was my judgement based on what I saw? Was it purely a guess? etc. In this sense, I 
am entitled to a judgement if it is based on, or grounded in, a good reason.
When talking about our entitlement to self-knowledge, Burge seems to have in 
mind sense (1), whereas Peacocke, in his objection to Burge, has in mind sense (2). 
That is, for Burge, our nature as critical reasoners warrants or justifies us in our use of 
our immediate, non-inferential, authoritative, directly reason-based self-ascriptions, in 
that without them critical reasoning would not be possible. In this sense, the role of 
our immediate introspective judgements in critical reasoning can indeed be thought of 
as the source of our entitlement to them. Burge is not concerned with what entitles us 
to self-knowledge in any other sense than this. But, one might ask, why is he not? 
Should he be concerned with explaining what our immediate judgements about our 
conscious attitudes are based on? Perhaps his thought is that there is nothing 
illuminating there to be said about what entitles us to self-knowledge in this sense. 
Our judgements are just immediate; they are not based on any evidence.
As pointed out though already in the introductory chapter, a judgement can be 
both immediate and rationally grounded. Moreover, given Burge’s account of critical 
reasoning, it looks like our second-order judgements clearly are rationally based on 
something, namely on our first-order (ie. world-directed) states. As seen above, for 
critical reasoning to be possible, our first-order attitudes must constitute immediate 
reasons for judging that we have them, and likewise, our second-order evaluative 
judgements must constitute immediate reasons for reviewing or confirming our first- 
order attitudes. Burge’s account in other words does seem to suggest that our
1 (Kant 1929)
2 See p.9 above.
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introspective second-order beliefs are based on reasons, that these reasons are the very 
first-order attitudes they are about, and moreover, that these first-order attitudes must 
count as good reasons for our second-order judgements, if critical reasoning is to be a 
reasonable activity to engage in. Burge’s account thus seems to imply that we have a 
special kind of entitlement to our mental self-ascriptions in sense (2) and not just in 
sense (1). It does not however explain this entitlement, but only leads us more 
forcefully back to the question set out at the beginning of this chapter, namely that of 
how our conscious world-oriented attitudes can possibly constitute immediate reasons 
for our attitude-onznXQdi beliefs. That is, how can it be directly rational to move from 
a conscious attitude towards the world to a belief about oneself and one’s mental 
states?
Burge does not address this question nor does he go into the issue of the 
rational grounding of our immediate introspective judgements at all, because as 
mentioned, perhaps he takes it that nothing illuminating can be said about how there 
can be a direct reason-giving relation between our first and second-order conscious 
states. All that can be said is that it must be so, because if it were not, we would not 
be able to reason critically, and it so happens that we are able to reason critically. We, 
however, need to say more than that. Or, at the very least given our explanatory aim, 
any option in this direction must be fully explored before resorting to the not so 
obviously coherent idea that the relation between our first and second-order states 
must necessarily be thought of as rational or reason-giving, yet in a way which bears 
no resemblance to the way in which other transitions between mental states of ours 
are understood as being rational or reason-giving. Perhaps Peacocke has the answer. 
His account certainly attempts to take things further in the suggested direction than 
Burge’s.
3.3 Peacocke
Focusing on the case of belief self-ascriptions,1 according to Peacocke it is 
inscribed in the very possession conditions for the concept of belief that anyone who
1 In his various discussions o f introspective self-knowledge, as is common in the literature on the subject, 
Peacocke focuses primarily on cases o f  belief self-ascription. Presumably however, as will become clear from the 
account he puts forward o f belief self-ascriptions, Peacocke would put forward a similar account o f our 
authoritative self-ascriptions o f emotions and desires. We will thus assume his account to extend to such cases.
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possesses this concept will find it ‘primitively compelling’ to judge that they believe 
that p, whenever they have an occurrent conscious belief that p (and consider the 
matter), and they will find judging so primitively compelling precisely because they 
have this belief, that is, for the very reason that they consciously believe that p. In 
fact, on this view, one will not count as possessing the concept of belief unless one 
has, in appropriate circumstances, a tendency to make such ‘consciously-based self- 
ascriptions’.1 In other words, on his view, someone who possesses the concept of 
belief will make immediate judgements about their occurrent conscious beliefs 
directly and rationally on the basis of these very first-order beliefs themselves. 
Moreover, these self-ascriptive judgements can be said to constitute knowledge, or 
warranted true beliefs (and not just true beliefs), because, when made for the very 
reason that one does have the self-ascribed state, they will be bound to be true. Self- 
ascribing one’s own beliefs in this way can in other words be said to be a reasonable 
(justified/warranted) process to engage in because it is one which is likely to lead to 
true beliefs. And, this warrant or entitlement one has to one’s ‘consciously-based’ 
self-ascriptions can be seen to have its source in the very conditions of what it is to 
possess the concept of belief, since these conditions are such that anyone who 
possesses the concept of belief will normally make mental self-ascriptions in the 
direct way outlined above, that is, directly on the basis of the very conscious beliefs 
self-ascribed, and so only in circumstances in which they actually do have these 
beliefs. Given this account of our entitlement to a special kind of self-knowledge, the 
next question is: how does it compare to Burge’s?
In the last section we saw how Burge’s transcendental argument from critical 
reasoning shows that we must be entitled to our immediate judgements about our own 
conscious states based directly and rationally on these conscious states themselves, 
but it does not actually explain why moving from a first-order conscious attitude to a 
self-ascription of it is a rational or warranted transition; it only suggests that it must 
be. Peacocke’s account on the other hand, does, in a sense, seem to explain this: we 
are reasonable in making judgements about our occurrent conscious beliefs on the 
basis of these occurrent conscious beliefs themselves, because proceeding in this way 
guarantees the truth of our self-ascriptions. To this extent therefore, Peacocke’s 
account might seem to be an improvement on Burge’s. However, the truly
1 See (Peacocke 1992; 1998)
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fundamental question to which Burge’s account led us but did not in fact provide an 
answer was not that of how consciously-based self-ascriptions, given that such self- 
ascriptions are possible, can generally be veridical (and so how self-ascribing in this 
manner can be a reasonable enterprise to engage in), but rather, that of how it is 
possible at all for a first-order conscious state to rationally issue in a higher-order 
belief about itself, given the general understanding laid out at the beginning of this 
chapter of what it is for a judgement to be reason-based, or of what it is for a 
transition between two mental states to be, at the personal level, immediately rational.
To put things differently, what Peacocke’s account seems to do, is explain 
how making a second-order judgement directly on the basis of having an occurrent 
first-order state can be a reasonable (and ultimately knowledge-yielding) process to 
engage in, and his answer is that this is so because, given the possession conditions 
for the concept of belief, these second-order judgements will normally be made only 
in circumstances in which they are true. Engaging in a belief-forming process which 
is likely to yield true beliefs, is clearly a reasonable thing to do. This however does 
not yet address the issue of particular concern to us here, namely that of how this 
belief-forming process can not only be a reasonable (justified/warranted) process to 
engage in given its likely outcome, but how it is possible at all. We do not, that is, yet 
have an answer to the question of how a state with one type of content (first-order) 
can constitute an immediate personal-level reason for making a judgement with a 
completely unrelated type of content (second-order).1
Having said that, it is not entirely true to say that Peacocke does not address 
this more specific question. There is at least the beginning of an answer to it in his 
discussion of the ‘conscious’ character of the beliefs which we are able to self-ascribe 
in this non-inferential authoritative way.2
For Peacocke, a ‘conscious’ state is essentially a phenomenally conscious, or 
phenomenologically occurrent state (in the sense defined in the introductory 
chapter)3, or, in Peacocke’s terms, a state which is currently ‘occupying our attention’, 
and which ‘contributes to what, subjectively, it is like for the person who enjoys it’.4
1 Martin raises a similar problem for Peacocke in (Martin 1998).
2 See in particular (Peacocke 1998)
3 See p. 13 above
4 (1998, p.64)
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Now, the relevance that the occupation of attention is supposed to have to our ability 
to move directly from a conscious state to a self-ascription of it, is that in the case of 
such self-ascriptions, a second-order judgement is not rationalized by the first-order 
attitude self-ascribed simply in virtue of this attitude’s content (in fact, we have seen, 
how could it?), but essentially in virtue of this attitude’s being one which is currently 
occupying our attention, and so somehow contributing to what things are like for us 
subjectively.
This seems to be a move in the right direction. There must be something about 
a self-ascribed mental state of ours being conscious (or consciously manifested, if it is 
a dispositional state)1 that enables it, if anything does, to stand in a direct reason- 
giving relation to a self-ascription of it. This appears in fact to be the only aspect of 
those of our states which we are able to introspectively self-ascribe, that distinguishes 
them from those of our states which we are not able to self-ascribe in any special way 
(eg. our unconscious or repressed ones). Merely stating this however does not yet 
resolve our problem -  ie. the problem of understanding how it is that or in virtue o f 
what it is that a first-order state’s being conscious, or being such that it contributes to 
what things are like for us subjectively, enables it to stand as an immediate reason for 
self-ascribing it. So, how might we go about solving this puzzle?
One possible way of doing this might be by saying that having a 
phenomenally conscious attitude involves not just having an attitude towards the 
world, but being also in some sense at the same time aware (perhaps implicitly) of 
oneself as having it. It would thus be in virtue of this self-awareness already present 
implicitly in having a first-order conscious state, that it immediately ‘makes rational 
sense’ to us, when having a conscious first-order state and considering the matter of 
whether we have it, to judge that we have it. In so judging, we would in effect just be 
explicitly articulating something we were already aware of implicitly in the having of 
the first-order conscious state itself. Peacocke however seems to want to resist any 
such option, particularly as he wants to allow for the possibility that non-human
1 Peacocke does not himself set out to draw a clear distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent (or episodic 
and dispositional) conscious mental states. He allows in particular that beliefs can be conscious in the ‘occurrent’ 
sense. It is not clear to me though that beliefs really can be thought o f as conscious other than in the Freudian and 
non-occurrent/dispositional sense. Nonetheless, like other dispositional conscious states, beliefs can it seems come 
to manifest themselves in phenomenally conscious episodes o f attention to their objects (eg. in a proposition’s 
coming to strike one as true upon being contemplated in thought). I will thus not, for immediate purposes at least, 
quibble with Peacocke’s talk o f certain beliefs as being ‘conscious’ in the phenomenal sense.
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animals have conscious states of the very same kind as we do. That is, he wants to 
leave room for the possibility that animals are roughly the same as us, except that we 
possess the concept of belief and they do not.1 In this regard he writes: ‘...what is 
involved in a beliefs being conscious can be fulfilled by a creature who does not even 
possess psychological concepts. What is true is that if a thinker does have the concept 
of belief and has a certain conscious belief, then he will be willing to judge that he has 
the belief. In other words: we are capable of self-consciousness and animals are not; 
and, this is so because we possess psychological concepts and they do not.
But now, if having a conscious state involves, as Peacocke seems to suggest, 
being aware only of the world, we are still left without an answer to our question: how 
can believing something about the world constitute or give rise to an immediate 
reason for believing something about our beliefs about the world? Perhaps there is 
something else about a first-order state’s being ‘conscious’ that could enable it to 
stand as an immediate reason for self-ascribing it, ie. other than the having of it 
already involving some implicit form of self-awareness. Perhaps, for instance, one 
could argue that it is in virtue of there being something specific it is like to have a 
conscious (or consciously manifested) belief that p (as opposed to, say, a belief that q, 
or a desire that z), that this belief can constitute an immediate reason for self-ascribing 
it. But, how might this suggestion help?
If the proposal is that we base our self-ascriptions of our conscious attitudes 
on some kind of ‘phenomenal feel’ that comes with having them (or that comes with 
conscious manifestations thereof if they are dispositional states) , and by which we 
can somehow ‘sense’ that we have them, we are just led back to a particularly 
implausible type of perceptual account of self-knowledge,4 and to all the problems 
that go with it. Taking this line is thus not a viable option, nor for that matter one that 
Peacocke would want to take, given his aim precisely of putting forward an account 
of self-knowledge that is reason-based without being perceptual -  an account 
according to which our introspective mental self-ascriptions are directly and rationally
1 See especially (Peacocke 1992, pp. 151-154) and (1998, p.96).
2 (1992, p. 153)
3 For more on how to understand the ‘manifestation’ o f dispositional states in consciousness see chapter 7 below.
4 See chapter 1, p.28 above.
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grounded in our first-order conscious states themselves, and not on some phenomenal 
feel associated with having them.
On Peacocke’s account therefore, given all of the above, the relevance that a 
first-order state’s being ‘conscious’ (or consciously manifested) might have to its 
ability to constitute an immediate reason for self-ascribing it, can have nothing to do 
either with one’s being in any sense implicitly aware of oneself as having it when 
having it, or with its being accompanied by some ‘phenomenal feel’ by which one 
might be able to sense it. The only answer therefore to our question to be extracted 
from Peacocke’s writings on self-knowledge is, it seems, to be found in his account of 
what it is to possess the concept of belief, together with his account, derived from his 
theory of concepts, of what it is for a transition between two mental states to be 
rational or reason-giving.
In brief, Peacocke’s view is that the transition between a conscious belief and 
a self-ascription of it is a rational transition precisely because it is a transition the 
making of which is contained in the first-person clause of the possession condition for 
the concept of belief, namely the following clause: ‘A relational concept R is the 
concept of belief only if [...] the thinker finds the first-person content that he stands in 
R to p primitively compelling whenever he has the conscious belief that p, and he 
finds it compelling because he has that conscious belief.1 But now, despite 
Peacocke’s promising talk of the relevance of the ‘conscious’ character of a mental 
state to it’s ability to stand in such an immediate reason-giving relation to a second- 
order belief about it, it would seem that one can raise a similar objection to Peacocke 
as Peacocke does to Burge. The above possession condition’s being the right 
possession condition for the concept of belief just seems to presuppose that we make 
mental self-ascriptions directly and rationally on the basis of our first-order conscious 
states themselves but does not explain it. We would indeed not count someone as 
possessing the concept of belief unless they found it primitively compelling to self- 
ascribe a belief whenever they had that conscious belief (and considered the matter), 
and found it primitively compelling for that very reason. This however does not yet 
explain why having a conscious belief makes it seem immediately appropriate/rational 
to us to self-ascribe it, nor does it explain what specifically it is about a self-ascribed
1 (Peacocke 1992, p. 163)
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beliefs being conscious that enables it to stand in such a direct reason-giving relation 
to a belief about itself.
At this point, Peacocke could of course just insist that a transition between a 
first-order conscious state and a second-order judgement is rational precisely because 
it is inscribed in the possession condition for the concept of belief, and it is only 
transitions between conscious beliefs and self-ascriptions of them that are inscribed in 
the relevant first-person clause of the possession condition. In fact to be fair to 
Peacocke, he seems to have a slightly different view of what it is for a transition to be 
rational than the one laid out at the outset of this chapter.1 He simply takes a transition 
to be a rational one, if it is one that is inscribed in the possession condition for a 
concept.
For example, a transition from a perceptual experience as of something red, to 
a judgement that there is something red in the near vicinity, counts as a rational 
transition on his view in virtue of the fact that this transition is written in to the 
possession condition for the perceptual concept of ‘red’ -  in essence, the condition 
that someone who possesses the perceptual concept of red will find the content that 
there is something red in the near vicinity primitively compelling whenever it appears 
to them that there is something red in the near vicinity and will find it primitively 
compelling precisely because they are having an experience as of something red. 
Similarly, regarding the concept of entailment, a transition from believing that p and 
believing that p entails q, to believing that q, is a rational transition on his view, 
because it is amongst the transitions the making of which, or the finding compelling 
to make which, is written into the possession condition for the logical concept of 
‘entailment’. That is, in brief, for someone to count as possessing the concept of 
entailment, they must find, amongst other things, contents of the form q primitively 
compelling whenever they believe that p and believe that p entails q, and they must 
find such contents primitively compelling precisely because, that is for the very 
reason that, they believe that p and believe that p entails q.2
But now, one might still point out that in the case of these other transitions -  
ie. between these states that are inscribed in the possession conditions for perceptual 
and logical concepts -  we are actually able to go further than Peacocke in making
1 See section 3.1 above.
2 All o f these possession conditions are laid out in (Peacocke 1992)
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sense of why someone who possesses the relevant concept (of red or of entailment), 
and who is in the former state of the transition inscribed in the possession condition, 
should find the content of the second state of the transition primitively compelling. 
We can make sense of this in fact by reference to the model of justification set out at 
the beginning of this chapter, that is, by reference to the idea that they find the latter 
content primitively compelling in such circumstances because they have evidence for 
the content of the second state of the transition in having the first state, that is, 
because they have access (in having the first state) to facts that justify (in the first 
sense)1 the content of the second state. To illustrate this, one might represent these 
rational moves as follows:
(1)
S perceives that p 
S believes that p
(2)
S believes that p
S believes that p entails q 
S believes that q
(3)
S believes that p 
S believes that S believes that p
In cases (1) and (2), we can makes sense of why moving from the first (or first 
two) mental states of the transition, to the second (or third) state, might be a rational 
transition, or, to put it in Peacocke’s terms, why anyone who possesses the perceptual 
concept of p (or the concept of entailment) and who is in the first (or first two) states, 
might find the content of the second (or the third) state primitively compelling, by 
reference to the fact that if the proposition that p (or the propositions that p, and that p 
entails q) to which they have (loosely speaking) access in having the first states are 
true, the contents of the second (or third) states of the transition follow, that is, will 
also be true.
1 See p. 61 above
In the case of the move from having a conscious belief to self-ascribing it on 
the other hand (ie. case (3)), it remains utterly unclear why someone in the first state 
of the transition will find the content that they are in this state primitively compelling, 
unless, in having the first-order conscious state of the transition, they either have at 
the same time some sort of access to the fact that they are in this state, or have some 
sub-personal causal mechanism in their brain which makes them find themselves with 
a sudden compulsion to self-ascribe a belief whenever they have such a conscious 
belief. Peacocke however, we have seen, does not want to accept any version of the 
former option, nor does he want to accept the latter, since, he insists, his account is 
supposed to be an account of the transition between our first-order conscious beliefs 
and our second-order self-ascriptions of them as a personal-\tve\ transition, ie. as a 
transition which, to use his words ‘makes sense to the subject himself given [the 
subject’s] point of view’1. This is precisely why he insists that the first-order state in 
such transitions must be a conscious state.
However, until we are given a story about what it is about a state’s being 
conscious that enables it to stand as a personal-level reason for self-ascribing it (other 
than that it is transitions only between conscious states and self-ascriptions of them 
that are written into the possession conditions for psychological concepts) it remains 
unclear what sense can be made of this idea that moving from a conscious state to a 
self-ascription of it is a transition which it makes rational sense to us to make, from 
within our own personal-level point of view. To take a simple example, what sense 
are we to make of why, say, from Joe’s point of view, his consciously believing that 
there is a cat on the mat should make him find the content that he believes that there is 
a cat on the mat primitively compelling, if his consciously believing that there is a cat 
on the mat does not in any way involve his also being aware of himself as holding 
this belief? To put things differently, what could it be about the cat’s being on the mat 
from Joe’s point of view that is directly suggestive of, or from which it follows 
(whether deductively or inductively) that he believes that there is a cat on the mat?
Perhaps to be asking these questions is just to be caught up in the assumption 
that there is more to be said about personal-level justification than a certain 
transition’s being inscribed in the possession conditions for a concept. It is difficult 
however not to ask them, especially as, first of all, it seems that more can be said in
1 (1998, p.96)
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the case of transitions involved in the possession conditions for all concepts other than 
those of mental states (eg. the concept of red or that of entailment), and secondly, 
because Peacocke himself stresses the importance of the self-ascribed state’s being a 
conscious one if it is to be capable of constituting an immediate reason for self- 
ascribing it. No real story however of what it is about a state’s being conscious that 
makes it able to constitute such an immediate reason for self-ascribing it is in the end 
given to us.
In sum, one of Peacocke’s main motivations for his account was to be able to 
maintain, contra what he calls the ‘no-reasons’ view of self-knowledge, that the 
transition between our first-order conscious states and our authoritative self- 
ascriptions of them is a rational personal-level transition, that is, a transition which it 
somehow makes sense to us to make from within our own self-ascribing perspective. 
However, the only way in which such a transition could seemingly be a personal-level 
rational transition is if that which fixes the content of our self-ascriptions is something 
to which we are sensitive to, or have access to at the personal level, namely 
something we are aware of. Peacocke of course does not deny that making a mental 
self-ascription involves being sensitive to the psychological nature of our self­
ascribed conscious states, since it is in virtue of their psychological nature (rather than 
their first-order content) that the content of our self-ascriptions of them is going to be 
fixed. However, we have seen that if this sensitivity is thought of as just a 
‘phenomenal’ sensitivity, we end up with a perceptual model of self-knowledge and 
all the problems associated with it. On the other hand, if this sensitivity is thought of 
as a kind of ‘implicit self-awareness’ intrinsic to the having of a first-order conscious 
state, then we can no longer hold on to the view (that Peacocke does seem want to 
hold on to) that having a conscious state involves the same thing across species, and 
in particular awareness only of the world. In resisting this latter option though (ie. that 
having a conscious state involves being at the same time implicitly aware of oneself 
as having it), his position ends up collapsing either into an implausible perceptual 
account of self-knowledge, or into a non reason-based view according to which 
having a psychological state (and not any personal-level sensitivity to it) directly 
causes one, at the sub-personal level, to self-ascribe it. Taking either of these two 
routes goes against Peacocke’s initial intention of finding an intermediate line 
between them. He would thus not want to take them. Yet, given his commitments 
about the nature of our world-directed conscious states (ie. as being attitudes only
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towards the world), it is difficult to see what other options are left open to him, other 
than the anti-explanatory one of just saying that there is no further sense to be made of 
the idea that a transition between a first-order conscious state and a self-ascription of 
it is rational than mentioning that it is inscribed in the very fact of what it is to possess 
a psychological concept.
In other words, in the end, Peacocke’s account seems to face a similar 
limitation to Burge’s, namely that of failing to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
how it is that it can be internally rational for us to move directly from having a 
conscious attitude towards an object to believing that we have that attitude towards 
that object, given that nothing about what attitudes we have seems to follow from how 
things are with that object. Peacocke’s account only seems to point to the fact that we 
must be able to make such self-ascriptions directly on the basis of our object-oriented 
conscious states, given that doing so is presupposed by the very fact that we possess 
psychological concepts. He does not however explain how this is possible. 
Nonetheless, his account does seem to move a step further than Burge’s in an 
explanatory direction, first of all in its actually addressing the question, and secondly 
in its suggesting that it must be something about a first-order state’s being conscious 
that enables it to stand as an immediate reason for a second-order belief about it. He 
seems to fail however to provide a satisfactory story of what this distinctive feature of 
our conscious states might be.
What point have we now reached? Our examination of Burge’s transcendental 
argument from critical reasoning has first of all shown that our nature as critical 
reasoners presupposes a certain ‘rational integration’1 of our first-order conscious 
states and our second-order judgements about them, thereby lending strong support to 
the view that the ‘intermediate’ reason-based approach to introspective self- 
knowledge must indeed be right. Secondly, Peacocke’s plausible account of what it is 
to possess the concept of belief has been seen to also strongly support the view that 
our immediate introspective judgements about our occurrent conscious states must be 
directly and rationally based on these conscious states themselves, since we would not 
tend to regard someone as possessing the concept of belief (or presumably, mutatis 
mutandis, other psychological concepts) unless they found the content that they 
believed that p primitively compelling whenever they did consciously believe that p,
1 (Burge 1996, p. 103)
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and unless they did so for the very reason that they believed that p. Thirdly, as seen in 
the introductory chapter, the very phenomenology of authoritative mental self­
ascription seems also to support the view that we do in fact self-ascribe our own 
conscious states directly on the basis of having these conscious states themselves. 
Following Evans’s datum on mental self-ascription, when we consider what beliefs 
(or other conscious states) we have, we do not turn to ourselves or to our mental states 
for evidence but essentially to the world} If I am asked whether I believe that it is 
raining for example, I will not look at myself but out the window, and then judge on 
the basis of what I come to see, and on the basis of what I thereby come to believe 
about the weather, that I either do or I do not believe that it is raining. Finally, if we 
take this relation between our first and second-order states to indeed be, as suggested, 
immediate and rational, we also have here a clear explanation of why error in self- 
knowledge is so closely tied to the ascription of rationality, that is, a clear explanation 
of why introspective self-knowledge is specifically immune to non-cognitive error, 
though not immune to error altogether, an explanation which neither perceptual nor 
non reason-based views were able to deliver.
In brief, we have seen that there are a number of positive reasons (in addition 
to the negative ones discussed in chapters 1 and 2) for adopting the ‘intermediate’ 
reason-based line of approach to self-knowledge. It is the only approach seemingly 
able to adequately accommodate all three of the distinctive features of our knowledge 
of our own minds set out in the introductory chapter. It is also, as seen in the present 
chapter, presupposed by our practices of critical reasoning and by Peacocke’s 
plausible account of the possession conditions for psychological concepts. However, 
Burge’s intermediate approach to self-knowledge fails to be fully satisfactory given 
our current explanatory aim, and Peacocke’s attempt to fill this explanatory gap by 
reference to the possession conditions for the concept of belief ultimately faces the 
same predicament. Nonetheless, the problems raised here for Peacocke’s specific 
proposal, like those raised for Burge’s, have not been so general as to undermine the 
intermediate reason-based line of approach altogether. Rather, the problems 
encountered have merely revealed that the following three claims, which Peacocke 
wants to hold together, do not in fact seem to be compatible:
1 See (Evans 1982, Chapter 7, in particular p.225)
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(1) Our immediate authoritative mental self-ascriptions are based on personal-level 
reasons.
(2) Our reasons for these self-ascriptions are the first-order conscious states thereby 
self-ascribed.
(3) Our first-order conscious states are not in any sense at the same time states of 
(implicit) self-consciousness; they are attitudes strictly towards the world.
Given the arguments of chapter 2 against all forms of non reason-based views 
of self-knowledge, we have to accept (1), and adopt an epistemological approach to 
self-knowledge. Given the arguments of chapter 1 (where it was seen that our self­
ascriptions cannot be based either on observation of our behaviour or on direct 
observation of our first-order states), we have to accept (2), and adopt the 
intermediate reason-based position. The only option left open to us is therefore to 
reject (3), and to maintain instead that our special, immediate, authoritative 
knowledge of our own conscious thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is based on 
reasons, that these reasons are the very conscious states thereby known, and that such 
a relation between first and second-order states is possible essentially in virtue of the 
fact that having a first-order (ie. world-directed) conscious state involves being also 
(in some sense) at the same time implicitly aware of oneself as having it. In other 
words, if we are to account for the immediate, authoritative, immune to non-cognitive 
error knowledge we are able to have of the contents of our own conscious minds, we 
must, it seems, ultimately assume that our world-directed conscious states are already 
themselves in some sense states of ‘implicit’, or as I shall sometimes say ‘pre- 
reflective’,1 self-consciousness, a form of self-consciousness that provides the basis 
for, and comes to be explicitly articulated in, our fully reflective second-order 
judgements.
1 I am borrowing this term from (Sartre 1969) though I will be using it here (unless otherwise specified) with no 
presumption to be conforming exactly to Sartre’s own use o f it.
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Chapter 4: Consciousness as self-consciousness
What does it mean to say that our first-order conscious states are states of 
implicit or ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness? What is it for the having of a world- 
oriented state to involve not only awareness of the world but also of itself? Our 
examination of the various available theoretical lines of approach to introspective 
self-knowledge has revealed that some such claim must be true, that is, that if that our 
world-directed conscious states are to constitute the immediate rational grounds for 
our second-order judgements (which we have seen they must if immediate 
authoritative self-knowledge is to be possible) we must assume them to also be in 
some sense states of implicit or ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness. This leaves us 
however without an entirely clear sense of what the claim is supposed to amount to, 
and in particular without a clear sense of how an account of introspective self- 
knowledge as based on the nature of our conscious states as states of ‘implicit’ or 
‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness is supposed to differ from the many accounts of 
self-knowledge already on offer.
Spelling out this thesis more clearly will be the main task of this chapter. We 
arrived at it, to repeat, essentially through seeing that some such claim must be true if 
self-knowledge, of a kind that exhibits certain distinctive features, is to be possible. 
The best way therefore to begin to understand what exactly the view is to be taken to 
amount to, is by looking at what it must amount to if it is indeed to constitute the view 
it is supposed to constitute, namely one that enables us to account for the possibility 
of immediate, authoritative and immune to non-cognitive error self-knowledge in a 
way that avoids the many problems facing other available accounts. Bearing this in 
mind then, this chapter will begin by first spelling out what the thesis should not be
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taken to be, before going over what it has to involve, and finally by considering what 
further positive sense might be made of it. First then, what is the thesis not to be taken 
to be?
4.1 Perceptual accounts, constitutive accounts, and the higher-order-thought 
theory of consciousness
First, and perhaps most obviously, the required form of ‘implicit’ self- 
consciousness should not be taken to be a form of accompanying perceptual 
awareness of ourselves as being in this or that state. In particular, the suggestion that 
having a conscious mental state involves at the same time being implicitly aware of 
oneself as having it should not be taken to be the suggestion that our conscious states 
have some kind of phenomenal buzz associated with them by which we are able to 
sense them, as this would just lead us straight back to the many problems already seen 
to be associated with perceptual accounts of self-knowledge, and in particular with 
one of the most implausible versions of it. This, of course, is not to deny that our 
occurrent conscious states are states which there is something ‘it is like’ for us to be 
in, or to deny that we are somehow sensitive to them via their phenomenal properties. 
The only point to remember here is that ‘what it is like’ properties associated with 
having particular mental states, and the accompanying sensitivity we may have to our 
conscious states via these phenomenal properties, is not sufficient for the grounding 
of the distinctive kind of fine-grained mental self-ascriptions we are clearly able to 
make in introspection, and so cannot be taken to constitute the crucial ‘implicit self- 
awareness’ that must be involved in the having of a first-order conscious state if our 
puzzle is to be solved. The sense in other words in which the first-order states that 
occur in our phenomenal stream of consciousness must be at the same time states of 
implicit self-consciousness cannot be the sense in which we might be sensitive to 
them via their phenomenal properties.
Secondly, the ‘pre-reflective’ form of self-consciousness being suggested here 
to be involved in consciously experiencing/ thinking about/ visualising/ etc. the world, 
should also not be taken to be a version of the ‘strong constitutive’ or ‘artefact of 
grammar’ approach to self-knowledge discussed in chapter 2. Saying that the 
possibility of introspective self-knowledge presupposes that our conscious world- 
directed states are intrinsically states of implicit self-consciousness, should not be
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taken to be the view that it is somehow ontologically constitutive of having a first- 
order conscious state that one also has a corresponding higher-order belief about it or 
vice versa. That is, the proposed thesis should not be taken to be the view that our 
first-order states and second-order beliefs about them are in some sense one and the 
same state, or the view that our first and second-order judgements are both 
expressions of one and the same state, or for that matter any form of the view that the 
mere having of a first-order state (or the making of a second-order judgement) 
somehow ontologically constitutes in one the having of a second-order belief about it 
(or the first-order state self-ascribed). To make any one of these claims would just be 
to call forth the many problems already seen to be associated with strong constitutive 
accounts of self-knowledge, and in particular to bring back the problem common to 
them all, of their being unable to adequately accommodate the fallibility of self- 
knowledge, that is, to accommodate its immunity to non-cognitive error without 
ruling out the possibility of error altogether.
Finally, the thesis that our phenomenally conscious states are states of implicit 
self-consciousness should not be merely taken to be the thesis that our conscious 
states are states which are always accompanied by second-order beliefs about 
themselves, since, even if this were true, merely stating this fact would not explain 
why it is so, or how it can be so. To make such a suggestion would not be to offer a 
solution to our puzzle at all, but instead to give rise to the initial problem of 
introspective self-knowledge all over again, ie. that of explaining how or in virtue o f 
what our conscious states are such that we always know (or are immediately able to 
know) that we have them. What we need to identify here is a form of self- 
consciousness that can provide the direct ground for a second-order belief about it, 
but which is not itself already a second-order belief.
Of course, one could argue following ‘higher-order thought theories of 
consciousness’ such as Rosenthal’s,1 that a conscious state’s being accompanied by a 
non-conscious second-order belief about itself is just a primitive fact about our 
phenomenally conscious states, a fact which cannot be analysed or explained any 
further. It is not an additional form of ‘self-knowledge’ based on our first-order states, 
but simply something that systematically comes with the having of conscious states. 
According to that theory, a state is conscious just in case it is accompanied by a non-
1 See (Rosenthal 1991)
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conscious second-order belief about itself, and its being conscious indeed consists in 
its being so accompanied. A number of objections however can be raised against this 
kind of approach to consciousness, not least of which the simple consideration that we 
can, and often do, have second-order beliefs about attitudes of ours which are not 
conscious, thus revealing that a state’s being accompanied by a higher-order thought 
about itself is clearly not a sufficient sign of its being conscious, let alone the very 
fact that makes it conscious. I may for instance discover through psychoanalysis that I 
have feelings of resentment towards a member of my family, and thereby come to 
hold the second-order belief that I have these feelings. This however will not 
necessarily make my feelings of resentment become conscious. They could well 
remain completely repressed, to the point that I may even start doubting whether what 
my analyst led me to believe is true. Moreover, without having to appeal to repressed 
attitudes, one can imagine having both a first and a second-order belief, both of them 
playing an active role in affecting one’s actions and other attitudes without either of 
these beliefs actually coming to occupy one’s attention, that is, without either of them 
becoming conscious in the phenomenal sense. I may for instance both believe that my 
name is Isabella and believe that I believe that my name is Isabella (as might be 
exhibited in various ways in my behaviour), without either of these contents (ie. that 
my name is Isabella, or that I believe that it is) for long periods of time actually 
occurring to me, that is, without my actually attending to these contents, or without 
their coming to consciously strike me as ‘true’. In other words, the ‘higher-order 
thought’ theory of consciousness seems to be neither plausible as it stands nor a 
fortiori a theory which could be taken to provide the fundamental primitive fact that 
underlies the possibility of introspective self-knowledge.
In brief, we have seen in the course of chapters 1-3 that if the original problem 
of authoritative introspective self-knowledge is to be solved, our first-order conscious 
states and our second-order self-ascriptive judgements about them must satisfy a 
number of criteria with respect to each other, (a) They must be distinct states from 
each other, (b) The latter must be rationally based on the former (not just causally 
triggered by them or based on any intermediate observation of them). And 
importantly, as seen in chapter 3, (c) this must be so essentially in virtue of the 
intrinsically self-conscious character of the former. In light of the points made here 
moreover, this new required ‘self-conscious’ character of our first-order states cannot 
itself be taken to consist in any one of the forms (or bases) of self-knowledge already
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seen to be problematic. It can consist neither in our being somehow perceptually 
sensitive to our first-order conscious states when having them, nor in their not being 
entirely ontologically distinct states from our reflective second-order judgements 
about them after all, nor of course, given our present explanatory aim, in their having 
a characteristic which would just generate the same explanatory question all over 
again -  such as in their being merely accompanied by non-conscious second-order 
beliefs about themselves, or indeed in their being the direct rational grounds for our 
self-ascriptions of them. But, if this is what being a state of ‘pre-reflective’ self- 
consciousness cannot not be taken to amount to, what can it be taken to amount to? 
What else is there for it to possibly be? Where are we to even turn to for further 
insights?
4.2 Pre-reflective self-consciousness, the threat of infinite regress, and the 
phenomenology of world-directed consciousness
An appealing further suggestion can it seems be found in Sartre’s discussion
of self-knowledge in Being and Nothingness.1 The exact form of self-consciousness
that we need in order to solve our puzzle about the grounding of our second-order
judgements directly by our first-order conscious states is in fact, I believe, very close
to what Sartre might have had in mind when speaking of the ‘pre-reflective cogito’ as
a form of self-awareness implicit already in consciousness itself, which is then made
explicit in the fully reflective Cartesian cogito, for which it stands as the latter’s ‘pre- 
•  • * 2  •cognitive’ basis. Now, in accordance with our own conclusions, this suggestion 
seems to present reflective (ie. fully explicit) self-knowledge as being based on, and 
as being only possible in virtue of, the presence of an implicit, non-articulated form of 
self-consciousness already in the very act of having the world-directed conscious 
states we are able to introspectively self-ascribe.
Sartre’s discussion however of this ‘pre-reflective’ or ‘pre-cognitive’ form of 
self-consciousness remains somewhat limited. It stresses at length (as we have come 
to do in this thesis) the importance of the existence of a pre-reflective form of self- 
consciousness for the possibility of fully reflective introspective self-knowledge, but
1 See (Sartre 1969)
2 See {ibid, especially pp.xxvi-xxvii, and chapter 2, section III)
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does not elaborate on it much further. In particular, Sartre’s discussion still leaves us 
very much in the dark (a) about the precise nature of this required ‘pre-reflective’ 
form of self-consciousness, (b) about how this notion might concretely be seen to 
apply, if at all, to our ordinary world-directed experiences, thoughts, emotions, etc., 
and (c) about how appealing to a ‘pre-reflective’ form of self-consciousness to solve 
our puzzle about introspective self-knowledge might not just amount to turning the 
problem of explaining how introspective self-knowledge is possible into that of 
explaining how an implicit form of self-consciousness is possible, thus in effect not so 
much solving our puzzle as moving it elsewhere. In other words, although we have in 
Sartre’s proposal (unlike in some of the other proposals considered above) the very 
thing we are looking for -  ie. a form of self-consciousness present already at the 
world-directed level which can in turn provide the needed basis for a direct rational 
move from a first-order conscious state to a second-order judgement -  we do not yet 
have in it a substantive account of what it is for a first-order state to be a state of ‘pre- 
reflective’ self-consciousness, nor any immediately obvious indication about where to 
look for what it might be. Sartre merely arrives at the conclusion that there must be 
such a thing.
A similar thought to Sartre’s can also be found implicit in Kant’s point about it 
having to be at least possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all our representations,1 
suggesting, somewhat similarly, that the grounds for the possibility of fully reflective 
self-knowledge are present already in our world-directed experiences themselves (ie. 
in the special character of our ‘representations’). As it stands though, this claim too 
leaves us without a concrete sense of how these grounds for the possibility of fully 
reflective self-knowledge could already be present in our way of experiencing the 
world. How are we to move forward from here? Let us look at this in context.
To be basing our second-order judgements directly on our first-order (ie. 
world-directed) states is, we have seen, essentially to be coming to make these 
judgements somehow not by ‘looking inside’, but by looking (or focusing our 
attention in thought, imagination, etc.) outward onto the world. This is of course what 
gave rise to our puzzle about explaining how being in possession of evidence 
regarding the world, or how in some cases just attending to the world, could possibly 
directly and non-inferentially, yet at the personal level (ie. in an internal
1 See (Kant 1929, p. 153 or B132)
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epistemological sense) provide us with an immediate basis for believing something 
about our own attitudes towards it. Put in the form of an example, the question was 
this: what could it be, say, about a cat’s being on the mat from our point of view, that 
immediately suggests to us that we believe that there is a cat on the mat, or, even more 
puzzlingly, that we fear the cat, or want to stroke it? Given this way of putting the 
question, it seems that it must be something precisely about the way the cat strikes us 
in experiencing it or in consciously contemplating it in thought, memory, imagination, 
etc. that immediately suggests to us that we have a particular attitude towards it. The 
obvious way forward would thus seem to be to examine the phenomenology of world- 
directed consciousness (ie. to examine how the cat actually does strike us in 
experience, thought, imagination, etc.) in order to see how this could be, rather than 
to look for some further account of ‘self-consciousness’ in terms of which the 
‘implicit’ form of self-consciousness we are trying to gain some insight into could be 
understood.
To an extent, this direction of inquiry is hinted at both in Sartre’s’ discussion 
of the ‘pre-reflective cogito’ and in Kant’s point about our ‘representations’ 
presupposing self-consciousness. Sartre’s discussion in particular, in stressing that 
fully reflective self-knowledge is just an articulation of what is already there in world- 
directed consciousness, suggests that it is indeed to the nature of wor/d-directed 
consciousness that we should turn for further insights rather than to some further 
explicit account of self-consciousness or self-knowledge. Similarly, Kant’s point 
about our representations being always potentially accompanied by the ‘I think’ 
though not always having it explicitly attached to them, suggests that the road to fully 
understanding our ability to attach the ‘I think’ to all our representations may 
ultimately lie in a better understanding of the nature of our representations, that is, in 
a better understanding of the way in which we consciously experience, think about, 
visualise, etc. the world. And indeed, given the specific puzzle before us, turning our 
attention to the way in which we experience the world may well be the only viable 
way forward. To persist in trying to articulate the needed ‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’ 
form of self-consciousness by way of yet other explicit notions of self-consciousness 
or by appeal to accompanying second-order beliefs or accompanying second-order 
perceptual experiences, will only make our explanatory quest for a substantive 
account of this implicit form of self-consciousness impossible to complete. Put more 
precisely, the problem is this:
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Trying to articulate what a particular form of self-consciousness is, by saying 
that it is a particular (however implicit or ‘pre-cognitive’) form of ‘consciousness of 
oneself as being in this or that state’, immediately establishes a reflective dissociation 
between the form of self-consciousness to be explicated and that which it is 
consciousness o f Any such dissociation in turn gives rise to the question of how this 
new form of consciousness of our own mental states is possible, and of what it is 
based on. If one then follows the line followed so far in this thesis, one ends up 
having to rule it out as being either based on inference or on observation or on 
‘nothing’, and having to conclude that it is based on yet a more fundamental form of 
self-consciousness present already even more ‘implicitly’ (if this even makes sense) 
in the state it is consciousness of. Ultimately, one is just sent off on an infinite regress 
of having to explain, each time at a different level, how self-consciousness of a more 
and more fundamental or implicit kind is possible, and of having to do this by positing 
ever more fundamental forms of self-consciousness, which when in turn articulated 
(ie. said to be forms of ‘awareness of oneself as being in this or that state’) 
immediately give rise to the same question all over again of how these forms of self- 
awareness are possible, and of what they are based on, etc.
In light of this threat of infinite regress, two options seem open to us: (1) to 
conclude in despair that the ‘pre-reflective’ form of self-consciousness needed to 
solve our puzzle about mental self-ascription cannot be articulated beyond a certain 
point; it must at some point be taken as primitive, and yet as something that must be 
present in first-order consciousness as the ground for its possible reflective 
articulation in a second-order judgement; or, alternatively (2) to turn away, as 
suggested above, from thinking explicitly about self-consciousness and the different 
forms that this might take (ie. some perceptual form, the form of a mere 
accompanying second-order belief, or the form of some special feature of a certain 
category of statements), and to turn instead to thinking about the nature, or rather the 
phenomenology, of world-directed consciousness -  ie. to thinking about the way in 
which the world strikes us, from within our own personal-level point of view (note, 
regardless of how it actually is) in experience, thought, imagination, etc. such that it 
might contain, amongst other things, evidence already of ourselves as having this or 
that cognitive or emotional attitude towards it. If any fully explanatory solution to our 
puzzle is to be found it will clearly have to be found through option (2).
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4.3 Solving the explanatory puzzle
Our investigation has once again taken a new turn, this time from an enquiry 
into the nature of an implicit form of self-consciousness to an enquiry into the nature 
of uw/d-directed consciousness. Let us first briefly recapitulate how we got here.
We began this thesis with the traditional problem of explaining how 
immediate, authoritative, immune to non-cognitive error knowledge of our own minds 
is possible. We were then led, through an examination of the specific shortcomings of 
all standard approaches to this problem (inferential models, perceptual models, and 
non reason-based accounts) to the view that if such knowledge (which we do seem to 
have) is to be possible, we must ultimately assume that it is, in a personal-level sense, 
based on reasons, not however either on inference or observation, but directly on the 
conscious states thereby known. This conclusion in turn, combined with a clearer 
understanding of what it is for a transition between two mental states to be directly 
reason-giving at the personal-level (discussed in chapter 3), gave rise to a new and 
deeper explanatory puzzle: that of explaining how a first-order conscious state can 
possibly constitute an immediate rational ground for self-ascribing it, given that our 
first-order states are about the world and our self-ascriptive judgements about our 
mental states, and given that nothing about what mental states we are in directly 
follows from (or is directly indicated/expressed by) how things are in the world. To 
put things differently, we ended up in chapter 3 with the problem of having to explain 
why someone (or, at least a fully rational and conceptually competent person) should 
find it immediately appropriate to apply a mental concept to themselves (say, that of 
perceiving), in a situation in which it would appear that they are in no way aware of 
the fact that the concept is applicable (ie. of the fact that they are having a perceptual 
experience), since by hypothesis, the situation is one where they are looking only out 
at the world and not also at themselves and their states. Confronted with this new 
puzzle, and with the specific limitations (from an explanatory point of view) of two 
recent attempts (Burge’s and Peacocke’s) to uphold such a direct reason-based view 
of self-knowledge, we eventually had to conclude, at the end of the last chapter, that 
in looking out at the world we must be aware not only of the world (though that is 
what we are primarily attending to), but somehow also implicitly or ‘pre-reflectively’ 
of ourselves as perceiving the world, or as having some other underlying dispositional 
attitude towards it.
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Yet, this left us with a further explanatory problem: this time, that of 
explaining how, concretely, attending to the world can indeed involve being aware not 
only of the world but also of oneself as having a particular attitude towards it. The 
conclusion reached so far in the present chapter has been that if any truly substantive 
insight is to be gained into how our second-order abilities might be already reflected 
in the way we experience, think of, and visualise the world, we must turn away from 
explicitly thinking about self-knowledge and self-consciousness, and turn instead to 
thinking about the way in which we actually do experience, think of, and visualise the 
world. That is, the focus of our enquiry must now turn away from considerations 
about self-consciousness and turn instead towards direct considerations about the 
phenomenology of world-directed consciousness. The remainder of this thesis will do 
just that.
Before embarking on this seemingly vast new task though, a number of 
preliminary points should be borne clearly in mind regarding what exactly it is that, in 
the next few chapters, we will and will not need to uncover about world-directed 
consciousness.
(1) First, it should be noted that, for our specific purposes, we will not need to 
establish that being conscious or having conscious states consists in one’s being at the 
same time implicitly or ‘pre-reflectively’ self-conscious, or that being pre-reflectively 
self-conscious in having a first-order state is in any way essential to this state’s being 
a distinctively conscious one. We can in fact readily allow, in agreement with 
Peacocke for instance, that what it takes to have a conscious mental state is something 
that can be fulfilled even by a creature who does not possess any psychological 
concepts, and who is perhaps not capable of any form of self-consciousness at all -  
whether of a conceptually articulated form, or of some ‘non-conceptual’ form.1
What we will need to do, is to uncover a (possibly contingent) feature of our 
first-order conscious states which could explain how we (even if not other creatures) 
are able to move directly from consciously attending to the objects of our attitudes to 
self-ascribing these attitudes towards these objects. In other words, the task ahead of 
us is a somewhat narrower one than it might initially appear. Having to show that/how 
the conscious states which we are able to introspectively self-ascribe are at the same
1 I will discuss the possibility o f the existence o f ‘non-conceptual’ forms o f  self-consciousness in the next chapter, 
noting in particular how such ‘non-conceptual’ or ‘pre-conceptual’ forms o f self-consciousness (as portrayed in the 
recent literature -  eg. Bermudez 1998) should be distinguished from the implicit or ‘pre-reflective’ form o f self- 
consciousness needed here to solve our puzzle about mental self-ascription.
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time states of implicit self-consciousness is not to have to show that self- 
consciousness is somehow constitutive of, or presupposed by, consciousness in 
general.
(2) A second, and closely related point to stress before we proceed any further 
is that given the above narrower remit of the claim to be articulated, success in our 
endeavour to show how our ordinary thoughts, experiences, etc. might indeed be 
states of ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness, should not be taken to have many of the 
counter-intuitive consequences associated with accounts of consciousness as itself 
presupposing self-consciousness. In particular, the claim arrived at here should not, as 
mentioned above, be taken to have the undesirable consequence that non self- 
conscious creatures cannot be said to have conscious states of any kind at all.
Having said that, one might still feel that our (albeit restricted) thesis has an 
equally counter-intuitive result. To say that our conscious states are states of 
‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness does after all rule out non-human 
animals and very young children (whom, I am assuming, we do not take to be self- 
conscious) from qualifying as having conscious states of the same kind as we have 
(even if not from qualifying as having conscious states altogether). And, it is perhaps 
this consequence that we find most counter-intuitive, even when considering more 
general claims about consciousness as presupposing self-consciousness. This point is 
worth looking into further, as it tends to constitute a primary reason for wanting to 
avoid theories which entail that having conscious states (of any kind) requires or 
presupposes being (in any way) self-conscious. Let us therefore briefly consider how 
threatening this point really is to our findings.
Upon reflection, it is not I believe as damaging to the intuitive appeal of our 
position as it might initially seem. For one thing, most of us would agree that neither 
non-human animals nor very young children have occurrent conscious thoughts of 
any kind, let alone thoughts of the same kind as our own. We would not, that is, 
intuitively be inclined to say that animals and young children explicitly think to 
themselves -  be it in words or in images -  that is, that they engage in conscious acts of 
entertaining possibilities, in conscious acts of judgement (ie. acts of assent to 
propositions), or indeed in any episodic mental acts requiring the explicit conscious 
manipulation of symbols with meanings. To deny that non self-conscious creatures 
have conscious thoughts is of course not to deny that they may have many non- 
conscious (ie. non-occurrent) dispositional states such as beliefs, desires and
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emotions, which guide their behaviour and which are clearly manifest in their 
behavioural patterns. The view arrived at in this investigation is only that consciously 
(in the occurrent sense) attending to the objects of our attitudes involves being pre- 
reflectively aware of ourselves as having them. If the dispositional attitudes of a 
creature are thus not manifest in any such occurrent conscious acts of attention, no 
pre-reflective form of self-consciousness need be involved in having them. It is only 
derivatively, through the manifestation of some of our dispositional states in occurrent 
conscious acts of attending to their objects (ie. in thinking of their objects, perceiving 
them, etc.) that we are able to come to know our own dispositional mental states.1
Now, insofar as we would not be prepared to think of non-human animals as 
engaging in any occurrent conscious acts of thinking, their dispositional states can of 
course not come to manifest themselves in any such conscious acts (ie. conscious 
thoughts). If any real clash is therefore to be seen to arise between the conclusions of 
our investigation so far, and our intuitions regarding the subjectivity of non-human 
animals, it will have to be seen to arise essentially in relation to considerations about 
the conscious experiences of non-human animals -  ie. states which we would 
generally take them to have, and which, we may feel, must be similar to our own. The 
question we therefore need to ask ourselves is this: would we really want to say, from 
an intuitive standpoint, that the conscious experiences (or episodes of sensory 
recollection, of visualisation in dreaming, etc.) of non-human animals and very young 
children are, phenomenologically, of the very same kind as our own?
It is far from obvious it seems to me that we would want to say this. For 
example, it is far from clear that we would want to say that non-human animals 
experience the world as an objective, unified world, of usable objects, etc. in the way 
that we seem to do, rather than as McDowell for instance suggests, as a series of 
obstacles, opportunities, problems and other pressures from the environment, not 
experienced as such, but merely dealt with as they come.2 Consider for instance 
whether we would really want to say that bats experience the world in the same way 
as we do (or rather, in the same way as we would, if we had echolocatory 
experiences). Would we want to say that dogs experience the world in the same way 
as we do, or primates? In the case of bats we would probably be inclined to say that
1 This was discussed in the introductory chapter section 0.2 above.
2 See (McDowell 1994, chapter 6)
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they do not, while in the case of dogs we might be more hesitant, and perhaps in the 
case of primates we might even be tempted to say that some do. It is noteworthy 
though that, in each case, the degree to which we would be prepared to say that a 
creature’s conscious experiences of the world are similar to our own corresponds 
roughly to the degree to which we would be prepared to attribute to this creature, 
amongst other things, some level of self-consciousness. At the very least therefore it 
remains far from obvious that there is anything deeply counterintuitive about the view 
that the way the world appears to non self-conscious creatures might be, 
phenomenologically (ie. from a personal level point of view), quite different from the 
way it appears to us. It would be highly surprising in fact to find that both self- 
conscious and non self-conscious creatures alike, conceptually competent and non 
conceptually competent creatures alike, humans as well as bats, etc. all experienced 
the world in the same way, the only real difference between species lying in the fact 
that some but not others possess additional conceptual skills and additional faculties 
such as of ‘introspection’. If we did discover that all animals experienced the world in 
exactly the same way as we do, and that therefore, for instance, the way in which fish 
subjectively experience their environment is just as we would experience it if we were 
in a fish’s body swimming under water, would we not be inclined to say that these 
animals were to an extent self-conscious} If we would, this would suggest that our 
reluctance to attribute self-consciousness to non-human animals actually reflects an 
underlying intuitive reluctance to think of them as subjectively experiencing the world 
in the same way as we do. And, if so, clues to our special ability to self-ascribe our 
own mental states directly on the basis of consciously attending to their objects may 
well be there to be found in the distinctive character of the way in which we in 
particular experience these objects.
(3) Finally, and before proceeding to try to make more concrete sense of this 
thesis about our own conscious world-directed states, one further issue is worth 
addressing concerning it still in the abstract -  ie. the issue of the status of this 
position. How should it really be taken? Should it, in particular, just be viewed as a 
‘default’ position, one which we have reason to accept (and for the moment no 
obvious reason to reject) only because no better route to solving our initial problem of 
introspective self-knowledge seems available? Or, can it be seen to be a plausible 
view even on positive independent grounds? There is I believe already much evidence 
to suggest the latter.
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Although we arrived at the view that our authoritative mental self-ascriptions 
are based on our first-order conscious states considered as states of ‘pre-reflective’ 
self-consciousness essentially through a process of elimination of alternative 
approaches to the problem of introspective self-knowledge, the position reached here, 
upon reflection, is not only able to avoid the many problems faced by its counterparts, 
but also ultimately the one that seems to fit best with the phenomenology of the 
process of introspection discussed in chapter 1.
First, if our phenomenally conscious states are indeed intrinsically states of 
implicit self-consciousness, we can now immediately see why (as discussed in chapter 
1 section 1.2.1) self-ascribing them might make immediate rational sense to us from 
within our own outward-looking and self-ascribing point of view. Next, if our thesis is 
correct, we also have an explanation of why (as also discussed in 1.2.1) when it 
suddenly occurs to us that we are, say, thinking about something (or angry at 
someone, etc.), this information does not usually strike us as a surprise, but is 
something that we tend to feel we were aware of all along -  even if we were not 
explicitly thinking about the fact that we were in this or that state. Finally, and 
relatedly, if it is indeed true that in consciously attending to the world we are in some 
sense at the same time pre-reflectively aware of ourselves as having this or that 
attitude towards it, we also have an explanation of why (as also discussed in 1.2.1) we 
are often able to remember, much later, thinking thoughts, or having other attitudes 
(beliefs, desires, emotions, and so on) which we were not at the time reflecting on. 
For example, we now have an explanation of why I may be able to remember thinking 
to myself as a child that Santa Claus does not exist (thus putting me now in a position 
to self-ascribe this thought), although at the time I was only thinking about the 
existence or not of Santa Claus and not about myself and my thoughts.
In sum, the solution to the problem of introspective self-knowledge reached in 
this thesis by way of the assumption that our first-order conscious states are at the 
same time states of implicit self-consciousness, appears to be, in the abstract at least, 
not only necessitated by the shortcomings of all other possible theoretical approaches 
to introspective self-knowledge, and not only unperturbed by our intuitions about the 
subjectivity of non-human animals, but arguably also in many positive ways the most 
intuitively plausible.
What we need to do now is to try to make more concrete sense of this thesis. 
We have seen in this chapter that the only way forward towards a substantive account
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of how experiencing, visualising, etc. the world might indeed involve our being 
implicitly aware of ourselves as having a particular attitude towards it, is through a 
direct enquiry into how we actually do ordinarily experience, think of and visualise 
the world in having particular cognitive or emotional attitudes towards it. The time 
has come to take on this task.
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Chapter 5: Cognitive states: self-consciousness, 
experience and objectivity
So: how do we experience, think of and visualise the world at the first-order 
level? How does the world ordinarily strike us when we consciously attend to it? And, 
in particular, how is it that this way the world strikes us can provide us with 
information simultaneously about the world and in so doing (ie. not in some separate 
act) also somehow of ourselves as perceiving it, thinking of it, or indeed as having 
some other underlying dispositional cognitive or emotional attitude towards it? The 
aim of the remaining chapters will be to consider how evidence of ourselves as having 
particular cognitive attitudes towards the world on the one hand (in this chapter), and 
how evidence of ourselves as having particular emotional attitudes towards it on the 
other (in chapters 6-8) might indeed, in practice, be seen to be already present in the 
way the world appears to us/ is for us phenomenologically, in conscious experience, 
thought, memory, imagination, etc.
Starting in this chapter with the case of self-ascriptions of cognitive states, the 
immediate question before us is this: how does the world ordinarily strike us from 
within our own outward-looking point of view (regardless of how things might 
actually be) in experience, thought, imagination, memory, visualisation, etc. such as 
to be immediately suggestive to us of our having a particular cognitive perspective 
upon it, that is, of ourselves as either perceiving it, thinking about it, or holding a 
particular belief about some aspect of it?
An appealing answer to this question, this chapter will argue, can be extracted 
from Strawson’s interpretation of Kant.
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5.1 Self-consciousness and experiencing the world as objective
That there is something peculiar about the phenomenology of world-directed 
consciousness that can explain the possibility of fully reflective introspective self- 
knowledge is, it was suggested in the last chapter, hinted at both in Sartre’s writings 
on the ‘pre-reflective cogito’ and in Kant’s point about it having to be at least possible 
for the ‘I think’ to accompany all our representations. Sartre’s discussion of the ‘pre- 
reflective cogito’ in Being and Nothingness did not however tell us anything 
sufficiently specific about this way the world actually is (or appears, or is thought 
about, etc.) from our point of view such as to potentially reveal to us something 
simultaneously about the world and about our having a subjective perspective upon 
it.1 A somewhat more informative account however of how our world-directed 
conscious experiences might be at the same time states of implicit self-consciousness 
can I believe be extracted, albeit in a modified form, from Kant’s discussion of self- 
consciousness, and in particular from the connection Kant draws between the 
possibility of attaching the ‘I think’ to all our representations on the one hand and our
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experiencing the world as an objective world on the other. This Kantian idea, as it 
might apply to our purposes, is most clearly articulated by Strawson.
Strawson’s suggestion is essentially that experiencing the world as an 
objective world can be said to have a dual aspect, in that taking the order and content 
of a series of such experiences (ie. experiences as of an objective world) together (say, 
as articulated in a series of judgements), would give us ‘on the one hand a (partial) 
description of an objective world and on the other a chart of a single subjective 
experience of that world. Not only the series as a whole, but each member of the 
series has a double aspect’. In other words, to experience and think about the world 
as an objective world is, in effect, to experience that which our experiences are as of 
as not exhausting the world (ie. as not constituting the whole world but only part of a 
world which extends beyond that which is presented to us), and to experience the 
order in which the world presents itself as not necessarily being the order in which 
things exist, which, in effect, just is to experience that which our experiences are as
1 See again (Sartre 1969, pp.xxvi-xxvii, and part two, chapter 2, section III)
2 See (Kant 1929, the Transcendental Deduction (B))
3 (Strawson 1966, pp.105-106)
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of, as being the world only as experienced from our point o f view or as thought about 
by us.
In relation to our present concerns, it thus seems that insofar as we do 
experience the world as objective (even if we may not necessarily believe it to be 
objective)1, experiencing the world in the way that we do can be seen to involve 
making an implicit distinction between how things are on the one hand and how 
things are experienced as being from our point of view on the other, and so, in effect, 
to involve our having not only experiences as of a world, but also, in so doing, as of 
ourselves as having a particular cognitive or perceptual point of view upon it. In other 
words, as required to solve our puzzle about mental self-ascription and thereby our 
initial problem about introspective self-knowledge, experiencing the world in the way 
that we do does seem to involve being somehow implicitly or as I am calling it ‘pre- 
reflectively’ self-conscious. More than that, if it is right to say that we do experience 
the world as objective, and that doing so does involve drawing an implicit objective/ 
subjective distinction of the kind described by Strawson, it turns out not only that 
consciously experiencing the world in the way that we (adult human beings with first 
and second-order abilities at least) do involves being pre-reflectively self-conscious, 
but that it cannot but involve being pre-reflectively self-conscious. We could not 
experience the world in the way that we do (ie. as objective, as independent from our 
having a perspective upon it) without being self-conscious. In this Kantian account of 
objective experience as having a dual aspect we may thus finally have a positive 
account of how our second-order abilities might already be reflected in the very way 
in which we experience (or think about, visualise in imagination etc.) the world; and, 
moreover, an account which does not just replace the problem of explaining how a 
special form of self-knowledge is possible with that of explaining how a special form 
of self-consciousness is possible, but an account that actually explains and makes 
concrete sense of how an implicit form of self-consciousness can already be present in 
world-directed consciousness itself.
It should be noted however that neither Kant nor Strawson have anything like 
our puzzle about mental self-ascription in mind when discussing the connection
1 To say that we experience (or indeed think about, visualise etc.) the world as objective is not to say that our 
experiences, etc. are necessarily o f  an objective world or even o f a world believed to be objective, but merely to 
say that phenomenologically and prior to reflection our experiences (episodes o f thought, imagination, etc.) are (to 
repeat) as o f  an objective world. The metaphysical issue o f what our world-directed conscious states are actually of  
or believed to be o f -  ie. real objects, sense data, or nothing at all -  is not o f immediate relevance to our purposes, 
though it is o f  some importance to Kant’s. More on this below.
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between self-consciousness and the objectivity of our experiences. Kant (and 
Strawson in his interpretation of Kant) is not so much concerned with how we might 
be able to self-ascribe our own mental states directly on the basis of looking out at the 
world, as keen to establish that the world of our experiences must be objective, or at 
least conceived of as being objective. Kant’s starting point is the fact that we are self- 
conscious, that is, that we are always capable of attaching the ‘I think’ to all our 
representations (ie. of attributing our successive experiences to ourselves, to a single 
unified mind or perspective). He then argues from this that our experiences must be of 
a world conceived of as being objective (ie. mind-independent and spatio-temporally 
connected), on the grounds that only experiences of a world conceived of as such can 
make room, in Kant’s terms, for the possibility of always attaching the ‘I think’ (the 
same ‘I think’, expressing the unity of our experiences) to all our experiences. In 
brief, his aim is to show that self-consciousness presupposes experiencing an 
objective world (or a world conceived of as being objective), and he does this, at least 
on Strawson’s interpretation, roughly by arguing that if self-consciousness is to be 
possible, our world-directed experiences or ‘representations’ must be such as to be 
immediately attributable to ourselves, and it so happens that only experiencing a 
world conceived of as being objective can make them so attributable; our experiences 
must therefore be of a world conceived of as being objective.1
For our purposes, in appealing to Kant’s and Strawson’s discussion of the 
connection between self-consciousness and the objectivity of our experiences we are 
clearly not (nor need we be) following the dialectic of the above Kantian 
transcendental argument. For the purposes of explaining how it can make immediate 
rational sense to us, at the personal-level, to move directly from attending to the 
objects of our attitudes to self-ascribing certain attitudes towards these objects, we do 
not need to establish that the world of our experiences either is objective, or conceived 
o f  by us to be objective, let alone that our experiences must be (even if only 
phenomenologically) as of an objective world. For our purposes, it only matters that 
phenomenologically the world does in fact strike us as objective, whether or not it 
must do so by virtue of any requirement of self-consciousness.2 And, on the face of it,
1 (Strawson 1966)
2 Recall, in the first part o f  this thesis it was established that for self-knowledge to be possible, our world-directed 
conscious states must be states o f implicit or ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness. It was not established, nor is it 
being argued here, that the only way in which they could be so is by being as o f an objective world. The only point 
being extracted here from Strawson’s interpretation o f Kant is that being phenomenologically as o f an objective
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our ordinary experiences are as of an objective world. More than that, even our 
hallucinatory experiences, visualisations, recollections, etc. seem to be as of an 
objective world in the relevant sense.
Consider for instance visualising a tree in imagination. In visualising a tree in 
imagination, one is not taking any actual objective tree to be before one, or even to 
exist. Yet, in so imagining a tree, what one appears to be doing is, 
phenomenologically at least, not projecting or conjuring up a mind-dependent tree 
(eg. some kind of ‘sense datum’ of a tree -  whatever that might look like) but an 
objective tree, a tree presented from a particular angle (as opposed to, say, presented 
from ‘every angle’ or from ‘no angle’ at all -  if this even makes sense to consider), 
and thus, in effect, a tree as viewed by one from a particular point of view. The 
phenomenology of imagination too in other words, and not just of perception, seems 
to involve drawing the kind of objective/ subjective distinction that allows for the 
possibility of moving directly from attending to a world (or imagined world) to self- 
ascribing a cognitive or experiential (whether veridical or not) perspective upon it. 
Much the same could also be said of the phenomenology of hallucination or indeed 
experiential recollection. What we appear to be presented with in hallucination, as 
what we conjure up in imagination, or have in mind in recollection, is not a mind- 
dependent world but an objective world, a world always presented from a particular 
point of view, and this, it seems, regardless of what, if anything, is actually 
metaphysically before us, or conceived by us to be metaphysically before us.
A number of metaphysical theories are compatible with this phenomenology 
of first-order consciousness. Staying with the example of imagination, one could 
argue for instance that in imagining a tree one is in fact confronted with a sense 
datum. Or, one could argue that one is not actually confronted with anything at all -  it 
only appears that way phenomenologically. Alternatively, or additionally, one could 
argue that in imagining a tree one is in a representational state with (perhaps amongst 
other things) propositional content, or, on the other hand, in a representational state 
with purely imagistic content. Following some of the recent psychological literature, 
one could argue further that in visualising something in imagination, a representation 
that is essentially imagistic in nature actually comes to be formed in our brain (as 
suggested for instance by the fact that much the same parts of our brain come to be
world is at the very least one way in which a series o f  world-directed states can be seen to be states o f ‘pre- 
reflective’ self-consciousness.
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used in visualisation as in ordinary perception),1 and manipulated in essentially 
‘visual’ type ways (eg. by way of essentially spatial transformations being performed 
in our heads, etc.) when we engage in reasoning from this representation -  when, say, 
trying to determine whether a piece of furniture will fit in a particular comer of our 
living room, without actually measuring anything.
Which if any of such theories of the metaphysics of imagination is correct, or 
which if any of these theories is correct about the metaphysics of hallucination or of 
ordinary perception remains however essentially irrelevant to our purposes. For the 
purposes of solving our specific puzzle about mental self-ascription, what matters is, 
as mentioned above, not the metaphysics of imagination, hallucination, ordinary 
perception, etc. but the phenomenology of it, and in particular the phenomenological 
fact that our experiences, visualisations, hallucinatory experiences, all seem to be as 
of an objective world.2 If a mind-independent table is before us for instance and being 
perceived by us, but does not actually strike us as such phenomenologically (if it 
appears to us instead, say, in the confused way in which it appears to newborn infants 
or certain non-human animals -  not as an object amongst others, arrayed in space, 
presented from a particular angle, etc.), we will not, in perceiving this (albeit 
objective) table be making the kind of objective/ subjective distinction that comes 
with experiencing the world as objective, and which could be appealed to to explain 
how attending to the objects of our first-order attitudes can provide us with direct 
grounds, from within our own point of view, for self-ascribing these attitudes. What is 
important in other words, for self-knowledge to potentially arise out of our experience 
of this table, is not that the table actually be objective, but that it strike us as such 
phenomenologically.
In sum, we do not, for our purposes, need to refute idealism or establish that 
the world of our experiences is believed by us to be objective. We also do not need to 
establish, following a Kantian line, that the world of our experiences must (even if just 
phenomenologically) present itself to us as objective -  there may be other ways in
1 See for instance the discussion o f this in (Kosslyn 1995)
2 In saying that our experiences, hallucinations, and other world-directed states are phenomenologically as o f an 
objective world, I am o f  course not saying that there are no phenomenological differences between these states. I 
am also not suggesting that what is metaphysically before us in having such states might not in certain respects 
make a phenomenological difference to what is involved in having them. The sole point being made here is that 
these states have in common the phenomenological characteristic o f being as o f an objective world -  a 
characteristic which they can have whether or not they are actually o f  an objective world, or believed to be o f such 
a world.
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which our first-order states, or those of other creatures, could be states of pre- 
reflective self-consciousness. Our starting point here is not (nor need it be) the 
possibility of self-consciousness as something from which to derive the objectivity of 
our experiences. Instead, our starting point is merely a plausible assumption about the 
actual (even if perhaps not in principle necessary) phenomenology of world-directed 
consciousness, an assumption that can it seems be appealed to to show that and how 
our first-order conscious states can make room for immediate thought about 
themselves (essentially along the lines described by Strawson), thus allowing us to 
make concrete, non-metaphorical sense of how consciously thinking about, 
experiencing, recalling, imagining, etc. the world can contain already within itself the 
grounds for the possibility of fully reflective introspective self-knowledge -  the latter 
(ie. reflective introspective self-knowledge) just being an explicit articulation of what 
is already there implicitly and intrinsically (ie. not as an additional accompanying 
second-order state) at the world-directed level.
Having said this, solving the puzzle in the above way (ie. by reference to the 
phenomenological objectivity of our experiences) can of course only truly succeed if 
the assumptions made in so doing can be legitimately taken on board -  ie. the 
assumption that we do ordinarily experience (think of, visualise, etc.) the world as 
objective, and the assumption that experiencing the world in this way does in fact 
involve drawing an objective/ subjective distinction of the kind described by 
Strawson. Moreover, even granting these two assumptions, a number of further 
questions might be raised concerning this solution to our puzzle more generally:
One might wonder for instance how appealing to the objectivity of our 
experiences in order to explain the possibility of self-consciousness can avoid being 
essentially circular, given that experiencing the world as objective and being 
implicitly self-conscious are being said here to come essentially together. Put 
differently, how, one might wonder, can the possibility of self-consciousness be truly 
explained by an explanandum (ie. the phenomenological objectivity of our 
experiences) which is being said to already presuppose its explanans (ie. the existence 
of an implicit form of self-consciousness)?
Next, one might be concerned that even if this appearance of circularity can 
somehow be dispelled, we might be faced with an explanatory regress instead. Will 
we not, that is, in explaining the possibility of self-consciousness by way of the 
objectivity of our experiences end up at best solving the explanatory problem of how
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an implicit form of self-consciousness is possible by bringing forth a new and equally 
puzzling explanatory problem this time about how experiencing the world as objective 
is possible?
Third, even assuming that these concerns about circularity and regress can 
both be dealt with, one might still wonder what exactly is to be understood by the 
‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’ character of the self/world dualism supposedly involved 
in experiencing the world as objective. To say that a self/world distinction is being 
drawn ‘implicitly’ could it seems mean a number of things (eg. non-conceptually? 
without attending to what one is doing? etc.) not all of which -  as we will see in what 
follows -  may actually serve the purpose of solving our specific puzzle.
Finally, and perhaps most pressingly, even if the objectivity of our experiences 
can successfully be appealed to to solve our puzzle about mental self-ascription for 
the case of cognitive states and perceptual experiences, a question still remains about 
how our experiencing the world as objective can possibly help explain our ability to 
self-ascribe a wide range of our own desires and emotions towards the world. How is 
it, that is, that the objectivity of our experiences is to be appealed to to help make 
sense of how we are in many cases able to move directly from attending to the objects 
of our emotions and desires (eg. a cup of coffee that we desire, a spider that we fear) 
to judging that we would like a cup of coffee or that we are afraid of spiders? In brief, 
how are we to fit mental states other than judgements, thoughts, and perceptual 
experiences as of an objective world into the picture so far given of how a state can be 
a state of ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’?
The rest of this chapter will attempt to address these many questions in turn, 
leaving the last one however (ie. concerning the self-ascription of desires and 
emotions) to be pursued in greater detail in the subsequent chapters.
5.2 Objectivity and self/world dualism
First then, why should we believe that we experience the world as objective 
and next, why should we be persuaded that thinking of, or experiencing the world as 
objective (assuming that we do so) has the kind of self/world dual aspect described by 
Strawson and needed to solve our puzzle about mental self-ascription?
It has been assumed so far in this chapter that our world-directed experiences, 
memories, hallucinatory experiences, etc. are phenomenologically at least as o f
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objective objects, events, states of affairs, etc. -  eg. as of a red dragon ‘out there’ 
before us (eg. in hallucination), as of a table viewed from above (eg. in imagination), 
as of an event unfolding and continuing to unfold independently of our having a 
perspective upon it, etc. Even our first-order thoughts, it is being assumed here, are 
(unreflectively at least) as of objective tables and chairs, as of objective events and 
states of affairs, as of possible objective states of affairs, and so on. We think and talk, 
that is, as of mind-independent objects and events, whether or not we believe the 
things we are talking about or thinking about to be in actual fact mind-independent.
Some people may feel however, when they reflect upon the phenomenology of 
their experiences in particular, that the world strikes them as mind-dependent, 
although they may on occasion come to believe or judge this world to be, contrary to 
the way it presents itself to them, an objective world. Matters of phenomenology are 
by their very nature difficult if not impossible to establish against contrary intuitions. 
It will thus to a great extent just have to be assumed here, on the grounds of (on my 
view) greater intuitive plausibility, that the world does not strike us as mind- 
dependent but as objective, and this thesis taken as addressing itself only to those who 
would agree that we ordinarily experience the world as objective. In the context of 
discussing the phenomenology of our world-directed conscious states however (ie. 
world-directed conscious states of the kind that we, adult human beings with 
sophisticated first and second-order abilities have), this is an assumption that most 
people would probably find plausible. No attempt will in any case be made here to 
argue, say, by way of a Kantian transcendental argument, that our experiences must be 
phenomenologically as of an objective world. It may be that such an argument can be 
given, but doing so here would lead us to a far stronger conclusion than we currently 
need. For present purposes, all that needs to be granted is that our experiences are 
phenomenologically as of an objective world, whether or not they need to be so by 
virtue of any special feature of self-consciousness or of the unity of consciousness. In 
taking the phenomenological objectivity of our experiences on board however merely 
as an empirical assumption, the possibility ought to be considered, even if only 
briefly, that this assumption might be misguided, and that we might in fact experience 
the world as mind-dependent. How threatening would our experiencing the world as 
mind-dependent really be to our attempt here to show that the way in which we 
experience the world involves being pre-reflectively self-conscious?
108
If someone were to insist that we experience the world as mind-dependent, or 
that at least this is how the world strikes them phenomenologically, it could be 
quickly pointed out that no real difficulty need arise from this for the claim that 
experiencing the world in the way that we do involves being implicitly self-conscious. 
Suggesting that we experience the world as mind-dependent would in fact make our 
task (of explaining how experiencing the world in the way that we do involves being 
pre-reflectively self-conscious), if anything, easier. Consider what it would actually 
be to be experiencing the world as mind-dependent. Consider in particular what it 
might be to be having an experience as of a sense-datum, or what it would be to be 
having a hallucinatory experience by which one is not taken in (in the very act of 
experience, not just in judgement). The very idea of a sense-datum or of a 
hallucinatory object is that of a subjective entity, in the sense of a mind-dependent 
entity, ie. of something that exists only insofar as it is perceived. In experiencing the 
objects of one’s attitudes therefore as sense-data, hallucinatory objects and so on, 
reference (however implicit and non-articulated) to oneself as having a cognitive or 
experiential perspective upon these objects is going to be inevitably smuggled in. One 
could not be having an experience as o f a mind-dependent entity without thereby 
taking oneself (implicitly, if not downright explicitly) to be in some mental state or 
other, and so without tending to find it appropriate, upon asking oneself the question 
of whether one is having an experience, to judge that one is. The view that we 
experience the objects of our attitudes as mind-dependent can in other words quite 
easily be fitted into the picture of self-knowledge put forward here so far.
In sum, whether one agrees that we experience the world as objective, or 
wants to claim instead that we experience it as mind-dependent, experiencing the 
world in the way that we do phenomenologically can be seen to involve being at the 
same time aware of ourselves as being in some mental state or other. It will continue 
to be assumed here nevertheless that in most cases we experience the world as 
objective (ie. as mind-z«dependent). This, on my view at least, is both the more 
intuitive assumption to make and the more interesting one, in that experiencing the 
world as objective can be seen to involve our being simultaneously aware of the world 
and of ourselves as having a perspective upon it despite the fact that at first glance at 
least (unlike experiencing the world as mind-dependent), experiencing something as
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objective involves making reference only to the thing attended to and not also to 
oneself and to one’s mental states.1
Leaving thus aside the suggestion that we might experience the world as mind- 
dependent, one distinctive feature of the world-directed conscious states that we at 
least have (ie. adult human beings with sophisticated first and second-order abilities) 
has now been identified, a feature that can be seen to enable us to immediately and 
authoritatively self-ascribe a cognitive attitude simply on the basis of attending to the 
object of this attitude. This feature is the phenomenological objectivity, from our point 
of view, of the objects of our world-directed attitudes.
Taking this on board, let us move on next to consider the second assumption 
made in this chapter: the assumption that experiencing the world as objective 
involves, as suggested by Strawson, drawing an objective/ subjective distinction. In 
brief, I take this to be a straightforward conceptual point. To experience the world as 
objective in the present sense just is to experience it as independent from our 
perspective upon it, or, put differently, as independent from it’s being present to us. 
Again therefore, no argument will be put forward to show that this must be the case, 
as this is just how I understand and will continue to understand the notion of the 
‘objective’ in this context, ie. as that of something ‘independent of one’s having a 
perspective upon it’. To experience the world in a way which did not involve drawing 
such an objective/ subjective distinction would not be to experience it as objective in 
the way that we do. A conception or direct experience of the world as objective (in the 
present sense) is, I take it, intrinsically a self/ world dual conception or experience.
1 A concern might o f course remain about whether the world can actually be said to phenomenologically strike us 
as anything at all -  be it as mind-dependent or mind-wdependent. Perhaps, prior to any concept being applied in an 
act o f  judgement the world does not strike us as anything at all, except in the confused way in which it is often 
claimed to strike non-human animals, ie. as just a series o f obstacles, not experienced as such, but just dealt with as 
they come. This seems both phenomenologically highly counterintuitive (in our own case at least), and is 
something which would lead to a whole host o f further problems about how we might be able to move from such 
experiences to the kinds o f judgements we arrive at based on our experiences. Moreover, it might be claimed 
following Bermudez for instance (see Bermudez 1998, ch.8) that even non-human animals and very young 
children (let alone adult human beings with a sophisticated understanding o f the world) experience the world as 
objective, although somehow ‘non-conceptually’. Issues about conceptual and non-conceptual content will be 
returned to in more detail in the next section. In the meantime, it will continue to be assumed here, as it seems 
most plausible to do, that we experience the world as something, and in particular as objective, whether or not 
explicit concepts should be thought o f as being deployed in our so doing.
2 There are o f  course other notions o f the ‘objective’ and corresponding notions o f the ‘subjective’ that may be 
appealed to in different contexts. For an illuminating discussion o f three possible ways o f drawing the objective/ 
subjective distinction see for instance (Eilan 1997). I am assuming that it is relatively clear from what has been 
under discussion, that the notion o f the ‘objective’ in play here is one which applies to the world  as experienced 
(rather than to the character o f our representations thereof), and, that the distinction between the objective and the 
subjective is a distinction between the mind-independent world before us and our having a point o f view upon it.
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Moreover, it is worth noting that, aside from this point appearing obvious to
me, it has been taken to be so in much of the literature. Strawson for instance, when
discussing (in an unrelated paper) whether a subject of a non-spatial (ie. purely
auditory) experience could be a subject of an objective experience, takes the question
‘Can the conditions of knowledge of objective particulars be fulfilled for a purely
auditory experience?’ to mean ‘Could a being whose experience was purely auditory,
make use of the distinction between himself and his states on the one hand, and
something not himself, or a state of himself on the other?’1 That objective experience
involves drawing a distinction between one’s states on the one hand and something
not oneself or one’s states on the other is taken for granted. Similarly Evans, in his
commentary on this discussion of Strawson’s takes it for granted that objectivity and
the drawing of a self/world distinction come together, the substantial issue for him
also being that of whether conceiving of the world as objective (and thereby drawing
# 2
a subjective/objective distinction) presupposes conceiving of it as spatial. Another 
question that arises in the literature about the presuppositions of objectivity in the 
present sense is that of whether being able to have objective experience and to draw 
the distinction it involves presupposes being, or at some point having been, an agent 
and thereby having experienced resistance to one’s will. Again, these discussions 
about the connection between objectivity and agency take for granted that objective 
experience and the drawing of a subjective/objective distinction come together, the 
real issue being whether being able to do so requires being an agent.
In other words, although the intimate connection I am appealing to here 
between objectivity and self/world dualism may not have been put to the particular 
use to which I am trying to put it here (ie. that of providing a grounding for 
introspective self-knowledge), it has certainly been noted, and quite rightly it seems to 
me, been assumed to hold. To experience the world as objective in the way that we do 
just is to experience it as independent from the particular perspective we have upon it.
To sum up then, experiencing the world as objective just is to experience it as 
distinct from one’s perspective upon it, and this essentially because a conception of it 
as objective, when made fully explicit, just is a conception of it as distinct from one’s
1 (Strawson 1959, p 69)
2 (Evans 1985)
3 See for instance (Baldwin 1998) and (Russell 1998) in The Body and the Self. eds. Bermudez, Marcel and Eilan.
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perspective upon it. That these two conceptions are inextricably linked allows us 
moreover to make sense of why it seems impossible for instance that someone could 
possess sophisticated first-order concepts of the kind that we have and be in a position 
to make explicit first-order judgements (eg. of the form ‘There is a book on the 
table’), yet not be in a position to make any second-order judgements (eg. of the form 
‘I believe that there is a book on the table’ or ‘It seems to me that there is a book on 
the table’) due to their not happening to possess the concepts of belief or experience. 
If what has been said so far is anything along the right lines, such a situation could not 
occur, since one could not possess first-order concepts of the kind that we have 
without possessing some second-order concepts, and so could not be in a first-order 
conscious state which involved the deployment of these first-order concepts, without 
being in any position at all (whether immediately or otherwise) to self-ascribe them. 
To put things differently, the suggestion being made here is that the concepts of 
experience and belief are not something that one might (or might not) acquire after 
having acquired first-order concepts, and similarly that having second-order abilities 
is not an additional faculty to that of having sophisticated first-order abilities. The two 
come together. Thinking about the world or indeed directly experiencing it (imagining 
it, etc.) as an objective world, and thinking about it or directly experiencing it as an 
experienced or thought about world, are just two sides of our same intrinsically 
self/world dual way of thinking about or experiencing the world.
One might be concerned nevertheless that an inevitable consequence of this is 
that only beings who possess some notion of the ‘subjective’ can be taken to 
experience the world as ‘objective’. What about those creatures (eg. primates perhaps 
and young children) whom we may want to think of as experiencing the world as 
objective (following some of the recent psychological and philosophical literature for 
instance)1, yet whom we would not want to think of as possessing any notion of 
subjectivity?
As discussed in the previous chapter, it seems to me that we would actually 
be quite reluctant to attribute grasp of the world as objective to a creature whom we 
did not also think of as being to some extent self-conscious, and so as having some
1 Gibson and Bermudez amongst others argue that some non concept possessing creatures exhibit behaviour which 
suggests that they distinguish in experience between the world and their subjective perspective upon it. See the 
discussion o f Gibson and Bermudez further below in section 5.4
2 See 4.3 point (2) above.
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grasp of the idea of their having a subjective perspective upon the world. Of course, 
we would probably not want to think of primates or very young children as possessing 
any fully fledged concept of ‘subjectivity’ or as being capable of fully reflective self- 
knowledge, but neither would we, I take it, want to think of them as having a fully 
fledged concept of ‘objectivity’ or as being capable of forming explicit thoughts about 
the world before them. The kind of grasp, if any, of the objectivity of the world that 
non-human animals and very young children might be taken to have (assuming that 
they do not possess either first or second-order concepts) is going to have to be in 
some sense «o«-conceptual or pre-conceptual. This is in fact the kind of grasp 
attributed to them in the literature mentioned above. It is attributed to them moreover 
on the basis of evidence that suggests that, in experiencing the world, they are 
drawing some form of distinction between the world before them and their point of 
view upon it, a distinction which they must presumably also be drawing non- 
conceptually since they do not possess any second-order concepts.1
One can it seems therefore accept that some creatures experience the world as 
objective without having to deny the point made in this chapter that experiencing the 
world as objective and experiencing oneself as having a perspective upon it come 
inextricably together. The form (conceptual or non-conceptual) of self-consciousness 
that comes with experiencing the world as objective, will just in each case correspond 
to the form (conceptual or non-conceptual) of a creature’s grasp of the world as 
objective.2 Nothing in fact about what has been said so far suggests that grasping the 
world as objective in experience (and drawing the corresponding objective/ subjective 
distinction) must be an all-or-nothing affair or a fully conceptual affair. If one wants 
to leave room for the existence of less sophisticated conceptions of the world and of 
its objectivity, or for non-conceptual experiences of it as objective, one can just say 
that the degree to which one’s conception or grasp of the world’s objectivity in 
experiencing it is sophisticated will correspond to the degree to which one’s 
conception or grasp of one’s own subjectivity is sophisticated, and in turn to the 
degree of sophistication to which one can be thought of as self-conscious in having 
this experience.
1 That non-conceptual forms o f self-consciousness are possible, and characteristic o f the consciousness o f some 
animals and young children, is something argued for strongly by Bermudez in (Bermudez 1998).
2 A creature’s grasp o f the world’s objectivity may go anywhere from being a purely ‘practical’ grasp (cf. 
Campbell 1994, ch.l, p.30), to perhaps being a ‘non-conceptual’ representation o f it as objective, all the way to 
being a fully conceptual, complex, theoretical, multifaceted understanding o f it as objective.
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Having said this, nothing essential to the progress of the present thesis hangs 
on whether one is or is not prepared to allow for degrees of self-consciousness or for 
non-conceptual forms of first and second-order awareness. As long as experiencing 
the world as objective in beings like ourselves capable of fully explicit reflective self- 
knowledge comes together with awareness of ourselves as experiencing it, our 
solution to the problem of introspective self-knowledge stands unperturbed. Whatever 
the case of non concept-possessing creatures may be, consciousness and self- 
consciousness can be seen to come inextricably linked in us, since we could not 
experience the world as objective in the way that we actually do (given what this 
involves, ie. drawing an objective/ subjective distinction) without experiencing 
ourselves as having a cognitive or perceptual point of view upon it. It is worth 
reminding ourselves in fact that the whole purpose of introducing the notion of pre- 
reflective self-consciousness in this thesis was to allow us to answer just this one very 
specific question of how, in an adult human being like ourselves, a direct, rational, 
personal level move, on a particular occasion, is possible from a conscious thought or 
experience to a judgement about this thought or experience. For this narrow purpose a 
number of things are and can be taken for granted.
First, it can be assumed that we, those for whom the problem of self- 
knowledge is being raised, are able to have first-order conscious thoughts and 
experiences of the kind that we actually have, namely ones which (we have agreed) 
are phenomenologically as of an objective, spatio-temporal world, as of a world of 
usable objects (eg. tables and chairs), as of objects that are presented from a particular 
perspective and so available for demonstrative reference (eg. objects experienced as 
being there or this one) and so on. Next, it can also be assumed that we possess all the 
concepts (if any) that might be required for having such first-order states, together 
with whatever else this might presuppose. It can also be taken for granted that we 
possess all the second-order concepts required for making explicit mental self­
ascriptions, since our whole problem arose from the fact that we are able to self- 
ascribe our own mental states in a seemingly special way. That we are able to make 
mental self-ascriptions is not being put into question. We clearly are capable of fully 
explicit self-knowledge. Creatures who do not possess second-order concepts may 
well turn out to be self-conscious in some way, but there is no need to assume here 
that the form of self-knowledge that we have, or the form of self-consciousness that is 
implicit in our experiencing the world as objective, is going to be of the exact same
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kind as that of those creatures. In our case, the relevant ‘implicit’ form of self- 
consciousness could, for instance, be conceptual in some sense.1 The crucial point 
here is that the problem of introspective self-knowledge and puzzle about self- 
consciousness to which it leads arise even once it is assumed that we possess first and 
second-order concepts, and even once it is assumed that we have world-directed 
experiences as of an objective world. The problem remains that, in self-ascribing our 
world-directed experiences and other mental states, we still attend only to the world 
(even if indeed grasped as an objective world composed of physical objects arrayed in 
space, etc.), and on that basis make judgements about our mental states. It is the 
possibility of this move that the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness, and then 
considerations about the objectivity of our experiences, are supposed to explain. We 
need not therefore show that, in attending to the world, the implicit form of self- 
consciousness involved in our doing so is not of a kind that presupposes possessing 
second-order concepts, since we do possess second-order concepts, and since our 
problem arises even once this is assumed.
Of course, none of this tells us anything about how possessing second-order 
concepts or having a sophisticated conception of the world as mind-independent of 
the kind that we have is possible in the first place. Thinking however of self- 
consciousness and of the phenomenological objectivity of experience as not being an 
all-or-nothing affair (as suggested a paragraph back) may make it easier to see how 
our fully-fledged form of self-consciousness and our sophisticated, fully conceptual, 
theoretical grasp of the world’s objectivity and of our own subjectivity might have 
progressively developed from some more primitive earlier situation through our 
interaction primarily with the world, and through our coming to construct a 
progressively more complete and elaborate picture of this world. The difference 
between us and other animals and young children may lie not in us, as opposed to 
them, being self-conscious at all, or having any grasp of the world as objective at all, 
but rather, in our having an overall more sophisticated conception of the world and of 
its objectivity, with our sophisticated second-order abilities and sophisticated
1 The fact that we possess sophisticated first and second-order concepts does not o f course entail that the form of  
self-consciousness that is implicit in our experiencing the world as objective is o f a kind that requires possessing 
second-order concepts. It could be o f the kind that non concept-possessing creatures can also have, ie. o f a kind 
that does not require possessing second-order concepts. The point here is that, for our purposes, we do not have to 
show that this implicit form o f self-consciousness is in some sense ‘non-conceptual’ (ie. o f the latter kind) since 
we (for whom the problem is being raised) do have second-order concepts.
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conception of ourselves as having a perspective upon the world just being a 
particularly distinctive sign of this.
A lot more could of course be said about the exact connection that exists 
between the kind of conception we have of the world and of it’s independence from 
us on the one hand and the kind of conception we have of ourselves and of our 
subjectivity on the other than I will be going into here, but, given all that has been 
said, it does seem that this is going to be a very intimate one. In the case of other 
animals too, we are likely to find that the kind of grasp a being has of itself and of it’s 
subjectivity is reflected in the kind of grasp it has of the world and of its objectivity. 
Any concerns in any case related to the kind of understanding that non concept- 
possessing creatures may have of the objectivity of the world before them and of their 
own subjectivity need not worry us here. We clearly have a sophisticated grasp of 
both. The puzzle of mental self-ascription for us starts from the fact that we (whatever 
the case may be of other animals) are able to self-ascribe our own mental states upon 
merely attending to the world. This is a puzzle that arises for fully rational, 
conceptually competent (at both first and second-order levels) adult human beings 
with experiences, thoughts and other attitudes of the very kind that we have. What has 
been suggested here is that this puzzle can be solved by reference to the fact that we 
experience the world as objective, and by drawing attention to the fact that 
experiencing the world as objective involves drawing a distinction between the world 
before us and our particular perspective upon it.
A number of points of clarification remain however to be made. Recall in 
particular some of the further questions raised at the end of the last section.
First, how can appealing to the phenomenological objectivity of our 
experiences possibly help explain the possibility of self-consciousness by virtue of the 
fact that this phenomenological objectivity presupposes self-consciousness? Does this 
not involve some form of explanatory circularity? Next, if it does not, are we not led 
down the road of explanatory regress instead? Are we not, that is, in explaining the 
possibility of self-consciousness by appealing to the phenomenological objectivity of 
our experiences at best just shifting our central question of how an implicit form of 
self-consciousness is possible to that of how experiencing the world as objective is 
possible? Let us consider these two worries in turn.
5.3 Circularity and explanatory regress
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A key point made in this chapter was that experiencing the world as objective 
and drawing a distinction between the objective and the subjective always come 
together, that is, that experiencing the world as objective and being implicitly self- 
conscious are just two sides of the same coin, two sides of our same intrinsically 
self/world dual way of experiencing the world. The solution put forward here to our 
puzzle was then that it is precisely in virtue of this fact (ie. of the fact that objectivity 
and self-consciousness come inextricably together) that we are able to self-ascribe our 
own conscious states directly on the basis of having them, ie. directly on the basis of 
attending to their objects out in the world. Such accusations therefore as that 
objectivity already presupposes self-consciousness (or, in Kant’s terms, that 
experiencing the world as objective already presupposes the possibility of attaching 
the T think’ to all our representations) and so cannot be used to explain it, are based 
on a misunderstanding of the solution here on offer and of the puzzle to which it is a 
solution. Far from being viciously circular, the explanation of how being implicitly 
self-conscious at the world-directed level is possible by reference to the fact that we 
experience the world as objective, is an explanation that can (a) help clarify the sense 
in which objectivity can be concretely said (following Sartre, Kant and Strawson) to 
already ‘presuppose’ self-consciousness or to ‘make room for thought about itself 
and (b) provide an account of why it is always possible (following Kant) to attach the 
‘I think’ to all our conscious ‘representations’, or (in less Kantian terms) to 
immediately self-ascribe our own mental states. It is always possible because having 
the self-ascribed mental states themselves, insofar as having them involves 
experiencing the world as objective, also involves thereby being implicitly aware of 
ourselves as having them. The fact therefore that the existence of a pre-reflective form 
of self-consciousness is presupposed by our explanans (the phenomenological 
objectivity of our experiences) is a virtue of the proposed account of self-knowledge 
and not a defect in it. No explanatory circularity is involved.
Yet, although we may now be able to see how a pre-reflective form of self- 
consciousness can exist at the first-order level given that we experience the world as 
objective, the question of how we can experience the world as objective in the first 
place still remains unanswered. By putting the burden of explanation on the 
phenomenological objectivity of our experiences, we may not so much have explained 
how being implicitly self-conscious at the first-order level is possible as shifted our
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question of how an implicit form of self-consciousness at the first-order level is 
possible to the equally puzzling question of how experiencing the world as objective 
is possible. In other words, how, one might still wonder, is such phenomenological 
objectivity, or even a conception of objectivity, possible in the first place?
To pose this question is it seems again to misunderstand the puzzle in question 
and the nature of the solution here on offer. The puzzle being solved by appeal to the 
phenomenological objectivity of our experiences is not a developmental puzzle but a 
puzzle about how given that we do have a grasp of objectivity and of subjectivity, and 
given that we do experience the world as objective, an implicit form of self- 
consciousness can be seen to exist at the first-order level. It begins from a being who 
is fully rational, whose attention is turned to the world, who possesses all the first- 
order and second-order concepts required for specifying the contents of her 
experiences and for self-ascribing these experiences, and who then moves directly 
from, say, a conscious experience as of a book on a table, to a judgement about her 
mental states of the form ‘I believe that there is a book on the table’ or ‘It appears to 
me that there is a book on the table’. What is being explained in other words by 
reference to the phenomenological objectivity of our experiences is not how a pre- 
reflective form of self-consciousness might have come about but how its existence 
can be seen to fit in with how things currently are. The fact that this explanation does 
not tell us anything about how things might have come to be the way they are (ie. how 
we might have come to experience the world as objective) is thus not a defect in it. No 
explanatory regress is being generated.
In sum, what has been done in this chapter in appealing to the objectivity of 
our experiences and in drawing attention to the fact that this involves drawing a 
distinction between the objective and the subjective, is just to bring out how being 
implicitly self-conscious can indeed be seen to be present already in the way in which 
we do experience the world. The question of how we might have gone from being 
infants not experiencing the world as objective and not being self-conscious to being 
both self-conscious and experiencing the world as objective is another question 
altogether. This latter question, or indeed that of how we might have gone from 
possessing neither first nor second-order concepts to possessing both a sophisticated 
conception of the world as objective and of ourselves as having a perspective upon it, 
is a question which would require a developmental answer, or a suggestion as to how 
drawing a distinction between the objective and the subjective in experiencing the
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world might be innate, combined perhaps with an account of how our visual systems 
parse the visual array, etc. No such answer is needed here however, as our question is, 
to repeat, not a developmental one but one about how an implicit form of self- 
consciousness (required for the possibility of fully reflective introspective self- 
knowledge) can be seen to fit in with how things actually are when we experience the 
world, and when, in so doing, we come to self-ascribe a perspective upon this world.
With this clearer idea in mind of the precise role that experiencing the world 
as objective and thereby being implicitly self-conscious is supposed to play in our 
solution to the puzzle about mental self-ascription, we can now go back to address a 
question left to us from the last chapter -  that of the exact sense in which this so 
called ‘implicit’ form of self-consciousness that comes with experiencing the world as 
objective can truly be said to be implicit, and so to be something which can provide 
(as required) the grounding for our introspective second-order judgements, without 
being already itself a form of introspective self-knowledge.
5.4 ‘Pre-reflective’ self-consciousness and ‘non-conceptual’ self-consciousness
In the last chapter we considered and rejected most possible interpretations of 
the notion of ‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’ that could be extracted 
from the already existing literature on self-knowledge (from ‘higher-order thought’ 
accounts of consciousness and from a number of traditional accounts of self- 
knowledge -  ie. perceptual accounts and constitutive accounts)1. So, how else could 
this notion be understood? One particularly similar sounding notion to our Sartrian 
one of ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’ it seems still remains. It can be found in 
recent writings on ‘non-conceptual’ or ‘pre-conceptual’ self-consciousness.
Should we thus perhaps take ‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’ in the present 
context to mean ‘non-conceptual’ or ‘pre-conceptual’? If we should, might this not 
however open the door to a host of further explanatory questions about how one can 
move directly from a state with a second-order content that is non-conceptual to a 
fully conceptual articulation of this content in a second-order judgement? On the other 
hand if we should not take being ‘implicit’ here to mean being ‘non-conceptual’, in 
what other sense could our first-order states be said to be states of ‘implicit’ self­
1 See 4.1 above
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consciousness? In particular, how could a form of self-consciousness be said to be 
both implicit and conceptual? What could it possibly be to be implicitly deploying a 
second-order concept when attending to the world?
In what follows, it will be argued that the reflective/pre-reflective self- 
consciousness distinction we need to draw in this thesis does not map clearly onto the 
conceptual/non-conceptual self-consciousness distinction, and that in fact the whole 
present discussion about reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness should, in a 
way, be thought of as orthogonal to debates about conceptual and non-conceptual 
content. This will not be to deny that there might be such a thing as non-conceptual 
self-consciousness, or to suggest that postulating such a form of self-consciousness 
might not be required for solving a number of other problems. The sole purpose of the 
comparison here will be to establish and specify, through this comparison, at least one 
distinctive sense in which a certain class of our states must be states of ‘implicit’ self- 
awareness regardless of whether there may also be other senses in which certain states 
of ours or of other creatures can or should be thought of as states of a ‘less-than-fully- 
fledged’ form of self-consciousness.
So, the broad question before us is this: in exactly what sense should we think 
of the ‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’ form of self-consciousness required for the 
purposes of solving our puzzle as being implicit? More narrowly, should we take 
being ‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’ in the context of this thesis to mean being ‘non- 
conceptual’ or ‘pre-conceptual’? That is, should the ‘pre-reflective’ form of self- 
consciousness which it has been argued must be involved in having all conscious 
states which we are able to immediately self-ascribe, be thought of essentially as a 
form of non-conceptual self-consciousness?
As mentioned, this section will essentially argue that issues about the 
conceptual or non-conceptual character of the content of the form of self-awareness 
we have in experiencing the world as objective should be thought of as quite 
orthogonal to issues about its implicitness or explicitness. That is, the notion put 
forward in this thesis of ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness should not, it will be 
argued, be thought of as equivalent to that of ‘non-conceptual’ self-consciousness, at 
least given a certain understanding of ‘non-conceptual self-consciousness’, namely 
the one that follows:
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On the view to be considered here for heuristic purposes,1 an attitude towards 
the world can be said to have conceptual content, if, in order to be in that state, one 
must actually possess the concepts required to specify that state’s content. The content 
of my conscious thought that there is a book on this table will thus, for example, count 
as conceptual since I could not it seems be consciously thinking to myself that there is 
a book on this table unless I possessed the concept of a book, that of a table, the 
demonstrative concept this, the concept of being on something, and so on. On the 
other hand, a state can, on the understanding to be appealed to here, be said to have 
non-conceptual content, if one need not (though one might) possess the concepts 
required to specify the content of this state in order to be in it. It is often claimed that 
in this sense the contents of perceptual states are always fully or partially non- 
conceptual. Someone could for instance on this view be counted as having a 
perceptual experience as of something red (ie. a perceived object could appear to them 
as red) without them possessing the concept of ‘red’.2
Assuming that there can be such things as states with non-conceptual content 
in the above sense, one might then go further and suggest that in addition to there 
being states with non-conceptual first-oxdox contents (ie. contents to specify which 
one would need to explicitly deploy first-order concepts), there can also be states with 
non-conceptual second-order contents. Such a suggestion is for instance made by 
Bermudez, who argues that we need to posit the existence of such states for a number 
of reasons, in particular it seems the following three.
In brief, one reason is essentially developmental, arising from the general 
question of how one can possibly acquire a concept unless one is, prior to that, 
already able to detect the presence of instances of the property designated by that 
concept. Another motivation is supposed to be that of making it possible to provide a 
non-circular account of what possessing second-order concepts, or in particular what 
possessing the ‘I’ concept, consists in. And, the third reason has to do primarily with
1 See for instance (Crane 1992); also (Bermudez 1998, Chapter 3.)
2 To give ourselves a frame o f reference, Peacocke (1992) amongst others seems to believe in non-conceptual 
contents in the sense outlined here whereas McDowell (1994) for instance does not.
3 Bermudez’s concerns are more generally focused on establishing the existence o f states with non-conceptual first 
person contents, whether these be first-order (as in the case o f a content expressible by, say, ‘I am standing in front 
o f a tree’) or second-order (as when judging ‘I believe that it is raining’). The arguments he provides, and 
psychological evidence he appeals to are thus not always explicitly put forward in support o f the existence o f  
specifically psychological first person contents, though I will o f course be focusing primarily on these latter cases.
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trying to make the best possible sense of some of the behaviour of animals and very 
young children who clearly do not possess any second-order concepts, yet whose 
behaviour in certain circumstances is such that the principle of inference to the best 
explanation seems to require attributing to them states with, for one thing, content 
(that is, it seems to require interpreting their behaviour as not purely reactive, but as 
based on their actually representing things to be one way or another or experiencing 
things as this or that), and secondly with second-order contents.1
Now, without going into any of these arguments in great detail -  since it is not 
amongst our present aims to assess the case for the existence of states of non- 
conceptual self-consciousness but merely to compare the notion of ‘non-conceptual 
self-consciousness’ with that of ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’ set out in this 
thesis -  let us just briefly go over some of the empirical evidence appealed to, so as to 
have in mind some concrete examples of what states of ‘non-conceptual self- 
consciousness’ are supposed to be.
One source of empirical evidence for the existence of such states is supposed 
be found in experiments of so called ‘joint visual attention’, where inference to the 
best explanation of the observed behaviour of pre-linguistic children in interaction 
with their mothers, seems to require attributing to the infants in question states with 
(a) contents and (b) with contents which we would normally express by such 
sentences such as ‘Mother wants me to look where she is looking’ or ‘I am looking 
where Mother is looking’ or ‘Mother will look where I am looking if I look back and 
forth from her to it’, etc. Now, if this is indeed the right interpretation to give of these 
infants’ behaviour in these experiments, we would in fact seem to have here paradigm 
cases of states with non-conceptual second-order contents in the sense defined above, 
since the infants are supposedly able to be in states with the above second-order 
contents without possessing any second-order concepts, and indeed without 
possessing any concepts at all.
1 Incidentally, in support o f the claims made earlier on, beings who do not possess any second-order concepts do 
not seem to possess any first-order concepts either.
2 See (Bermudez 1998, ch.9) for a more detailed discussion o f these experiments and their potential support for the 
existence o f states with non-conceptual second-order contents. As already mentioned however, I am side-stepping 
all these details here essentially because it is not my present aim to take sides on the issue o f what these 
experiments can actually show, or indeed on the issue o f the possibility or not o f there being states with non- 
conceptual content, whether at the first or the second-order level. The primary aim o f this section is to suggest that 
we do not need to take sides on the question o f whether there can be states o f non-conceptual self-consciousness, 
or indeed states with non-conceptual content at any level in order to make room for the existence o f 'pre- 
reflective ’ or implicit self-consciousness in the sense needed to solve our puzzle about mental self-ascription.
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But now, given the above examples of states of non-conceptual self- 
consciousness, and given what has been said in this thesis about pre-reflective self- 
consciousness and the specific explanatory gap it is supposed to fill, it seems quite 
clear that the notions of ‘non-conceptual self-consciousness’ and ‘pre-reflective self- 
consciousness’ will fail, at least in some cases, to match up in their extensions. In 
particular, what is needed to solve our problem is a form of self-consciousness that 
constitutes an intrinsic part of what is involved in being in an essentially first-order 
conscious state. It is not at all clear however that the states in the above examples of 
joint visual attention can be thought of as first-order states. They are states about 
one’s own mental states (ie. second-order states). To this extent, the notion of ‘pre- 
reflective’ self-consciousness needed to solve our puzzle is much closer to the notion 
of self-consciousness sketched by Sartre in his talk of the ‘pre-reflective cogito’ 
(which he stresses is not a separate state about a first-order conscious state, but part of 
the very mode of being of the first-order conscious state itself)1 than to Bermudez’s 
notion of ‘non-conceptual self-consciousness’. In the above examples at least, the 
states of supposed ‘non-conceptual self-consciousness’ in question are not first-order 
states of implicit self-awareness but clearly second-order states (ie. states with 
contents to specify which one would need to explicitly deploy second-order 
concepts). If these are therefore supposed to be paradigm examples of states of ‘non- 
conceptual self-consciousness’, then positing the possibility of a non-conceptual form 
of self-consciousness (ie. a form of self-consciousness which does not require 
possessing or deploying second-order concepts) cannot alone get us any closer to 
understanding how self-ascribing a conscious state directly on the basis of having it 
(ie. on the basis of attending to the world) is possible. The examples of non- 
conceptual self-consciousness taken from experiments of joint visual attention seem 
to be essentially cases of what we might call explicit yet not conceptual thoughts 
about one’s own mental states, insofar as what the infants’ attention in these examples 
is occupied with are facts about themselves looking (or their mother looking) rather 
than facts about how the world is, thereby suggesting that there is a possible 
distinction to be drawn here between the idea of a form of self-consciousness being
1 See (Sartre 1969, Introduction)
2 By ‘attention’ here I do not o f course mean perceptual attention or perceptual focus, which, either way, is going 
to be on some aspect o f the world, if  on anything.
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implicit and it’s being non-conceptual. It’s implicitness has to do with what one is or 
is not attending to, whereas it’s non-conceptual character has to do with what 
concepts one need or need not possess in order to be in that state.
This is of course not to say that there could not be states of self-awareness 
which are both implicit and non-conceptual. An illustration of such states of implicit 
non-conceptual self-consciousness can in fact be found in another source of evidence 
appealed to by Bermudez for the existence of states with non-conceptual first-person 
contents, namely in Gibson’s theory of ecological optics. Based on various 
experiments performed on non-linguistic animals and infants, Gibson suggests that 
outward-directed perceptual experience itself, even in the case of beings with no 
conceptual abilities at all, is a direct source of information not only about the world, 
but also about oneself: of one’s location, of one’s own movement and position, of 
various possibilities regarding what one can or cannot do, etc.1 To take an example, 
this is supposed to be shown by the fact that in so called ‘moving room’ experiments 
(where infants are put in a room the walls of which are made to move) the infants 
involved, by looking only ahead of themselves, tend to take the changes in their visual 
field to signal a change in their own position and movement. This is supposedly 
revealed by their tendency to compensate for these changes by moving their bodies in 
the opposite direction and eventually falling over.
Now, although it is not clear that these kinds of considerations alone can 
actually show that the relevant animals or infants are in anything like contentful states 
(rather than manifesting a perhaps surprising but purely practical ability to attune 
themselves to their environment), and although it is not clear either that the self- 
specifying information here is in any straightforward way information about their 
mental states, it certainly seems that being capable of reacting in this way to perceived 
changes in their visual field does display some kind of sensitivity to the distinction 
between the perceived world and their subjective point of view upon it. So, perhaps, 
these cases of infants co-perceiving the world and properties of themselves as well as 
making some subjective/objective distinction through attending primarily to the 
environment, could be taken to be examples of them being in states of implicit, non- 
conceptual self-consciousness -  implicit because their attention is, if on anything 
explicitly, on the environment (rather than on their perceptual experience), and non-
1 See (Gibson J. J 1979 as well as Gibson, E. J. 1969) and (Bermudez 1998, Ch. 5)
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conceptual because of course they do not possess the concepts needed to specify or 
represent any of this conceptually (whether the world or the fact of their looking at it 
at a certain angle).
Nevertheless, although such an implicit form of self-consciousness might 
indeed be involved in having these first-order perceptual states (first-order states 
which are themselves non-conceptual), and although the form of self-consciousness 
these infants would seem to have is certainly going to have to be a form of non- 
conceptual self-consciousness (since they do not possess any second-order concepts), 
it is not clear that in our own case (ie. in adults), given what has been suggested about 
the inter-dependence of first and second order concepts,1 the implicit form of self- 
consciousness that comes with having first-order states with conceptual content (ie. of 
a kind that we at least sometimes have) can come out as being a form of non- 
conceptual self-consciousness. Being pre-reflectively self-conscious in the way that 
comes with being in a first-order state with conceptual content will of course not 
involve explicitly deploying any second-order concepts (since in having a first-order 
state one is attending only to the world), but it certainly will require possessing such 
concepts, since, if the suggestion about the interdependence of first and second-order 
concepts is correct, possessing some second-order concepts will be presupposed by 
one’s possession of the concepts actually deployed at the first-order level.
To try to make this latter point clearer, and to avoid getting ourselves tangled 
up in ambiguous terminology, let us remind ourselves of the two main factors at work 
here: (1) a state is supposed to have conceptual/non-conceptual content if being in a 
state with that content requires/does not require possessing the concepts needed for 
specifying that content, and (2), following the suggestion made in section 5.2 above, 
one cannot possess sophisticated first-order concepts of the kind that we have, without 
also possessing some second-order concepts. Now, if both of these claims are true, it 
would seem that one cannot be in a first-order state with conceptual content without 
possessing any second-order concepts, and can therefore not be ‘pre-reflectively’ self- 
conscious in the way that one actually is when in a first-order state with conceptual 
content, without possessing some second-order concepts. So, in a somewhat indirect 
sense, the pre-reflective form of self-consciousness involved in having first-order 
conscious states with conceptual content (ie. of the kind that we at least sometimes
1 See pp. 110-112 above
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have) requires possessing second-order concepts, and thus, on the above definition of 
conceptual and non-conceptual content, this form of self-consciousness would come 
out as being conceptual, although being self-conscious in this way clearly does not 
involve explicitly deploying any second-order concepts. Perhaps the best way of 
putting it then would be to say, if we can make sense of this idea at all, that it involves 
implicitly deploying these concepts. It is a form of implicit, yet conceptual, self- 
consciousness.
But, does it actually make sense to talk of implicitly deploying a concept? It is 
not clear to me that it does not. There are in fact other cases in which it would seem 
appropriate to say that a concept is being deployed implicitly. Let us digress for a 
moment and consider a discussion in the philosophy of time.
Consider the case of someone saying ‘I am writing an essay at the time of this 
utterance’. This is something along the lines of what reductionists about dynamic 
temporal facts (ie. facts about pastness, presentness and futurity) to static temporal 
facts (ie. facts about simultaneity and being earlier or later than some event) generally 
want to say that we actually mean when we say such things as ‘I am now writing an 
essay’.1 A good objection to such a view is however to say that, insofar as this 
analysis works, it is not in fact a reductive analysis at all, since what is meant by ‘this 
utterance’ is precisely ‘the utterance which I am making now\ It is a distinctive 
feature of demonstrative reference with the word ‘this’ that it presupposes reference to 
the temporal presence of that which is being picked out. Thinking of an event as ‘this 
utterance’ is to be thinking of it as the utterance which is occurring now. Thus, 
assuming that this analysis is correct, it does not seem that one could fully grasp the 
content of what one is saying in saying ‘I am writing an essay at the time of this 
utterance’ without having some grasp of the concept of something’s occurring now. 
Consequently, in a sense, saying something like ‘I am writing an essay at the time of 
this utterance’ could be said to involve implicitly deploying the concept of temporal 
presence ‘now’, or to involve making implicit reference to temporal presence, in a 
way that on the other hand saying something like ‘I am writing an essay at time t’ or 
‘I am writing an essay at the time of my utterance of ‘I am writing an essay” would 
not.
1 For various reductionist and non reductionist views o f temporal facts, see LePoidevin and MacBeath (eds.) 
(1993), section 1.
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Incidentally, referring demonstratively seems to presuppose not just implicit 
reference to dynamic temporal facts, but also to ourselves and to our mental states, 
such as for instance when pointing at something in our immediate vicinity and saying 
‘that object’ meaning essentially ‘the object I  am now pointing at’, or ‘the object in 
my visual field" or ‘the object I am now looking at’. Similarly, in non-perceptual 
cases, when one is for instance just reflecting on something and suddenly comes to 
think ‘that is interesting’, what one seems to mean by ‘that’ is essentially ‘the 
proposition that just occurred to me" or ‘the thing I just thought o f. These 
considerations may I believe be of some importance when thinking about our ability 
to self-ascribe thoughts that are not about the world directly before us, but, say, about 
abstract ideas or propositions.
To return to our discussion of non-conceptual self-consciousness, the point to 
take home is that what is essential to a first-order state’s being a state of implicit or 
pre-reflective self-consciousness in the sense needed to solve our puzzle in this thesis, 
is that this self-awareness be involved in the very having of the first-order conscious 
state itself, and not that being in this state not require possessing second-order 
concepts. In fact the pre-reflective form of self-consciousness involved in having first- 
order states with conceptual content (ie. some of the very states we are able to self- 
ascribe directly on the basis of having them -  eg. our occurrent empirical thoughts) 
would even seem to require possessing second-order concepts, since, as we have 
seen, being in a world-directed state with conceptual content not only involves being 
pre-reflectively self-conscious, but also, or so I have suggested, presupposes 
possessing second-order concepts. Thus, if there is to be such a thing as non- 
conceptual pre-reflective self-consciousness, it will have to be (as perhaps is the case 
of the animals and infants in the Gibsonian experiments) essentially associated with 
being in states with non-conceptual first-order contents.1 In any case, whatever side 
one chooses to take on the issue of the existence or not of states with non-conceptual 
contents (whether at the first or second-order level), no threat is going to be posed to 
the present solution to our problem about mental self-ascription. The side one chooses 
to take on this issue may well change what one can say about animals and very young 
children, but it will not change anything essential, in most cases, about what the 
situation is for us.
1 This again fits quite well with the idea that the kind o f grasp one has o f oneself and o f one’s subjectivity will 
correspond to the kind o f grasp one has o f the world and o f its objectivity. See pp. 112-113 above
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Of course, one could mean something very different by ‘non-conceptual’ than 
that which I have been assuming it to mean here. In fact, it might be claimed that 
‘non-conceptual’ just means ‘implicit’ or ‘not fully spelled out’ or ‘not currently 
attended to’ thereby affecting whether we should label the form of self-consciousness 
I have been calling ‘pre-reflective’, ‘non-conceptual’. This would however be a 
purely terminological issue. If what one means by ‘non-conceptual’ encompasses all 
that I have been meaning here by ‘implicit’ or ‘pre-reflective’, then I am happy to call 
this form of self-consciousness ‘non-conceptual’. It is far from clear however that this 
is what is generally meant by ‘non-conceptual’. More relevantly, the main purpose of 
the above comparison between the above two notions of self-consciousness (‘pre- 
reflective’ and ‘non-conceptual’) was simply to allow us to articulate more clearly 
what ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness is supposed to be in the context of solving our 
puzzle about mental self-ascription, regardless of what might or might not be meant, 
in other contexts, by ‘non-conceptual self-consciousness’.
To sum up, what we have done in this chapter is put forward and clarify a 
concrete solution to the puzzle of how our introspective self-ascriptive judgements 
can be based directly on looking out at the world, and thereby ultimately provided a 
solution to our original problem of how immediate, authoritative, immune to non- 
cognitive error knowledge of our own conscious mental states is possible. Or, we 
have at least done so for the case of world-directed cognitive states.
The focus of our solution has been on the phenomenological objectivity of our 
experiences, thoughts, etc. as the one aspect of our first-order conscious states in 
virtue of which they can be states of ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’ and thereby 
constitute immediate rational grounds for self-ascribing them. This still leaves a 
fundamental question unanswered -  that of how we might be able to self-ascribe, in a 
special authoritative way, states of ours other than beliefs, experiences, thoughts, etc. 
as of a mind-independent world. More precisely, the problem left before us is this: if 
what has been argued in this thesis so far is correct, all mental sates which we are able 
to authoritatively self-ascribe, we must be able to self-ascribe directly on the basis o f 
having them, that is, directly on the basis of attending to their objects out in the world. 
Yet, it is not clear (a) that in having all conscious states, in particular certain emotions 
and desires, their objects always present themselves to us as objective, nor (b) 
that/how our experiencing the world as objective, even when doing so is involved in 
our having particular emotions and desires, can involve our being implicitly aware of
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ourselves as having distinctively emotional attitudes towards the world (eg. fear, 
hope, etc.) as opposed to just a cognitive perspective upon it. In sum, it is far from 
clear how the suggestions made so far about how a state can be a state of pre- 
reflective self-consciousness can be extended to cover the case of all conscious states 
of which we are able to have immediate authoritative knowledge.
But, perhaps these suggestions do not need to be so extended. Perhaps, that is, 
we are not actually able to know our own emotions and desires in the special 
authoritative way in which we are able to know our own cognitive states, and so do 
not need to show how attending to the world when having an emotion or desire might 
involve being pre-reflectively self-conscious. Or do we? In order to answer this 
question, a step back will need to be taken to re-consider the puzzle about mental self­
ascription to which pre-reflective self-consciousness was supposed to be an answer, 
and to focus this time on how a parallel puzzle might arise, if at all, for the case of 
states other than thoughts and experiences as of a mind-independent world.
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Chapter 6: Knowing our own emotions
On the face of it, the process of self-ascribing our own emotions is quite 
different from that of self-ascribing our own cognitive states. Self-ascribing our own 
emotions and desires tends in particular to be a far lengthier, more difficult, and more 
prone to error process than that of self-ascribing most of our own thoughts, beliefs 
and perceptual experiences. This would initially seem to suggest that a very different 
account of self-knowledge should be adopted for the case of emotions and desires 
from that adopted for the case of cognitive states. Take for example the process of 
self-ascribing a feeling of guilt about feeling envy. Such a process is likely to be both 
lengthy and highly susceptible to error very much wwlike a process of self-ascribing, 
say, a simple belief (eg. that it is raining) or an occurrent perceptual experience (eg. as 
of a table). Should this not be taken to suggest that although we are able to know our 
own cognitive states in a way that is immediate, authoritative, and immune to non- 
cognitive error, we are perhaps not able to know our own emotions in any such 
special way? Should we not in fact adopt something more like a Rylean account of 
self-knowledge for the case of emotions and desires than we have adopted for the case 
of cognitive states -  ie. an account according to which we come to know our own 
emotions and desires in much the same way as we come to know the emotions of 
others, namely by inference from observation (or from direct observation) of our 
behavioural patterns?
The view that first-person authority begins and ends with our knowledge of 
our own consciously manifested cognitive states and perceptual experiences, to the 
exclusion of motivational states like emotions and desires, is initially quite compelling
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in that it seems to fit well with the innumerable situations where we do not appear to 
know what we want, where we are not sure how we feel or are sure but are in fact 
mistaken, or where we get things right only at cost of much effort and lengthy 
interpretative reflection. It could in fact quite plausibly be argued that the whole 
problem about introspective self-knowledge (and resulting puzzle about mental self­
ascription) does not arise at all for the case of emotions and desires. Contrary to this 
however, it will be argued here that a parallel puzzle about mental self-ascription does 
arise for the case of emotions and desires, and that a parallel solution therefore to it 
must be found -  ie. a solution that can show how attending to the objects of our 
emotions and desires involves, like attending to the objects of our cognitive states, 
being implicitly aware of ourselves as having them. So, how might such a puzzle 
arise?
6.1 The puzzle
At first glance, as mentioned above, there is much data to suggest that unlike 
our own cognitive states, we do not have immediate authoritative access to our own 
emotions and desires. Consider for instance what you want to do with your life, or 
whether you want to do a particular thing with it such as have children, change job, 
etc. Alternatively, ask yourself whether you resent, say, your family for preventing 
you from following a certain path in your career, or whether it is instead yourself that 
you are angry at for not having pursued it. Even more simply, ask yourself whether 
you are happy, or whether you want to go to the countryside for the weekend, or 
indeed whether you like the colour of the wall in front of you. You may in all these 
cases be initially quite unsure what to say. In some of them, you may even remain 
unsure after suitable consideration and perhaps even get what you feel wrong in the 
end, as an analyst, or someone who knows you well, might make you realise later. In 
other cases you may be wrong even when initially certain that you do (or do not, as 
the case may be) feel a certain way about something. For instance, you may be 
convinced that you have no feelings at all for someone, yet find yourself trembling 
nervously upon suddenly seeing them walk into the room. Or, more interestingly, you 
may come to this realisation that you still love/hate/are angry at this person little by 
little, upon observing them, thinking about them, recalling past situations involving 
them, listening to what they are saying, etc.
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These examples are of course different in many ways. They all seem to 
suggest however that in one way or another the process by which we come to know 
our own emotions (even in cases of emotions which clearly are not unconscious or 
repressed) tends to be one fraught with the possibility of error, and even when carried 
through successfully, often a laborious task. None of this seems true of most cases of 
cognitive self-ascriptions. If, for instance, instead of being asked how you feel about 
someone you are asked whether you are now thinking about them, you will probably 
be immediately able to say that you are or are not thinking about them, without much 
hesitation. And, except in rare circumstances (eg. of irrationality, insincerity, or 
conceptual incompetence), you are not likely to be mistaken. The question therefore is 
why are things different in cases of self-ascription of emotions and desires? The 
obvious answer is to say that things are different because we do not actually come to 
know our own emotions and desires directly on the basis of having them as we do 
many of our cognitive states, but only on the basis of a long and interpretative 
inferential process. That is, the obvious suggestion is to say that the process by which 
we reach judgements about our own emotions is not a directly introspective one like 
that of self-ascribing our own cognitive states, but a complex inferential and 
interpretative one, based essentially on observing our own behavioural and nervous 
system reactions, noting recurring patterns of (non-emotional) thought, noting what 
we are perceptually attending to, and so on. Some of this data may of course be 
acquired through direct introspection, particularly the data about what thoughts we are 
having, what we are perceptually attending to, what we are imagining, and so on. But, 
this in itself does not make the knowledge we thereby acquire of our own emotions 
non-inferential or introspectively based in the sense described in the first part of the 
thesis. In fact regardless of how the information about ourselves is acquired, it 
remains information about ourselves and not about the world (only the latter would 
give rise to our puzzle), and, once acquired, can only be used in the way a third person 
would use it, essentially in a process of inference to derive what emotions we have.
So, why should having emotions and desires actually need to be shown to 
involve our being implicitly aware of ourselves as having them? Why, in fact, should 
we be taken to have any kind of special access to our own emotions at all?
It certainly seems true that some of our emotions, in particular our repressed or 
unconscious ones (in the Freudian sense), are known by us only in the above way, that 
is, not through any direct form of introspection, but essentially through inference from
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explicit data regarding ourselves. I might for instance have a repressed desire to hurt 
someone (a desire which might be repressed, say, because of some other emotion I 
also have -  eg. a feeling of guilt about having such a desire), which therefore fails to 
manifest itself in my conscious mind (eg. in what I consciously believe about the 
person or in how I intentionally relate to them), but which I may nonetheless come to 
realise that I have through noting various involuntary behavioural and nervous system 
reactions on my part in this person’s presence, or by noting recurrent thoughts or 
dreams I might have involving them. Taking all emotional self-knowledge however to 
be inferential in this way ultimately fails, we will see, to do justice (a) to certain clear 
distinctions that exist between different cases of self-ascription of emotions (eg. 
between self-ascriptions of conscious emotions and self-ascriptions of unconscious 
emotions), and (b) to certain important similarities that exist between some cases of 
self-ascription of emotions and a number of cases of introspectively (ie. not 
inferentially) based self-ascriptions of cognitive states and perceptual experiences.
To begin with, it is not just some of our own emotions and desires (ie. our 
unconscious or repressed emotions and desires) that we are able to know inferentially, 
but also a wide range of our own beliefs -  ie. our repressed beliefs such as in cases of 
denial. The latter fact, ie. that some of our beliefs are known only inferentially does 
not however, as discussed earlier in the thesis, preclude other beliefs of ours from 
being accessible to us through direct introspection (or at least through direct 
introspection of their conscious manifestations in judgement). Thus, similarly, there is 
no reason yet to believe that all our emotions are known only inferentially. Some of 
our emotions and desires, like some of our beliefs, may well be known in a special 
first-person authoritative manner. Next, it so happens that many conscious (in the 
dispositional sense) emotions do seem to function quite differently from wwconscious 
(ie. repressed) emotions. They seem in particular capable of manifesting themselves 
in episodes of consciousness (in our occurrent thoughts, experiences, episodes of 
visualisation, etc.), and crucially, they seem knowable (like many of our cognitive 
states) without the need for any inference from data explicitly regarding ourselves.
Take for instance the desire you might now have for chocolate cake, or your 
love for someone, or your embarrassment about something you did last night, or your 
mild annoyance at the person in front of you partially blocking your view at the 
cinema. In all these cases, if asked whether you have the relevant emotion, you are 
likely to turn your attention to the objects or events themselves rather than to yourself
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and to your behaviour, arousal symptoms, patterns of non-emotional thought, etc. 
Suppose in fact that you are now presented with the chocolate cake and asked whether 
you would like some. You will probably not turn your attention to how you are 
behaving (you may be sitting perfectly still), or to whether you are having any 
specific arousal symptoms (you may riot be having any, or at least not any specific 
enough to identify yourself as desiring chocolate cake rather than as having some 
other emotion), nor indeed will you introspect any relevant non-emotional thoughts 
you might be having (you may well not be having any explicit thoughts about the 
cake’s being good or worth having, etc. let alone be actually consulting these 
thoughts). Instead, what you will it seems most likely do upon being offered chocolate 
cake is consider the cake (not the fact that your are considering it), turn your attention 
and gaze towards it (not to the fact that you are looking at it or visualising it in 
imagination), and so on. Similar things could also be said of the other examples. In 
response for instance to the question of whether you are embarrassed about something 
you did the night before, you will probably run through the events of the previous 
evening in your head, focusing on particular moments of it, rather than turn your 
attention to your present behaviour, thought patterns, or bodily sensations. Of course 
in many cases of self-ascription of emotion the latter kind of evidence is consulted as 
well. The point however remains that often it is not consulted and that in some cases it 
could not be consulted not being actually available, so it obviously need not be 
consulted in all cases. What we do need to attend to in these cases however is it seems 
the objects of our emotions (whether they be objects, states of affairs, events, abstract 
possibilities, etc.). Our knowledge of our own emotions in these cases therefore has to 
be explained other than by way of an inferential account according to which our 
knowledge of our own emotions is derived essentially from explicit data regarding 
ourselves.
It now seems that there is clearly an epistemological difference between 
different cases of self-ascription of emotion -  between instances of self-ascription of 
unconscious emotions and instances of self-ascription of consciously manifested (or at 
least consciously manifestable) emotions -  and that this difference lies specifically in 
what kind of evidence is consulted in each case. Moreover, the evidence in play in 
coming to know the latter set of emotions, seems to be very much akin to that in play 
in coming to know our own conscious (ie. non-repressed) cognitive states and 
perceptual experiences. In both cases, in being asked whether we have a particular
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state (emotional or cognitive), we seem to focus our attention on the world rather than 
on ourselves and on our behaviour, arousal symptoms, or other mental and physical 
properties. Our judgements about our own conscious emotions thus seem to be in this 
respect reached on a similar basis to those about our conscious beliefs, ie. on the basis 
of having first-order occurrent states (in which our emotions/beliefs are manifested), 
rather than on the basis of thinking about the fact that we are having them. This is 
clearly something which no third person is in a position to do, and so suggests that in 
the end, as with the case of beliefs, we do have some kind of privileged access to a 
wide range of our own emotions. No one other than ourselves can effect a direct 
psychological transition between having a mental state of ours and judging that we 
have it, since only we ourselves have our states.1
With this similarity though between our knowledge of certain of our emotions 
and our knowledge of some of our cognitive states comes also a similar puzzle: how 
can having a first-order consciously manifested emotion itself already reveal to us the 
fact that we have it? Or, more specifically, how can attending to the object of an 
emotion of ours directly reveal to us the fact that we have an emotional attitude 
towards it rather than just a cognitive perspective upon it? The same puzzle that arose 
for the case of cognitive states in other words clearly arises also for the case of 
emotions and desires -  or at least a very similar puzzle which will require a similar 
solution.
It is true, it must be said, that in self-ascribing emotions, we do not (as we do 
in self-ascribing experiences and beliefs) actually consider whether the world is a 
certain way. That is, we do not make self-ascriptive judgements about, say, whether 
we dislike rain by looking at whether it is actually raining. We do however attend to 
the objects of our emotions in order to determine whether we have these emotions, 
and so do move directly from the first-order emotional level to the second-order self- 
ascriptive level, that is from our emotional perspective on the world to self-ascribing 
an emotion towards it. The puzzle about self-knowledge thus arises nonetheless, and 
still requires the same kind of solution. In fact, additionally, just as when self- 
ascribing a cognitive state, we turn our attention not only to the world in coming to
1 There is o f course a sense in which the fact o f  one’s having a certain emotion could constitute a direct ‘reason’ 
(relative to some normative system) for a third person to move on to judge that one has it. In the sense o f transition 
appealed to in this thesis though, as should be clear from what was said in previous chapters about reasons (see in 
particular 3.1 above), the transition in question is an essentially psychological one, holding between the mental 
occurrences themselves, and not a normative relation between the fac t that the one state is occurring and 
someone’s believing that it is.
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self-ascribe an emotion, but doing so seems generally to make sense to us from within 
our own conscious point of view. We do not just ‘find ourselves’ self-ascribing 
emotions on particular occasions. Rather, when self-ascribing an emotion based on 
looking out at the world, doing so seems appropriate to us from within our own 
outward-looking perspective. Our attention to the world does not just act as a trigger 
for our self-ascriptions. Rather, we seem to turn to the world for evidence or 
confirmation that we have a particular emotion.
In sum, despite the differences that clearly exist between our knowledge of our 
own cognitive states and our knowledge of our own emotions, a crucial point of 
similarity between the two is also striking. When self-ascribing a wide range of our 
own emotions, as when self-ascribing a wide range of our own cognitive states, we 
tend to turn our attention not to ourselves (eg. to our behavioural patterns) or to our 
mental states (ie. to psychological facts about ourselves) for evidence or confirmation, 
but primarily to the world, that is, to the objects of our attitudes, or to that towards 
which we have these mental states. The puzzle about mental self-ascription arrived at 
in the preceding chapters arises in other words both for the case of our knowledge of a 
certain class of our own cognitive states (beliefs, thoughts, perceptual experiences, 
etc.) and for the case of our knowledge of many of our own emotions (eg. desires, 
fears, hopes, etc.). An account of how implicit reference to ourselves as having a 
particular attitude towards the world can already be present in the way the world 
strikes us phenomenologically does therefore turn out to be needed for both cases. In 
light of the differences however between emotional states and cognitive states, and 
between our abilities to know each of them, a slightly different account may in the end 
turn out to be needed for the case of the latter from that adopted for the case of the 
former. Broadly though, the correct account of self-knowledge for the case of 
emotions will it seems have to be, as it was for the case of cognitive states, an account 
of how our having these attitudes towards the world can be already implicit in the way 
the world (or the objects of these attitudes) strikes us in our having these attitudes. A 
difficult question remains though about how this might be done.
6.2 Knowing our own emotions and experiencing the world as objective
It was suggested, recall, that our world-directed judgements and perceptual 
experiences could be understood to be states of implicit self-awareness by appeal to
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the distinctive self/world dual way in which the world presents itself to us (or is 
represented as being) in our having these experiences, thoughts, etc. Put differently, 
the starting point of our solution to the puzzle about mental self-ascription for the case 
of cognitive states was simple. It was a plausible assumption about the 
phenomenology of world-directed thought and experience, that is, the assumption 
that, phenomenologically at least, we experience and think about the world as 
objective, or, put differently, that our first-order thoughts, experiences, episodes of 
imagination, etc. are as o f  (even if not necessarily o f  or believed to be of) objective 
tables and chairs, etc. that is, in effect, as of tables and chairs upon which we have a 
point of view. Attempting to account for our knowledge of our own emotions and 
desires by appeal to the idea of our representing the world as objective comes 
however with an added challenge. Two problems in particular immediately present 
themselves.
First, it was argued that if a first-order mental state is to constitute a direct 
ground for authoritative knowledge of a given mental state (be it a cognitive state or 
an emotion) this first-order episode must either be the mental state to be self-ascribed 
itself or an episodic conscious expression of it. Yet, it is far from clear how episodes 
of representing the world as objective (or of it’s directly presenting itself to us as 
objective) can possibly be thought of as episodes of emotion, or even as episodic 
expressions of emotion (if one wants to think of emotions as primarily dispositional 
states). Second, even if one grants that in some cases emotions do manifest 
themselves (in part at least -  manifestations of emotions may be complex) in the 
world’s striking us as being objectively a certain way (eg. paranoia may manifest 
itself in our representing someone as actually out to get us), a further problem arises, 
namely that of how representing the world in this way can possibly constitute, from 
within our own outward looking point of view, a direct source of knowledge of the 
fact that we are not just representing the world or certain aspects of it as being a 
certain way (eg. representing someone as out to get us) but have a specific underlying 
emotion (eg. paranoia) towards it.
Let us consider these two problems in turn, starting with a more precise look 
at the first.
(1) As already mentioned, authoritative self-knowledge is supposed to be 
knowledge based directly on the mental states thereby known, or in the case of 
dispositional states, knowledge based on episodic manifestations of these states in
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consciousness. However, it is not at all clear that episodes of representing the world 
merely as being a certain way objectively can be thought of either as actual episodes 
of emotion or as episodic world-directed expressions of emotion (in the way that, say, 
certain acts of judgement might be seen as conscious expressions of belief). If 
instances of representing the world (or of its directly presenting itself to us in 
perception) as being objectively one way or another are thus to be shown to be the 
first-order episodes on the basis of which direct authoritative knowledge of our own 
emotions and desires is possible, these episodes will have to be shown to be in some 
respect conscious expressions of emotions and desires. There are however a number 
of reasons for thinking that they cannot be. Consider for instance the simple case of 
desire.
It is often assumed in the philosophy of mind that beliefs and desires are 
distinct types of attitudes but potentially towards the same objects (propositions or 
states of affairs) considered in the exact same way. That is, apart from the (not 
uncontroversial) assumption that all desires are in fact directed at propositions or 
states of affairs, it is assumed that with respect to any proposition p, or with respect to 
any particular state of affairs, one can have either the attitude of belief or that of 
desire. No difference in other words is taken to exist at the level of content but only at 
the level of attitude. Upon closer examination however, there does seem to be an 
important difference between what one desires and what one believes, or between 
how the objects of one’s beliefs and desires appear in one’s mind when one 
supposedly ‘desires that p’ and when one supposedly ‘believes that p’.
Suppose for instance that p is the (possible or actual) ‘state of affairs’ of there 
being world peace. When believing that p, what one believes, and so what one 
consciously represents when the question arises, is, it seems, that there is world peace. 
That is, one represents world peace as an objective state of affairs, as something that 
actually obtains mind-independently. On the other hand, when desiring supposedly 
the same thing, ie. ‘that p’, that is, when having a desire supposedly towards the same 
proposition, fact, or state of affairs, what one seems to desire is not actually that there 
is world peace (ie. that anything is objectively the case), but that there be world peace. 
The idea of there being world peace seems to figure in one’s mind very differently 
according to whether one has the belief or the desire. In the case of desire, when one’s 
attention is focused on the idea of world peace (and so this desire -  assuming it is not 
a repressed desire -  comes to manifest itself in consciousness), one’s attention is it
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seems on world peace considered as a possible way the world could be (or perhaps as 
a way it is to be made to be) but not on world peace as a way the world actually is, ie. 
as a fact, or as a mind-independent state of affairs upon which one has a point of 
view. If so however, that is, if the objects of our desires do not feature in our attention 
as objective states of affairs, then episodes of representing the world as being 
objectively one way or another (such as when judging ‘there is world peace’ or ‘there 
is food in the refrigerator’) cannot it seems capture our world-directed perspective in 
desiring these things and so cannot be said to be direct expressions of these desires at 
the first-order level, nor ultimately therefore to be the direct non-inferential grounds 
on which authoritative knowledge of these desires could be based. If a mental episode 
is to constitute an expression or manifestation of a particular attitude at the conscious 
world-directed level, and so to be the possible ground for direct authoritative 
knowledge of this attitude, the episode must it seems at the very least capture how the 
object of one’s attitude actually presents itself to one, from within one’s conscious 
perspective in having this attitude and attending to its object. Instances of representing 
the world as objectively one way or another do not seem to be able to do this for the 
case of most desires.
One might go even further and say that representing the world as being a 
certain way objectively is not only unable to capture the way the world is 
apprehended from the point of view of desire, but that it actually goes contrary to 
some of what is directly implied by the way in which the objects of our desires figure 
in our minds from this perspective. To start with, there is already something 
distinctively inconsistent-sounding about saying such things as that one desires that 
there is world peace, or that one desires that it actually is raining. Not only is putting 
things this way ungrammatical, but it seems for good reason. As mentioned above, 
when one has the idea of world peace in mind in desire, one has it in mind that world 
peace be the case, not that it is the case. And, having in mind that something be the 
case seems to imply that it is not, at least from one’s own epistemic standpoint, the 
case. There being world peace is represented merely as a possible way the world 
could be, and so implicitly not as the way things actually are. Far therefore from being 
a potential direct expression of a desire that the world be one way or another, having 
in mind that the world is objectively some way seems to altogether contradict the way 
things are represented in desire. If anything, representing the world as being
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objectively a certain way suggests that one probably does not desire that it be that way 
(or no longer desires this, and is now just happy that it is so).
It should be noted however that this is not to say that there is nothing more to 
the difference between the attitudes of belief and desire than a difference in their 
contents or a difference in how their respective objects are apprehended or 
represented when attending to these objects. It is important however to realize that the 
difference between beliefs and desires does not hold only at the level of attitudes 
(whatever this difference may amount to) but also at the level of world-directed 
content, and indeed in more ways than one. Martin for instance goes further and 
argues that a number of desires are fundamentally desires towards events, and cannot 
be reduced to propositional desires, or to desires towards states of affairs without 
thereby rendering entirely unintelligible certain important aspects of the role of these 
desires in motivation, as well as certain crucial facts about the circumstances in which 
these desires will tend to cease or persist1. For example, if one has the desire ‘to drink 
a beer’, and this desire is reinterpreted as the desire that some particular state of 
affairs obtain, say, the state of affairs of one now drinking a beer, one would end up 
with no way of explaining why once now (ie. the present moment) has passed, and 
one has not yet had a beer, the desire should persist. Leaving aside though for the 
moment why we should think of such desires as fundamentally desires towards events 
rather than towards states of affairs, there is a feature these desires seem to share with 
the desires considered earlier. In having the desire ‘to drink a beer’, if this desire is 
taken at face value as a desire for just that, drinking a beer will it seems figure in 
one’s mind as a general type of event, perhaps additionally as one to be actualised, but 
clearly not as any particular objective event actually occurring, whether now or at 
some specific future time. Thus, again, the objects of one’s desires (be they events, 
states of affairs, or anything else) do not seem to figure in one’s mind, from the 
perspective of desire, as objectively obtaining. This of course presents a serious 
problem (more than one in fact) for any attempt to extend the preceding account of 
self-consciousness to the case of desire.
To add to these problems, there being the above differences between the way 
things are represented in belief and in desire (as objective in belief, and specifically 
not so in desire) has much data to support it. It seems to fit well for instance with, and
1 See Martin (1999)
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may indeed help explain, a number of claims often made about beliefs and desires in 
the literature on ‘direction of fit’,1 claims that would be difficult to explain on the 
assumption that beliefs and desires are attitudes towards the exact same things 
considered in the exact same way.
For example, one claim often made is that there is something wrong with or 
irrational about believing, say, that p, when the world presents itself to one in 
perception as not-p, whereas there is no cognitive failing or irrationality involved in 
desiring that p when in the presence of similar evidence, or when actually 
simultaneously representing that not-p. In light of the earlier distinctions, this 
difference might now be explained as follows. In both perception and consciously 
expressed belief (but not in desire) the world presents itself to one, or is represented, 
as being objectively one way or another. Perceiving that not-p can thus be seen to 
constitute an immediate reason for taking not-p to be objectively the case. If one were 
therefore to believe that p  (ie. to take p to be the case) despite the perceptual evidence 
one has to the contrary, one could easily be seen as going against (or failing to take 
account of) one’s reasons or evidence, and so as being irrational (assuming one has 
no reason to mistrust one’s senses) or as subject to some other cognitive failing -  eg. 
division of the mind, conceptual incompetence, denial, insincerity, and so on. On the 
other hand, given that in desire, when attending to the objects of one’s desires nothing 
is actually represented as obtaining or as being the case or as objectively unfolding 
before one (when the object is an event), the fact that perception might present 
something as not being the case will have no bearing on whether one ought or ought 
not to desire that it be the case. In other words, one will not be caught up in any 
contradiction in simultaneously perceiving that not-p and desiring that p, even though 
in so doing one is representing both not-p in perception and p  in desire, since p is not 
in desire represented as actually obtaining, ie. as an objective state of affairs, but only 
as a possible way the world could be, or perhaps additionally as a way the world is to 
be made to be. There being no contradiction here however would remain somewhat 
mysterious if one assumed that desiring that p involved (like believing or perceiving 
that p) having p in mind as an objective state of affairs. If this were so, in desiring that 
p while at the same time representing that not-p, one would in effect be representing p 
as both being the case and as not being the case simultaneously, thus landing one in a
1 See for instance (Smith 1987) and (Sobel and Copp 2001).
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contradiction of the very kind involved in simultaneously representing that p  in belief 
and not-p in perception.
From all that has been said, it now clearly seems that episodes of representing 
the world (or it’s directly presenting itself) as objectively one way or another cannot 
(at least in the case of the desires considered) capture the first-order perspective of 
desire, and might in fact be said to downright contradict some of the implications of 
the way in which the world features in our minds from our point of view in desire. 
Episodes of representing the world as objective can thus not be thought of as the first- 
order episodes that could potentially constitute the direct non-inferential grounds for 
our authoritative self-ascriptions of desires.
Having said that, a point in common remains between beliefs and certain 
desires, or between certain conscious manifestations of each. Both in consciously 
manifested belief and in consciously manifested desire, something (ie. that which one 
believes and that which one desires respectively) is being considered in one’s mind or 
represented. The difference is in how these things are represented. That is, one does in 
consciously manifested desire (ie. when attending to the objects of one’s desires) 
represent or have somehow in mind objects other than oneself (be they things, events, 
or states of affairs). Consciously attending to something other than ourselves or 
‘having something in mind’ or ‘being consciously occupied with something’ is 
certainly part of what is involved in having a consciously manifested desire, and not 
just part of what is involved in having a consciously manifested belief. Having a 
desire is not, that is, just being in some kind of pure ‘sensation’ state. Specific 
episodes of representing things (possible events, possible ways the world could be, 
etc.) in certain ways may therefore still be found to constitute conscious expressions 
of desires, and so to constitute the potential immediate non-inferential grounds for 
self-ascribing desires. The problem of course is that in order for such episodes to 
constitute immediate grounds for mental self-ascriptions of desires, the way the 
objects of these desires are represented in these episodes must first of all not be as 
objective (for the reasons discussed above), yet still somehow such as to presuppose 
self-consciousness. So far though, the only sense we have been able to make of the 
idea of a world-directed state being at the same time a state of implicit self- 
consciousness, is by appeal to the world’s striking us in having this state as objective. 
We are thus faced with a dilemma:
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In order to move forward, we are going to have to either uncover some aspect 
of the way in which the world is apprehended in desire which does not involve 
objectivity yet which presupposes self-consciousness, or, we are going to have to 
settle for the view that, unlike cognitive states and perceptual experiences, desires are 
not actually states which we are able to self-ascribe directly on the basis of having 
them. Both of these options will be explored. Before turning to either though, there 
are a wide range of motivational states which we have so far overlooked, and which 
actually seem to go against the conclusions reached here that representing the world 
as being objectively one way or another cannot be part of how motivational states 
manifest themselves at the first-order level in consciousness. So far in fact, we have 
only considered a particular sub-class of desires and not yet any other emotions.
(2) Many emotions, and indeed a number of desires, do seem to manifest 
themselves (in part at least) in our coming to represent certain things as being 
objectively the case, and indeed sometimes in our coming to represent the very 
objects of our emotions and desires themselves as objective, ie. as objectively 
occurring events, as objectively obtaining states of affairs, or as actual mind- 
independent objects or people out in the world. That is, there do seem to be a number 
of emotions and desires which are directed towards objects, events, or states of affairs, 
actually represented as objective. In fact in some of these cases, representing the 
world as being objectively one way or another seems to not just be part of, but an 
essential part of how the world figures in our minds from the perspective of the 
particular emotion or desire in question.
It might be said for instance that it is essential to and constitutive of being 
paranoid that one come to represent someone as actually being out to get one. Or, one 
might argue that it is essential and constitutive of feeling guilty, say, that one 
represent oneself as actually having done something wrong, or that one represent that 
which one feels guilty about as having actually occurred. Similarly, in the case of 
many emotions directed at specific objects, events, or states of affairs, it might be said 
to be essential to one’s feeling these emotions that the things in question be 
represented as mind-independent objects, as actually occurring events, or as 
objectively obtaining states of affairs. Consider for instance a case of loving a 
particular person, or fearing a particular spider, or being afraid of an unfolding event, 
say, lava flowing towards one, or being unhappy about some state of affairs. It would 
seem to be an essential part of having these emotions, that one be, when attending to
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their objects, representing them as objective, that is, the person as actually existing, 
the spider as being a mind-independent creature before one, the lava as truly flowing, 
and the state of affairs one is unhappy about as objectively obtaining. If one did not 
have the spider in mind as actually before one objectively but merely as something 
that could be present, or if one did not represent the state of affairs one is unhappy 
about as actually obtaining, it is doubtful that one would be quite so afraid, or at all 
unhappy. Thus, in many cases it seems that representing the objects of one’s emotions 
and desires as objective, or representing various things as actually being objectively 
the case (as in the examples of guilt and paranoia) can be an essential and constitutive 
part of the way in which these emotions and desires manifest themselves at the world- 
directed conscious level.
But now, if in being afraid of something, say, of an oncoming object, or if in 
having a pang of desire, say a sexual desire for someone, one’s attention is focused 
out on the world, a world which clearly appears to one a certain way, or is represented 
as being a particular way, in fact amongst other things as objective, there should it 
seems be no real problem for fitting at least these emotions and desires into the 
account of self-knowledge already put forward for cognitive states. Could one not, 
that is, just appeal to the self-world dualism implicit in representing the world as 
objective to account for how these conscious manifestations of emotions could be 
states of implicit self-awareness, and so direct grounds for mental self-ascriptions of 
the relevant underlying emotions?
In a sense it is true that such episodes of representing the objects of one’s 
emotions as objective could be shown to be states of implicit self-awareness. The 
more fundamental problem however would still remain of accounting for how such 
states could be states not just of implicit self-awareness, but of implicit awareness of 
oneself as having a particular emotion or desire and not just a cognitive perspective on 
their objects. To see how this problem arises, one need only look back at how 
objectivity did the trick for cognitive states and perceptual experiences.
Representing something as objective, in the relevant sense of ‘objective’, is to 
be representing it as mind-independent, that is, in effect as independent from a point 
of view one has upon it. In representing the world as objective therefore, one is also 
thereby implicitly representing oneself as representing it or perceiving it, that is, 
implicitly representing oneself as having a cognitive or perceptual point of view upon 
it. Objectivity however only implies this distinction between the world and one’s
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cognitive or perceptual point of view upon it; it does not imply an emotional relation 
between oneself and the world. Representing therefore an object of fear or a person 
one desires merely as objectively before one, or a state of affairs one is unhappy about 
as objectively obtaining, cannot, it seems, even if such representations are 
constitutively tied to having the emotions in question, be a source of knowledge of 
oneself as being afraid or of oneself as desiring or of oneself as being unhappy and so 
on, but only of oneself as representing or perceiving, that is, of oneself as having a 
detached, purely cognitive or perceptual point of view upon these things. In fact, if 
particular emotions were to manifest themselves only in our coming to represent 
various things as being objectively the case -  eg. someone as being actually out to get 
us, or a person as having various negative character traits, etc. -  it is unlikely that we 
would find ourselves inclined, merely upon being asked the question, to self-ascribe 
an emotion (eg. paranoia, hatred, etc.) rather than to make a primarily evaluative 
judgment about the person in question, their intentions, or the situation as a whole.
The main problem thus seems now to be not that having consciously 
manifested emotions might not involve at the personal level representing the objects of 
our emotions as objective. Instead, the problem is that the objects of our emotions 
striking us as objective or being represented as objective even if crucially involved in 
having certain emotions, is still not enough to ground immediate knowledge of 
ourselves as having the emotions in question as opposed to merely having a non- 
emotional point of view on their objects. If specifically emotional self-consciousness 
is to be shown to be already implicitly present at the first-order level, emotions will 
have to be shown to contribute something additional to our conscious first-order 
perspective than our representing their objects as objectively existing, occurring, or 
being the case.
One first appealing attempt at this might be extracted from cognitivist theories 
of emotions. This attempt will ultimately be shown not to work. Seeing why however 
will prove invaluable in allowing us to narrow down the requirements on a more 
successful account.
6.3 The cognitivist proposal
Put briefly, according to cognitivist accounts of emotions, to have an emotion 
is essentially to be making a special kind of judgement, or more generally, to be
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representing (with or without active assent) the object of one’s emotion as having 
some special emotion specific property such as that of being desirable, attractive, 
frightening, dangerous, worthy of suspicion, worth possessing, worth avoiding, and so 
on.
Applying this idea to the problem of self-knowledge, it might be said that we 
are able to know what emotions we have directly on the basis of having them, in virtue 
of the emotion-specific content of these instances of representation that are 
constitutive of our having these emotions. Or, if one does not want to endorse all 
aspects of the cognitivist theory (ie. that emotions are nothing more than such 
instances of representation), one could treat these episodes of representing the world 
as having emotion specific properties merely as the expressions of emotions in 
consciousness, and suggest that we are at least able to self-ascribe the emotions 
specified by the contents of these conscious episodes (even though there may be more 
to emotions than these expressions) directly on the basis of having these first-order 
episodes in which our emotions are manifest. Now, at first glance at least, this 
approach to the problem of authoritative self-knowledge for emotions seems to have 
much going for it.
To begin with, it provides, as needed, an account of the contribution that 
emotions might make to how things are for us at the first-order (ie. wor/d-directed) 
personal level. Next, it also seems to tell us something about how things are at this 
first-order emotional level which already makes reference to the having of emotions 
(eg. reference to desire in things being represented as ‘desirable’, reference to fear in 
things being represented as ‘frightening’, etc). A further advantage of adopting this 
approach to the problem of self-knowledge for emotions is that one can do so it seems 
without having to take on many of the more problematic claims made by defenders of 
cognitivist theories, that is, claims about what emotions actually are or consist in and 
claims which are generally brought in to solve problems having nothing to do with 
self-knowledge.
Proponents of the view that emotions are a special kind of judgement or 
cognition,1 are in fact generally not motivated by considerations to do with self- 
knowledge, but by considerations primarily to do with questions about the rationality 
of emotions and their role in the rationalisation of other states and actions. Taking
1 See for instance (Solomon 2003) and De Sousa (1987).
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emotions to be kinds of judgements may in fact make it easier for us to see how they 
could be thought of as rational or appropriate in particular circumstances. If fear for 
example involves representing the object of one’s fear as being dangerous or 
threatening, being afraid could be said to be ‘appropriate’ in certain situations if 
indeed danger looms, and ‘rationally grounded’ if one perceives something to be 
dangerous. Similarly, taking emotions to be kinds of judgements would make it easier 
to see how having a certain emotion might make following a particular course of 
action more appropriate than following others. For instance, if being afraid involves 
representing the object of one’s fear as ‘worth avoiding’, avoiding the object would 
come out as being the rational thing to do when afraid.
Having said this, the view has been widely criticized, and in many cases rightly 
so. Without going too much into the details of these criticisms, there does seem to be 
more to having most emotions than making evaluative judgements. Two points are 
particularly damaging to the cognitivist proposal. First, one could it seems perfectly 
well be judging something to be, say, dangerous or frightening or ‘worth avoiding’ yet 
not be afraid of it, or, judging someone to be, in some objective sense, desirable or 
attractive without desiring them. Conversely, one could it seems also be afraid of 
something while not judging it to be frightening, or be attracted to someone despite 
not taking them to be objectively speaking attractive. Clearly therefore there must be 
more to having these and other emotions than making such judgements. Furthermore, 
there seems to be nothing about judging something to be generally speaking desirable 
or attractive or worth having, etc. which could explain why when desiring something, 
but not when making the above types of judgements, one tends to feel directly drawn 
into action, and drawn specifically either towards the object of one’s desire or into 
changing the world to match one’s desire’s content. In other words, the directly 
motivational aspect of emotions and desires cannot be accounted for via a purely 
cognitivist theory of what emotions are either.
Fortunately, one might say, the problems that arise for the cognitivist theory of 
emotions tend to apply to it mainly when considered as a theory of what emotions are 
or of what having an emotion consists in. Adopting the cognitivist idea purely for the 
purposes of solving the problem of self-knowledge need not involve making any such 
strong claims. All that is needed from the cognitivist proposal to account for the 
possibility of authoritative knowledge of our own emotions, is for it to identify some 
(possibly contingent) feature of a certain range of our emotions, or of their
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manifestations in consciousness, which would immediately reveal to us from our first- 
order perspective the fact that we have them. This aspect need not be exhaustive of 
their conscious manifestation; it certainly need not be what having an emotion consists 
in, nor indeed what an emotion’s being conscious consists in.
A useful analogy can be found in thinking about the case of belief. Beliefs can 
be thought of as manifesting themselves in our conscious minds as judgements, 
without it following from this that making such judgements or even being 
constitutively inclined to do so is exhaustive of what having a belief involves or 
consists in. Nonetheless, it is essentially through the manifestation of our beliefs in 
conscious acts of judgement that we are able to introspect them. Something similar 
might be true of emotions. What we are looking for is some aspect of the conscious 
manifestations of emotions at the first-order (ie. world-directed) level which could 
itself directly reveal to us that fact that we have them, but which, as mentioned, need 
not be exhaustive of what having an emotion involves whether at the conscious level 
or more generally speaking, let alone what having it actually consists in. To this extent 
then, appealing to the cognitivist idea merely to solve the problem of self-knowledge 
need not be subject to the various criticisms that might go with the idea that emotions 
just are kinds of judgements or cognitions, or episodes of representing things as 
having properties of desirability, frightfulness, and so on. Nonetheless, upon closer 
examination, parallel problems to those that arise for cognitivism per se carry through 
to this more restricted appeal to it.
The main problem with appealing to the cognitivist idea in order to solve the 
problem of self-knowledge for emotions lies in the fact that it is not at all obvious that 
something’s presenting itself to one, or being represented by one, as having general 
properties such as of desirability, frightfulness, worthiness of respect, 
blameworthiness, etc. actually does presuppose reference to oneself as truly desiring, 
fearing, feeling respect for, etc. the things/people so represented. And, if it does not, it 
cannot provide us with direct evidence that we have the relevant desire or emotion. As 
mentioned above, something’s being desirable or frightening or worth avoiding does 
not in any way guarantee or entail that one feels any emotion towards it. Things may 
just happen to strike one as having these general properties. Someone can appear to 
one as having many qualities, including as being lovable and attractive, without one 
actually loving them or being attracted to them. Similarly, a situation can strike one as 
being generally speaking dangerous or frightening without one actually being afraid in
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that situation. One’s representing therefore something as having such general 
properties cannot only not be what having an emotion consists in, but it can also not it 
seems provide a sufficient ground for immediately self-ascribing an emotion. The 
apparent desirable/ frightening/ etc. character of an object from our point of view does 
not tell us that we desire it or fear it.
In sum, the cognitivist proposal seems ultimately to fail not only as a theory of 
what emotions are but also as a theory of the conscious manifestation of emotions in 
consciousness, at least insofar as these conscious manifestations are supposed to 
provide the immediate grounds for knowledge of our own emotions. Put differently, 
the cognitivist proposal seems to fail as a way of accounting for the possibility of 
implicit emotional self-consciousness when attending to the objects of one’s emotions. 
Moreover, this proposal seems to fail for essentially the same reasons as did the 
attempt to account for the possibility of implicit emotional self-consciousness simply 
by appeal to the fact that emotions and desires involve (amongst other things) 
representing their objects as objective. What the cognitivist theory has brought out 
more clearly though, is that if emotions and desires are to be shown to manifest 
themselves in consciousness in such a way that involves being at the same time 
implicitly aware of oneself as having them, the objects of these emotions will have to 
be shown to strike us, from our first-order conscious point of view, as more than just 
objective things, events, or state of affairs, bearing various general properties, whether 
evaluative properties or otherwise.
In sum, the source of our worry now lies not in the thought that the account of 
pre-reflective self-consciousness put forward for the case of cognitive states is unable 
to account for our being implicitly self-aware in having an emotion or a desire, but in 
the thought that it is unable to account for our being implicitly aware of ourselves as 
having an emotion or a desire. If it is in virtue of how we represent the world as being 
or in virtue of how it appears to us to be that we are self-aware in desire and emotion, 
the worry is that unless the way things appear to us or are represented as being in 
desire and emotion is radically different from the way things appear or are represented 
in judgement and perception, all we can be aware of in having an emotion is of 
ourselves as representing and perceiving but not specifically of ourselves as desiring 
or fearing, etc. This problem is likely to persist until desires and other emotions are 
shown to contribute something to the way things appear to us at the personal level, 
which implies reference not just to the fact of our having a point of view on some
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aspect of the world but also to the fact that we have an emotional point of view upon 
it. The attempt just made in this direction by appeal to the cognitivist theory of 
emotions has failed. All that representing something as attractive or desirable or 
dangerous or worth avoiding seems able to ground is awareness of ourselves as 
representing or perceiving it as having certain general properties, but not of ourselves 
as desiring or fearing it, regardless of whether we take it to be objectively speaking 
attractive or dangerous. Nothing about representing things as having the kinds of 
properties posited by the cognitivist in other words seems to imply reference to 
oneself as having emotions. Cognitivist accounts of what is involved in emotion and 
desire at the personal level can thus not be the whole story, and for more reasons than 
one.
Cognitivist accounts cannot be the whole story of our first-person conscious 
perspective in having an emotion or desire not just because they are unable to make 
room for implicit awareness of our emotions and desires, but also because they are 
equally unable to accommodate certain other differences that clearly exist at the 
personal level between having an emotion and making a judgement. As mentioned 
earlier, there seems to be nothing about representing something as being generally 
speaking desirable or attractive or worth having that could explain why when we have 
a desire or emotion we are directly drawn into action, and in particular that could 
explain why we directly feel compelled or drawn towards very specific things. A 
correct theory of the manifestation of emotions and desires in consciousness must in 
the end be able to provide an account of the contribution that emotions and desires 
make to how things appear to us from our own point of view such that (a) having 
these emotions and desires is already presupposed by the way things appear to us at 
the first-order (ie. world directed) level, and (b) such that our feeling directly moved 
to act (and not our just ‘finding ourselves’ acting) is made intelligible. For present 
purposes, it is of course the first question that is most pressing. The second one 
however helps emphasise (and will end up, we will see, being answered by a solution 
to the first) that the way things appear to us in having an emotion or a desire must be 
such as to directly imply more than just having a point of view on an objective world 
of items bearing various general properties.
With these considerations in mind, it is time to move on to put forward an 
account of the manifestation of emotions and desires in consciousness which will be 
able to account for all these distinctive features of emotions, rectify mistaken
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assumptions about how things appear to us at the first-order level in having such 
states, and thereby ultimately rid us of the nagging sense that our awareness of our 
own emotions and desires cannot be accounted for along a similar model to that 
adopted for the case of judgements and perpetual experiences, that is, along a model 
based on the idea that having states of the kind we are able to introspect and self- 
ascribe with authority, involves being already at the first-order level somehow 
implicitly aware of ourselves as having them.
6.4 The way forward
Without abandoning the basic idea behind our present solution to the puzzle 
about mental self-ascription (ie. the idea that it is in virtue of our self-ascribed states’ 
being somehow states of implicit self-awareness that we are able to immediately self- 
ascribe them directly on the basis of having them), we might it seems be able to find a 
solution to our puzzle for the case of mental states other than beliefs and experiences 
as of an objective world by appealing to some of the other aspects of the way in 
which we think about and experience the world at the first-order level, aspects which 
might, like the phenomenological objectivity of our experiences for the case of 
cognitive states, presuppose our being implicitly aware of ourselves as having 
distinctively emotional attitudes towards the world.
Doing this however will require two things. First, it will require as already 
mentioned putting forward a more precise account of how emotions and desires 
manifest themselves at the conscious world-directed level. That is, an account of the 
world-directed phenomenology of emotions and desires will be needed, ie. of the 
distinctive way in which the objects of our emotions present themselves to us, from 
our point of view, when we consciously attend to them. Next, a very specific aspect of 
this world-directed phenomenology of emotions and desires will need to be uncovered 
(ie. at least of those emotions and desires we are able to know directly on the basis of 
attending to their objects), an aspect which presupposes self-consciousness. Doing the 
latter will come with the greatest challenge.
First, as we have already seen, we will not be able to appeal to the 
phenomenological objectivity of our experiences, episodes of visualisation, etc. alone. 
Instead, a feature of the world-directed phenomenology of emotions and desires will 
need to be uncovered implicit in which is already the fact that we have an emotional
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attitude towards the world and not just a cognitive or perceptual point of view upon it. 
Second, the account we must arrive at of how we are able to know our own emotions 
will have to be such as to still make room for the difficulty of access and openness to 
interpretative error characteristic of our knowledge of many of our own emotions. 
Even when our knowledge of our own emotions is based on wor/d-directed states 
rather than self-directed ones, reaching it tends to be a more difficult process, and one 
more highly susceptible to error than that of attaining knowledge of our own cognitive 
states and perceptual experiences. This will have to be made room for. Recall for 
instance the example mentioned earlier, of your coming to realise that you have strong 
feelings towards someone only after observing them for a while, thinking about them, 
listening to them, recalling past events involving them, etc.1 Although all of your 
reason-giving states are world-directed in this example, the knowledge of your own 
emotion for which they provide a ground is neither instantaneous nor largely immune 
to error. In brief, the account of self-knowledge to be put forward here will have to be 
able to accommodate the features that our knowledge of our own emotions shares 
with the knowledge we have of our own cognitive states without doing so in a way 
that renders the differences between the two kinds of knowledge thereby 
unintelligible.
The next two chapters will look at both these similarities and differences. 
Starting with the similarities, the first question that will need to be addressed is that of 
how attending to the world can give us knowledge of our own emotions, as it can of 
our own cognitive states. Towards this aim, an account will be needed of how our 
emotions and desires manifest themselves at the world-directed conscious level, 
focusing specifically on how they might do so in a way that already presupposes 
awareness ourselves as having an emotion. That is, if our puzzle about direct reason- 
based mental self-ascription is to be solved for cases of self-ascriptions of emotions, 
our earlier investigation of how the world strikes us in experience, thought, 
imagination, etc., will first have to be delved into further, with particular focus this 
time on the phenomenology of world-directed consciousness when in the grip of a 
desire or emotion, or, less episodically, when having an underlying emotional 
disposition towards some aspect of the world (eg. a general fear of spiders, love for 
one’s family, etc.). This is where the next chapter will begin.
1 See p. 130 above
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Before embarking on this task however, it should be borne in mind that what 
we will need is not a full account of what emotions and desires are, nor of what an 
emotion’s being conscious consists in, nor indeed a full account of every aspect of the 
world-directed phenomenology of emotion. Rather, what we will need to find is a 
(possibly contingent) feature of the way in which certain emotions (ie. those we are 
able to introspect) manifest themselves in first-order consciousness, such that self- 
ascribing them directly on the basis of attending to the world is possible. The time has 
come to look at this, ie. to delve further into how emotions and desires might indeed 
manifest themselves or find expression at the first-order level.
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Chapter 7: Expressions of emotion and desire
Chapter 6 has brought to the foreground a problematic feature of our 
knowledge of our own emotions, namely that in a wide range of cases, in self- 
ascribing our own emotions we turn our attention primarily to the world or to the 
objects of our emotions rather than to any explicit data regarding ourselves, such as to 
our behaviour, to our current sensations, or to any other of our mental states. This, we 
have seen, seems moreover to be not just something we do, but generally something 
that makes sense to us from within our own outward-looking perspective. We do not, 
that is, just ‘find’ ourselves self-ascribing emotions on certain occasions when turning 
our attention to the world, but rather, as with cognitive states, our doing so on these 
occasions seems somehow appropriate to us. We seem to turn our attention to the 
world for evidence or confirmation that we do or do not have a particular emotion.
How can this be? The fact that we often proceed in this manner has raised 
what is now a familiar explanatory challenge: how can attending to the world possibly 
give us knowledge of a certain class of our mental states, in this case of our emotions'? 
This challenge has come this time however with an added complication. We have 
seen that the objectivity of the world (as experienced) from our point of view cannot 
alone solve the problem for the case of emotions as it did for cognitive states. Some 
other aspect therefore needs to be uncovered, specific to the way emotions manifest 
themselves at the world-directed level in consciousness, implicit in which might 
already be the fact that we have an emotional attitude towards the world and not just a 
cognitive or perceptual point of view upon it. The aim of this chapter will thus be to 
do just that. An account will be put forward of the world-directed phenomenology of
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emotion, that is (as will be explained) of the way our emotions manifest themselves or 
are ‘expressed’ in our world-directed conscious experiences, such that authoritative 
knowledge of these emotions, based directly on looking out at the world, is possible.
With this aim in mind, the chapter will begin by first making clearer sense of 
the ideas of emotions ‘manifesting’ themselves or being ‘expressed’ in consciousness, 
and in particular of their doing so in our worW-directed conscious experiences. 
Having done that, this chapter will argue, first of all, that our emotions do manifest 
themselves at the world-directed level, and that they do so essentially by emotionally 
‘colouring’ the world (or certain aspects of it) from our perspective, that is, as will be 
explained, by making us come to experience the world in a manner that is 
‘expressive’ or ‘evocative’ of these emotions. Then, by appealing to considerations 
about the distinctive phenomenology of our emotionally coloured experiences, as well 
as to recent discussions and data from the psychological literature, it will suggest that 
and how our emotions (or at least those that we are able to know with authority) do 
not just tinge the world from our perspective, but do so in colours (a) that are 
implicitly self/world relational, and (b) implicit in which is already a distinctively 
emotional or motivational self/world relation; not just a cognitive or perceptual one.
First though, we need to get clear about what exactly it is for emotions to 
‘manifest’ themselves or to be ‘expressed’ in our world-directed conscious 
experiences. And, to this end, it will be worth first establishing what it might be for 
emotions to find expression in more familiar circumstances, that is, not in 
consciousness, but in outward behaviour. It will be suggested here that in a somewhat 
analogous way to the way in which we may be able to read off other people’s mental 
states directly from the outward manifestations of these states in their behaviour, we 
might also be able to read our own mental states (and emotions in particular) directly 
from their 'inner' manifestations, not in behaviour, but in first-order consciousness, 
that is, in our ways of experiencing the world.
7.1 Outward expressions of emotion
Consider the following concrete examples. Outward expressions of emotion 
can it seems be anything from facial expressions (eg. smiling, frowning, having a 
certain look in one’s eyes), to other spontaneous behaviours such as crying, laughing, 
hanging one’s head, dragging one’s feet, jumping up and down, punching the air,
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letting out sighs of relief, exclamations of surprise, and so on, all the way to (though 
more controversially) quite elaborate intentional actions such as putting pins in a doll 
resembling someone one dislikes, or tearing the eyes out of a photograph representing 
someone one is angry at.1 Additionally, emotions can it seems also be expressed in 
behaviours and actions that are not themselves ‘expressions’ of emotion, but that are 
nonetheless executed in some manner that is ‘expressive’ of an emotion, as when 
opening a door hesitantly for instance, or playing a piece of music with feeling. In 
other words, emotions can on the face of it be expressed in a variety of ways and in a 
wide range of behaviours and acts, ranging from automatic nervous system reactions 
to quite elaborate symbolic intentional actions, and even to particular ways in which 
some of these behaviours and actions are carried out.
The differences between these examples however are significant. In amongst 
other ways they differ (a) in whether the supposed outward ‘expression’ is an 
intentional action or not; (b) in whether the emotion is supposed to be expressed in the 
behaviour itself or only in the manner in which it is carried out; and most of all (c) in 
whether in each case the situation should be thought of as one where a particular 
emotion (ie. an emotion one actually has) is being ‘expressed’ in a specific instance 
of behaviour or instead as a case where the behaviour, independently of whether one 
has an emotion or not, is ‘expressive’ of a type of emotion. Some of these examples 
could it seems even be taken both ways, but not all. If any theoretically utilizable 
notions of ‘expression’ or ‘expressiveness’ are thus to be extracted from these cases 
and used in solving our problem about self-knowledge, a number of distinctions will 
first need to be drawn, and a number of questions addressed separately. In what 
follows, three questions in particular will be taken in turn:
(1) What is it for a particular emotion (ie. an instantiated emotion; a state one 
is actually in) to be ‘expressed’ in an instance of behaviour? Or, to put things the 
other way around, what is it for an instance of behaviour to constitute a direct 
‘expression’ of a particular emotion one now has? (2) What is it for an instance of 
behaviour to be this time ‘expressive’ of a type of emotion? That is, what is it, say, for 
a certain Took in one’s eyes’, or for a certain way of playing a piece of music, to be 
expressive of anger or of sadness or of joy? Is it just for the behaviour to be, as above, 
an expression or direct manifestation of an actual emotion one now has? Or, could a
1 This example is taken from Goldie (Goldie 2000, ch5) and will be discussed in further detail below.
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certain instance of behaviour (let alone a type of behaviour) count as emotionally 
expressive or evocative of a type of emotion without actually being the outward 
expression of anyone’s present mental state? Finally (3), the more specific question 
will be worth addressing (even if only to further clarify our answers to the first two) 
of whether it is ever appropriate (and if so, in what sense) to think of intentional 
actions (such as some of those cited in the examples above) as being either instances 
of ‘behavioural expressions’ or forms of ‘expressive behaviour’. Concerning this last 
issue in fact, it will be suggested that the controversy surrounding it arises in part 
from a failure to disambiguate between ‘behavioural expressions’ and ‘expressive 
behaviour’. Let us therefore begin with the first two questions, taking them in turn.
What are ‘expressions ’ o f  particular emotions?
Paradigm cases of ‘expressions’ of one’s emotions or of direct 
‘manifestations’ of emotions one now has include, most uncontroversially, behaviours 
such as smiling spontaneously when happy, bursting out laughing when amused, 
automatically raising one’s voice as one’s anger increases, and so on. In other words, 
standard cases of expressions of emotion tend to be episodes of essentially 
spontaneous, non-intentional behaviour, which, one might add, is not surprising since 
it would seem to be of the very essence of something’s being an expression of a 
mental state as opposed to an action out o f it, that it not be something done on 
purpose, ie. that it not be an intentional action} As soon as smiling, to take an 
example, becomes intentional, it seems to lose its whole status as an expression or 
manifestation. Consider for instance the difference between your smiling 
spontaneously upon being told some good news, and being happy and smiling, say, in 
order to let others know that you are happy. In both cases your facial expression
1 Not all actions, it has been argued, are intentional (see in particular O’Shaughnessy’s discussion o f sub- 
intentional action in O’Shaughnessy 1980). An example o f a sub-intentional action might be for instance a case o f  
flicking around a pen in one’s hand while, say, thinking about something else. Could such an action ever be an 
‘expression’ o f  emotion, say, o f nervousness? I would tentatively say that it can, as can other complex yet 
spontaneous behaviours such as punching the air or jumping for joy. The important contrast when distinguishing 
possible ‘expressions’ from ‘non-expressions’ is I believe (in part at least) one between intentional and non- 
intentional behaviour from emotion. For present purposes therefore, cases o f sub-intentional action can be put on a 
par with purely reactive behaviour. O f course, there may be borderline cases even between intentional and sub- 
intentional actions, thus making it remain unclear in some cases whether a particular instance o f behaviour should 
be thought o f as an ‘expression’ o f emotion or rather as an action out o f  emotion, ie. as an action motivated by an 
emotion. The mere existence o f borderline cases does not however in itself invalidate the meaningfulness o f  a 
distinction, and so will not be dwelled upon here.
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signals to others that you are happy, but in the latter case your happiness is not 
revealing itself in your behaviour, but rather you are revealing it by behaving in that 
way. That is, you are smiling essentially in order to signal that you are happy, rather 
than your happiness itself directly ‘coming through’ or ‘finding expression’ in your 
behaviour. Behavioural ‘expressions’ or ‘manifestations’ are in other words things 
one to some extent just ‘finds’ oneself doing, often even in situations where one might 
have preferred not to.1
None of this is to say of course that intentional control over one’s emotional 
outbursts is not to some extent possible. Clearly it is possible. One can purposely 
suppress one’s expressions of emotion in certain situations and purposely not suppress 
them in others. The only actions carried out though in such situations are those of 
suppressing or not suppressing one’s behavioural impulses, not those of intentionally 
manifesting or not one’s mental states. Once one stops suppressing an expression of 
emotion and allows the emotion to ‘come out’ so to speak, the actual coming out of 
the emotion in one’s behaviour is not itself an intentional action, just as, conversely, 
the act of allowing one’s emotion to come out is clearly not an expression of emotion. 
Consider for example a situation where you finally burst out laughing uncontrollably 
after having resisted this impulse for several minutes while stuck in a situation where 
such behaviour would have been unacceptable. Your action here is that of finally 
allowing your emotion to manifest itself, rather than that of you manifesting it, if 
indeed saying the latter makes any sense at all. ‘Expressing’ or ‘manifesting’ an 
emotion is it seems clearly not something that you purposely do.2
So, what follows from all this? Having noted the essentially non-intentional 
character of genuine cases of ‘expressions’ of emotion, one thing that immediately 
seems to follow is that some of the examples of ‘expressions’ mentioned at the very 
beginning, can no longer strictly speaking be counted as such. This includes in
1 The term ‘expression’ is actually ambiguous in that there is a sense in which one can intentionally ‘express one’s 
fears’ or ‘express one’s doubts’ where this means essentially putting into words one’s fears or doubts, in the same 
way that one might put into words someone e lse’s feelings. This is clearly not the sense o f expression at issue here. 
In fact, in the second sense, one could it seems ‘express one’s fears’ yet do so in a completely controlled and 
unemotional manner, that is, while letting no emotion transpire or be expressed in one’s behaviour in the present 
sense.
2 1 have been using the terms ‘manifestation’ and ‘expression’ interchangeably here, though I do believe that there 
is a significant distinction to be drawn between them. This distinction will be spelt out in more detail when 
considering the notion o f ‘expressive behaviour’ (in contrast to that o f ‘behavioural expression’). Very briefly 
though, the idea will be that ‘expressions’ are essentially a .sw^category o f ‘manifestations’. They are what one 
might call ‘expressive’ or ‘emotionally coloured’ manifestations o f emotion. Whether emotionally ‘coloured’ or 
not though, outward manifestations remain non-intentional states. The distinction therefore between manifestations 
and the narrower category o f ‘expressions’ is not o f immediate relevance here. It will be so further below.
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particular the examples of symbolic intentional actions out of emotion such as the one 
borrowed from Goldie, ie. that of tearing the eyes out of a photograph representing 
someone one is angry at. Insofar as this is a motivated action, one carried out because 
(ie. for the reason that) one is angry, it can no longer be thought of as a genuine case 
of ‘expression’ on the present account. What should we make of this result? And, 
most importantly, if it is (as it seems) so obvious that the phenomenon of ‘expression’ 
is by its very nature a non-intentional one, why might it intuitively seem to us 
nonetheless, as it does to Goldie, that such actions should in some sense still be 
counted as ‘expressions’ of emotion? As said earlier, the specific case of such actions 
will be examined in further detail once all the distinctions between ‘expressions’ and 
‘expressive behaviour’ have been drawn. It is however worth noting immediately that, 
as far as what has been said so far goes, intentional actions out of emotion have only 
been ruled out from being ‘expressions’ of emotion, but not yet from being potentially 
‘expressive’ forms of behaviour. It may thus still turn out that they can be the latter. 
Not being an expression of an emotion, we will in fact see, does not preclude an 
action from being an expressive action, which may well salvage much of the 
substance of what Goldie wants to say about these cases, despite his referring to them 
interchangeably as ‘expressions’ of emotion and as ‘expressive’ actions.1 More on this 
below.
So far, we have seen (i) that outward expressions of emotion are essentially 
tttftt-intentional episodes of behaviour; and (ii) that intentional actions therefore, even 
those motivated by an emotion cannot count as genuine instances of ‘expressions’ of 
emotion though they may still turn out to be emotionally ‘expressive’ actions in some 
sense yet to be specified. What about some of the other examples listed earlier of 
emotions being supposedly expressed, not in performing an intentional action itself, 
but nonetheless in the manner in which an intentional action is carried out? These, it 
seems, despite being in a sense manifestations of emotions in actions, will not be 
ruled out from being genuine cases of ‘expressions’ on the present account. From the 
fact that the phenomenon of ‘manifestation’ or ‘expression’ is not a reason-guided 
phenomenon, it does not in fact follow that all instances of behaviour in the course o f 
which emotions are expressed or manifest themselves cannot be reason-guided. The 
behaviour itself (ie. the fact of behaving at all, as well as the performing of a
1 See (Goldie 2000 ch. 5)
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particular action rather than another) may be intentional (eg. talking to someone), yet 
one’s performing it in a certain manner (eg. very loudly) may be to some extent wow- 
intentional, and to that extent potentially a direct outward ‘manifestation’ of an 
emotion. To go back to one of our initial examples, that of opening a door hesitantly, 
a person S’s action of opening a door might be perfectly intentional and reason- 
guided -  S might be opening the door because she needs to get something on the other 
side -  yet this action might at the same time be influenced, non-rationally and non- 
motivationally, by an emotion of hers, eg. fear. That is, S might be afraid of what 
awaits her on the other side, and her fear might thus spontaneously manifest itself in 
her way of opening the door (ie. slowly and hesitantly rather than swiftly and with 
confidence), a way in which she does not specifically intend to be opening the door, 
yet an aspect of her action which is clearly determined by her fear, and so a possible 
direct ‘expression’ or ‘manifestation’ of her fear. What is the importance of this?
In the second half of this chapter, it will be shown that in a parallel manner, 
when emotions manifest themselves in consciousness (as opposed to in behaviour), 
they do not do so only by giving rise to particular conscious episodes (in the way that 
they give rise to particular behavioural episodes), but also on occasion by altering or 
transforming conscious states one already has, or would have, independently of 
having any emotion. For example, one might be recalling a past event because one has 
been asked to recount it (ie. not because one feels any particular emotion), yet the way 
in which this event might be remembered, or experienced by one in memory, might be 
to an extent transformed by how one feels about it (eg. embarrassed, proud, etc.). Put 
more generally, emotions will be shown to manifest themselves in consciousness not 
just by causing specific conscious episodes, such as by making us attend perceptually 
to certain objects rather than others, by making us recall particular past events, or by 
making us imagine certain types of situations,1 but also often by affecting the way in 
which these objects, events, and situations are experienced, remembered and 
imagined from our conscious point of view.
Sticking for the moment though to the more familiar cases of expressions of 
emotions in behaviour, the point to note for present purposes is that, outwardly at
1 That emotions direct our attention, and determine the salience o f certain things rather than others in perceptual 
experience, memory, etc. is a point often made in the psychological and neuropsychological literature on emotions. 
See in particular (Damasio 1994) and (De Sousa 1987). My fear o f  rats for instance might result in my attention 
being drawn to such creatures, or to the possibility o f encountering such creatures, when, say, walking through an 
underground passage.
160
least, emotions find expression not only in involuntary episodes of behaviour, but also 
in the involuntary ways in which such behaviours (and often independently motivated 
voluntary actions) are carried out. Either way though, the phenomenon of expression 
remains a strictly non-intentional one. But, granting now that this is so, ie. that the 
relation of ‘expression’ is never a reason-giving one even when it holds between 
emotions and ways of executing reason-based actions, the question arises of what 
kind of a relation it is then.
A first thing to remember is that expressions of emotion are always 
expressions of particular emotions, ie. of states one actually has -  an emotion can 
hardly manifest itself in one’s behaviour unless one actually has the emotion in 
question. The relation between emotions and outward expressions is therefore going 
to have to be one that can hold between two concrete existences. Yet, since we have 
seen that it will not be a reason-giving relation, nor for that matter a purely 
coincidental one (recall, simply being happy and smiling is not enough for one’s 
smiling to constitute an expression of one’s happiness), the obvious alternative is that 
it is a purely causal relation. Thus, we might say: for an instance of behaviour to 
constitute an ‘expression’ of emotion, it must be directly triggered (in a purely 
physical and non-motivational sense) by an emotion one now has.1 Is this enough 
though? Can being just directly physically caused by an emotion be all there is to 
being an ‘expression’ of emotion? Something about this proposal seems deeply 
unsatisfying.
To see this, consider the difference between the following two types of cases: 
(a) having a certain ‘angry’ look in one’s eyes, or smiling, laughing, etc; and (b) 
twitching in some unusual way, or clumsily tripping up while in the grip of joyful 
enthusiasm or anger. In reality, instances of both of these types of behaviour could it 
seems be on various occasions directly caused by one’s emotions. Yet only the former 
are behaviours of a kind we would generally be prepared to call ‘expressions’ of
1 William James would argue that the causal relation should actually be thought o f as going the other way around 
(See James 1884). On James’s view, it is essentially visceral disturbances and other physiological changes (or 
more specifically one’s perception  o f these) that cause emotions rather than vice versa. Emotions are then in turn 
to be understood essentially as sensations arising from such causes. Oddly however, within this category o f  
visceral or physiological changes, James includes not just basic nervous system reactions, but also behaviours that 
we would more naturally classify as ‘expressions’ o f emotion (ie. facial expressions in particular) thereby turning 
expressions o f emotion into the antecedents o f emotions rather than, as seems more intuitive, the results o f them. 
James’s view will be returned to briefly when discussing how emotions manifest themselves in consciousness. 
This aspect o f it however (ie. the view that expressions o f emotion are essentially the causes o f emotions) will be 
left aside. It will simply be assumed that the causal relation (if any) between emotions and their outward 
expressions, goes from emotions to outward behaviour.
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emotion -  the latter being at best thought of as mere one-off consequences or 
incidental manifestations of them. The holding of a direct causal relation between a 
particular emotion and a particular bodily movement is thus clearly not sufficient for 
the latter to count as an ‘expression’ of the former. Moreover, upon reflection, it is not 
even obvious that the holding of a direct causally constitutive relation between one’s 
having an emotion of a certain kind and one’s behaving in a certain way would be 
enough for one’s behaviour to constitute an ‘expression’ of this emotion. 
Physiological changes such as trembling for instance, although arguably 
systematically correlated at the physical level with having certain specific types of 
emotion (eg. fear), are not events we would generally think of as ‘expressions’ of fear. 
For an episode of behaviour to constitute an ‘expression’ of emotion therefore, there 
must be more to it than it’s being simply caused by an emotion, whether this is a one- 
off causal connection or an instantiation of a more systematic causal correlation 
between emotions of that type and the relevant forms of behaviour. So, what is 
missing?
One way of bringing out what might be missing is by looking at cases of 
emotional pretence. When pretending to be happy or angry or sad one will generally 
tend to simulate certain types of behaviour rather than others. In particular, when 
pretending to be angry for example, one might try to give someone an ‘angry’ type of 
look or raise one’s voice (ie. carry out behaviours of kinds which, if done 
spontaneously, would be thought of as ‘expressions’ of anger), while one would not in 
similar circumstances (ie. in pretending to be angry) generally do such things as 
simulate some odd twitch, or pretend to trip over a carpet (ie. carry out behaviours not 
generally thought of as ‘expressions’ of emotion, however much they might be caused 
on particular occasions by one’s emotions). Now what this immediately suggests is 
that, at the very least, there must be something about behaving in the ways we think of 
as potential ‘expressions’ of emotion, to directly fool an onlooker into believing that 
one has the intended emotion. That is, there must be something about episodes of, say, 
smiling, laughing, shouting, etc. which makes us directly read into these behaviours 
happiness, anger, sadness, etc. in a way that we do not immediately do so into other 
behaviours, no matter how much they might in fact be caused (whether in isolated 
instances or more systematically) by these same emotions.
There are a number of things that might explain this, but the most obvious 
explanation (and I will suggest ultimately the correct one) is that in cases of
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behavioural effects of emotions we do think of as ‘expressions’ in contrast to those we 
do not think of as ‘expressions’, there is an additional direct conceptual link between 
the way one is behaving (eg. smiling) and the type of emotion causing one to behave 
in that way (eg. happiness). Immediately revealing of this is in fact already our 
tendency to refer to many outward expressions of emotion as ‘angry’ looks in one’s 
eyes, ‘guilty’ expressions on one’s face, ‘confident’ ways of behaving, and so on. We 
seem to think of certain forms of behaviour in other words as being already 
themselves intrinsically of an emotional type, or as being themselves directly 
indicative or evocative of certain types of emotions. More than that, when someone 
smiles or looks at us in an ‘angry’ type of way, we often take this to directly mean 
they are happy or angry, in a way that we would not take anyone’s twitching or 
trembling in itself to signify that the person in question actually has any specific 
emotion.
Positing the existence of a direct meaning relation between expressions such 
as smiling and emotions such as being happy, may not however be the only way of 
explaining the apparent immediacy of the mental transition we make between 
observing people behave in these ways, and conjuring up, or attributing to them 
specific emotions. One might protest that it does not follow simply from the fact that 
we are quicker to assume that someone is happy upon seeing them smile than we are 
to assume that they are angry upon seeing them twitch, that there is any more of a 
direct meaning relation between smiling and being happy than there is between 
twitching and being angry. It might just be that given past associations, we have come 
to have better reason to believe that someone is happy upon seeing them smile, than to 
believe that they are angry upon seeing them twitch, and so for this reason have 
acquired a tendency to very quickly infer that they are happy upon seeing them smile, 
but not so quickly to infer that they are angry upon seeing them twitch. In both cases 
though, in coming to the conclusion that the person behaving in the relevant way is 
happy or angry, we might be proceeding essentially inferentially, moving from how 
someone is behaving to what emotion they have, relying on the assumption (in some 
cases more reasonable than others) that their observable behaviour is likely to have 
been caused by a specific type of emotion. It is in other words not immediately 
obvious that any direct meaning relation needs to be appealed to to explain the 
intuitive distinction we draw between direct expressions of emotion and so called 
mere effects of these same emotions.
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Note that by a ‘direct meaning’ relation, I mean essentially one of a kind that 
might hold, say, between an utterance of ‘it is raining’ (in the mind of a native 
speaker) and the proposition that it is raining, in contrast to the kind of indirect 
meaning or ‘indicating’ relation that might hold between certain signs/clues such as 
people walking around with umbrellas, and the proposition that it is raining. Put in 
practical terms, in the latter types of cases, upon seeing the relevant signs/clues, one 
will generally infer that it is raining both on the basis of what one sees and on the 
basis of a further assumption about what generally causes or leads people to walk 
around with umbrellas. On the other hand, upon hearing someone say ‘it is raining’, 
one will not generally go through any inferential process, in deciding that it is raining, 
or in deciding that this is what is being suggested. No hidden premise will be appealed 
to to the effect that when people make noises of the kind “it is raining” they generally 
intend to convey the idea that it is raining. Rather, one will just directly hear their 
utterance as meaning, and their uttering of it as suggesting, that it is raining.1
So, the possibility raised in the paragraph before last in effect amounts to the 
suggestion that the sense we have that there is some kind of a direct meaning relation 
between having a so called ‘guilty’ type of look in one’s eyes and feeling guilty or 
between smiling and being happy, is an illusion. In reality, this apparent meaning 
relation between behaviours we call ‘expressions’ and their corresponding emotions is 
no more than an indirect ‘indicating’ relation, just as might be that between twitching 
and being angry, or between trembling and being afraid, or between people walking 
around with umbrellas and it raining. The only difference lies in our being more likely 
to immediately infer (and more justified in doing so) that a person feels guilty or 
happy upon seeing them give us a ‘guilty’ type of look or a smile, than to infer that 
they are angry or afraid upon seeing them twitch or tremble. For a number of obvious 
reasons though, drawing the distinction between ‘expressions’ and ‘mere effects’ of 
emotions in this way is not entirely plausible. It is not plausible, that is, to think of the 
relation between behavioural ‘expressions’ and the types of emotions of which they 
are expressions, as a purely indirect ‘indicating’ relation.
For one thing, our being justified, and/or our being very quick to infer from 
someone’s behaviour that they have a certain emotion does not seem to actually be 
enough for us to be prepared to count their behaviour as an ‘expression’ of their
1 For a more in depth discussion o f such different senses o f ‘meaning’ and ‘indicating’ see (Grice 1957).
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emotion. Suppose for example that I know that Mary tends to twitch in a peculiar way 
when she is angry and only when she is angry. Upon seeing her twitch in that way I 
will therefore tend to very quickly infer that she is angry, and be moreover entirely 
justified in doing so. Yet, it is not obvious that her twitching in this way is something 
we would want to call an ‘expression’ of her anger, rather than just an unusual 
accompanying side effect of it. Of course, one might insist that this is so only because 
twitching as a result of being angry is not as wide spread an effect of anger as is 
shouting or having a certain ‘angry’ type of look in one’s eyes. We might therefore 
just not yet have come to see twitching as directly suggestive or evocative of anger in 
the way that we have come to see certain looks in people’s eyes, or specific tones of 
voice as directly evocative of the same emotion. Having said that, to point this out is 
to make an essentially developmental point. The end result, relevant here, remains the 
same. Some forms of behaviour seem to have come (be it through observed constant 
association, cultural conditioning, or as a result of innate hard-wiring) to immediately 
evoke, mean, or designate directly (ie. not by way of any additional assumption about 
their causal origin) certain types of emotions or the fact that someone has these 
emotions. The move from perceiving behaviours we refer to as ‘expressions’ to 
attributing emotions to people on that basis is, phenomenologically at least, a 
distinctively non-inferential one. We do not refer back to any knowledge of constant 
associations between bodily movements of specific physical types and specific types 
of emotions when attributing emotions to others on the basis of observing them do 
such things as smile, laugh, etc. Rather, we seem to directly perceive their bodily 
movements as suggestive of emotion, or, as we might now say, as ‘expressive ’ of 
happiness, amusement, etc.
This becomes all the more obvious when looking back again at cases of 
emotional pretence and at our attitudes towards them. When watching someone 
simulate a supposed behavioural ‘expression’ of emotion (eg. a smile, a frown, etc), it 
is not just that we are easily fooled into believing that they actually have the 
corresponding emotion. But, even in cases where we know that someone (say, an 
actor) is only pretending, we still tend to often think of their way of moving, tone of 
voice, etc. as being, as we in fact often say, ‘highly expressive’ or ‘emotionally very 
suggestive’ and so on. In other words, we seem to often think of particular ways of 
behaving as themselves expressive of specific types of emotions, quite independently 
of whether a person behaving in these ways actually has the emotions in question.
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And, as we have seen, this being so fits well with the phenomenology of the process 
of actually attributing emotions to others on the basis of observing their behaviour. 
When someone smiles, laughs or gazes at us in a particular way for instance (whereas 
not when they twitch or tremble), we often feel that their emotion itself is 
‘transpiring’ or ‘coming through’ in their behaviour. We often say moreover such 
things as that a person’s anger or resentment can be seen in their eyes or heard in their 
voice. People just look angry to us or sound resentful. It is as if an inner state of theirs 
(or the type of state that they are in) comes to be directly ‘written on their face’, and 
so somehow immediately outwardly available to us.
Taking on board these observations about the directly ‘expressive’ character of 
our so called ‘expressions’ of emotion, the notions of ‘expression’ and of 
‘expressiveness’ can now start to be seen to come apart, yet at the same time to be 
closely related. ‘Expressions’ of emotion may in fact now be re-defined thus: for an 
instance of behaviour to constitute an expression of emotion as opposed to an action 
out of it and as opposed to a mere involuntary physical effect of it, it must be both 
directly caused by a particular emotion, and intrinsically (ie. non-relationally) of a 
behavioural type that is directly evocative or expressive of the type of emotion of 
which it is a direct effect/manifestation.1 It is then in virtue of the intrinsically 
emotionally expressive character of people’s expressions of emotion that we are able 
to tell what emotions they have directly on the basis of observing this class of their 
behavioural outbursts. We may thus have here not just a definition of ‘expressions’ of 
emotion, but also the beginning of an account of our knowledge of other people’s 
emotions, an account according to which this knowledge is often direct and 
distinctively non-inferential, though of course not authoritative. The primary aim of 
this chapter was however to account for our knowledge of our own emotions. So, how 
might this fit in?
1 Note that this is not to be taken as some kind o f ‘add-on’ theory o f expressions, whereby an episode o f behaviour 
counts as an ‘expression’ o f an emotion if and only if  two criteria coincide, ie. that the behaviour is caused by an 
emotion and that it simultaneously happens to be expressive o f this same type o f emotion. I am inclined to think (in 
agreement for instance with Wollheim -  see Wollheim 1999, ch .l) that emotions are dispositional states, and 
dispositional states moreover a constitutive part o f which is the disposition for these states to manifest themselves 
episodically (whether outwardly or in consciousness) in ways (or in episodes themselves) that tend to be 
distinctively expressive o f the types o f emotions thereby manifested. Being disposed for example to smile in 
particular circumstances (ie. to do something expressive o f happiness) is both causally and conceptually 
constitutive o f being happy -  one could not count as being truly happy if  one were not disposed in this way. The 
status o f our emotions as such dispositional states, and what exactly is to be understood by this, will be made 
clearer in the next section (pp. 179-180), though it is not part o f the main aim of this chapter to provide a worked- 
out theory o f the nature o f emotional states -  only o f the nature o f some o f their episodic manifestations in 
behaviour and in consciousness. Of course, to understand the latter, various assumptions made about the former 
will also have to be sketched out. This will therefore be done briefly further below.
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We have seen that we do not come to know our own emotions (not all of them 
at least) through observing our behaviour, whether inferentially or otherwise. Often in 
fact, in self-ascribing certain emotions we do not seem to look at our behaviour at all. 
Rather, we tend to look out at the world for evidence of what emotions we have. So 
how can any of the above be relevant? Well, emotions do not just find expression in 
outward behaviour. In what follows, it will be suggested that something directly 
parallel to what occurs in coming to know others ’ emotions can be shown to occur in 
coming to know a certain range of our own emotions, by reference this time to 
expressions of emotion in consciousness. That is, although we do not read off our own 
emotions (in certain cases at least) from their emotionally expressive manifestations 
in our behaviour, it will be shown that we read them off nonetheless from their 
equally emotionally ‘expressive’ or ‘evocative’ manifestations in consciousness, and 
in particular from such expressive manifestations (however complex) in our world- 
directed conscious experiences, memories, fantasies, etc. More will of course need to 
be said about this expressive dimension of our world-directed conscious states if any 
sense is to be made of our ability to directly read off our own emotions from the way 
the world appears to us. In particular, the emotional tone taken on by the world of our 
experiences will have to be shown to be not just emotionally expressive, but to be, 
from within our own outward looking point of view, recognizably expressive of 
ourselves as having a very specific emotional attitude towards the world.
First though, given the central role that this notion of the emotionally 
‘expressive’ character of our conscious states (or of the world from our point of view) 
is set to play, the notion itself is worth exploring a bit further on it’s own.
What is it for a phenomenon to be ‘expressive ’ o f an emotion?
Put in the most general possible terms, we have seen that something can be 
said to be expressive of an emotion essentially if it is somehow directly suggestive or 
directly evocative of a particular type of emotion -  eg. fear, anger, sadness about 
something, etc. We have also seen more specifically that having this characteristic of 
being expressive of a certain type of emotion is a constitutive part of an episode of 
behaviour’s being a direct expression of an emotion one now has (as opposed to a 
mere effect of it). An important difference however has also emerged between 
‘expressions’ of emotion on the one hand and ‘expressive’ behaviour on the other.
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Although we have seen that for something to be an expression of emotion it must be 
also expressive of the type of emotion of which it is a direct expression, the reverse 
dependence does not hold. For a behavioural event to be expressive of an emotion it 
need not also be an expression of emotion. Being emotionally ‘expressive’ (unlike 
being an ‘expression’ of emotion) is not a property relational upon anyone’s now 
having an emotion.
This came out in particular when considering our attitude towards the 
performances of actors. When praising an actor’s performance, we often say, recall, 
such things as that his or her performance is ‘highly expressive’ or ‘evocative’ or 
‘emotionally very suggestive’, etc. Now in so doing, we are clearly not saying that 
their true feelings are transpiring in their behaviour. That is, we are not praising them 
for letting out their personal emotional baggage in front of an audience or in front of a 
camera. We are not praising them for bravery (or, bizarrely, for lack of self-control), 
but rather for skill in the art of expressive movement, suggestive tone of voice, etc. 
Thus clearly, for us to count an instance of behaviour as ‘expressive ’ of an emotion, it 
need not be a genuine expression of anyone’s actual emotion. The person behaving in 
the so called ‘expressive’ way need not have an emotion of the kind being conveyed, 
nor indeed have any emotion at all. Being expressive is a property intrinsic to the 
behavioural type itself. And in a sense therefore, all expressive behaviour can be said 
to be genuinely expressive, in that it’s being expressive is entirely independent from 
whether or not the person behaving in the relevant way is being sincere.1
This independence of emotional expressiveness from being an expression of 
emotion in fact goes even further. For something to be expressive of an emotion, it 
need not it seems actually be a piece behaviour at all, nor indeed a state of a person at 
all, whether conscious or otherwise, thereby detaching the phenomenon of emotional 
expressiveness even more from any necessary association with the idea of being 
caused by someone’s actual emotion. Music for instance, can be thought of as 
emotionally expressive in virtue of its purely musical properties (eg. rhythm, 
modality, etc.), properties which it has entirely independently of anyone’s mental or
1 In mentioning this I have in mind the fact that Goldie contrasts what he calls ‘genuinely expressive’ behaviour 
with ‘rto/7-genuinely expressive’ behaviour. See (Goldie 2000, ch.5). From what we have seen here though, once 
one disambiguates between speaking o f ‘expressions’ o f emotion and speaking o f emotionally ‘expressive’ 
behaviour, the term o f ‘non-genuine’ can no longer truly be said to apply to instances o f the latter. Expressions o f 
emotion can be genuine or non-genuine depending on whether or not they actually arose from emotion. Expressive 
behaviour on the other hand remains expressive whether or not the person behaving in that way actually has any 
emotion at all.
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physical states, and indeed perhaps most relevantly, independently of anyone’s 
performance of the piece of music in question. The ‘minor’ musical modality for 
example is often thought to be evocative of sadness, and indeed, pieces in so called 
‘minor keys’ tend to be almost universally experienced as sad, or experienced as 
expressive of sadness. Pieces in ‘major’ keys on the other hand tend to be experienced 
as evocative of joy and confidence, while dissonant chords are often suggestive of 
horror or suspense. Take for example the use of music in films. Specific pieces of 
music tend to be chosen by filmmakers for specific films very much in accordance 
with what emotional context or emotional tone they want to set to the film or to 
particular scenes, that is, in accordance with what kind of emotional spin they want to 
put on the portrayed events. Horror films are for instance a very obvious context in 
which music is made use of for such purposes.
An interesting fact about this moreover, is that our perception of the emotional 
tone set by different types of music does not seem to vary greatly across populations 
or individuals. It is very unlikely that a particular piece of music, as used in a film, 
will be misinterpreted as indicating a completely different emotional context from the 
one intended. Even a sequence of notes as simple as a minor scale is going to be 
almost universally perceived as evocative of sadness, thus suggesting that our 
perception of particular musical modalities, rhythms, soft/loud contrasts, etc. as 
distinctively expressive of specific types of emotions rather than others, is likely to be 
due more to something constitutionally hard-wired within us, than to any incidental 
past associations we might have made between specific types of music and particular 
emotional situations. Put crudely: we do not seem to get the idea that particular pieces 
of music or sequences of notes indicate sadness or suspense by watching films; rather, 
specific pieces of music are chosen precisely because of the emotional tone that they 
will set to a scene. Exactly which way around the story goes however for different 
expressive phenomena (forms of behaviour, types of music, colours, 
phenomenological distortions of the world, etc.) is of course again an essentially 
developmental matter, the result of which, relevant here, remains the same. For 
present purposes, even if the specific expressive emotional tone that a particular type 
of music sets is the result of learnt associations, it still remains that when actually 
hearing a piece of music we do not refer back to these past experiences and 
associations, and infer from this that a certain emotion is being indicated, or that a 
scene in a film is to be interpreted as a scary one. Rather, we seem to recognize the
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relevant musical modalities, rhythms, contrasts, as distinctively expressive of 
particular types of emotions somewhat independently of any past associations we 
might have made, and indeed often quite independently of having made any 
associations at all between the particular types of music and specific emotional 
contexts. More than that, we often distinguish between the type of emotion that a 
piece of music ‘objectively’ suggests or is ‘objectively’ expressive of, and the type of 
emotion it brings out in us given our past experiences. We may for example recognize 
a particular piece of music as ‘objectively’ expressive of joy (ie. as expressive of joy 
in virtue of it’s purely intrinsic musical properties), yet still be filled with sadness 
upon listening to it because it is associated for us with a particular sad event in our 
lives.
A question that this leaves us with is that of what exactly it is non- 
developmentally about certain specific musical properties, or physical properties, or 
visual properties of different expressive phenomena (eg. sequences of notes, bodily 
movements, or, say, the shade of blue), that, from our personal-level point of view, 
right now, makes us see it as objectively suggestive of a particular emotion rather than 
another. Perhaps there is no answer to be given to this. That is, it may just be that 
from a personal-level point of view, the emotionally expressive character of certain 
forms of behaviour, certain types of music, certain colours, etc. is just primitive, ie. 
cannot be analysed any further or explained in terms of anything else. Whether or not 
this is so however will have to be left aside for present purposes. It will be suggested 
though, that when turning to the case of the expressive transformations effected by 
our emotions onto the world of our conscious experiences, there is more to be said 
about what might make these types of transformations distinctively emotional 
transformations, and indeed recognizably emotional transformations from within our 
own outward looking point of view. That is, it will be suggested that the emotionally 
expressive character of our conscious experiences, memories, fantasies, etc. can be 
analysed or broken down a bit further, or sufficiently at least to bring to light our 
ability to look out at this emotionally transformed world, and on that basis alone, self- 
ascribe the very emotions effecting the transformations.
Before turning to examine more closely this emotionally expressive character 
of our conscious experiences however, one further phenomenon, and in particular its 
potential status as an expressive phenomenon (like some of those considered above),
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remains to be looked into, namely, as promised, that of symbolic or displaced 
intentional action out o f emotion.
‘Expressive ’ actions out o f emotion
Recall some of the examples of intentional actions put forward at the very 
beginning as potential cases of direct ‘expressions’ of emotion. One of these, 
borrowed from Goldie, was that of tearing the eyes out of a photograph representing 
someone one is angry at. Another was that of putting pins in a doll resembling 
someone one dislikes. Such actions, it was suggested could not (being by their very 
nature intentional -  ie. actions motivated by emotions) be at the same time direct 
expressions of emotion (the latter being by their very nature spontaneous and 
involuntary). But, in light of what has now been said, such actions could conceivably 
turn out to be expressive actions out of emotion.
Such diverse phenomena as pieces of music, episodes of smiling performed 
intentionally by actors, and even colours, it has been suggested can be thought of as 
directly expressive of specific types of emotions despite clearly not being in any way 
direct involuntary effects of anyone’s emotions. The expressive character of a bodily 
movement in particular was shown to be entirely independent of whether the person 
carrying it out is doing so spontaneously and involuntarily or whether they are 
carrying it out intentionally. Intentional actions such as those considered by Goldie 
may therefore equally well turn out to be expressive actions despite not being direct 
expressions of emotion, so long as they are in one way or another of a behavioural 
type that is directly suggestive or directly evocative of the type of emotion in question.
Take the case of tearing the eyes out of a photograph representing someone 
one is angry at. It might be, as indeed Goldie suggests, that there is something 
primitively intelligible for us about behaving in such ways when angry at someone 
(ie. attacking them, or by extension, destroying something that symbolizes them). 
Now, this may in turn result in our seeing such destructive actions as directly 
expressive of anger towards the person represented or as directly expressive of a 
desire to hurt them. It might in fact be that, upon seeing someone behave in such a 
way, we are immediately inclined to take their acting in this way to mean that they 
are angry at the person represented in the photograph. Moreover, and contrary this 
time to what Goldie actually suggests, such actions, in being expressive in this way
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(assuming they are so) will always be so genuinely even if the person carrying them 
out is not actually angry. An action may of course genuinely or non-genuinely arise 
out of emotion (whether motivationally, or spontaneously as in the case of 
expressions), but, this will have nothing to do with its status as expressive. Smiling for 
instance, just like the sound of a major chord will always be expressive of happiness 
even if carried out intentionally by an actor. And, so it will be also for symbolic 
expressive actions such as the above.
Thus, despite not being potential ‘expressions’ of emotion, displaced actions 
out of emotion of the kind that Goldie considers may well turn out to be expressive 
actions out of emotion. And, in being expressive in this sense, they will always be so 
genuinely, even if they do not on a particular occasion arise out of emotion. Much 
more of course could be said about the intrinsically expressive character of such 
actions. More could also be said to do better justice to what Goldie in particular says 
about such cases. For present purposes though most of this will have to be left aside. 
To make a few brief points nonetheless, in light of some of the criticisms we have 
raised against Goldie, it should be said that his view that symbolic intentional actions 
out of emotion can also be expressions of emotion, is not driven solely by confusion 
and a failure to distinguish between ‘expressions’ and ‘expressive behaviour’. In 
actual fact, his view that some intentional actions can also be direct expressions is 
justified by a particular account he puts forward of what it takes to be an ‘expression’ 
of emotion, an account which contrasts somewhat with the one I have been suggesting 
here -  but which is itself, it seems to me, driven to some extent by the above 
confusion.
Goldie defines ‘expressions’ essentially as instances of behaviour carried out 
for no ulterior motive, that is, for no reason other than say, because one is angry. 
Certain actions out o f emotion (ie. actions motivated by emotion) can therefore on his 
account be seen to be not just ‘expressive’ actions but also ‘expressions’ of emotion, 
so long as they are not performed as means to any further end. Suppose for example 
that my anger motivates me to hurt someone. Given various social and psychological 
taboos however, I end up, as in Goldie’s example, tearing the eyes out of a 
photograph representing the person I am angry at rather than attacking the person 
herself. Now, in doing this, I am in a sense still acting out o f the motivational desire 
which is intrinsic to my anger, that is, out of my desire to hurt them. Yet, since I 
choose to act out on my desire (or on my anger) merely symbolically on a photograph
172
rather than on the real person, I cannot be said to have acted in order to achieve the 
desired end of physically harming the person represented, since I knew fully well that 
damaging the photograph would not achieve this. Thus, although my action is 
intentional, ie. voluntary and motivated by my anger and my desire to hurt a particular 
person, it is not carried out as a means to achieve the end or goal of hurting the person 
I am angry at. On Goldie’s account, this action can thus come out as being a possible 
‘expression’ of emotion. Intuitively though, this does not seem to be enough to make 
my emotionally motivated action a direct expression of emotion.
To bring out this intuition, consider the following analogy. Suppose I have a 
strong desire for ice cream, yet go to my refrigerator and discover that there is none 
left. Suppose I then express some disappointment and have a piece of fruit instead. In 
eating this piece of fruit I am performing a displaced action out of my desire for ice 
cream, displaced this time not because of any psychological or social taboo, but 
simply because doing the real thing is not possible. So, doing something close to the 
real thing, ie. something similar in form to what would be involved in satisfying my 
desire seems somehow better than doing nothing. It is far from clear though that my 
eating the piece of fruit here is something we would intuitively want to call a 
manifestation or expression of desire -  in the way that, say, a look of longing on my 
face directed towards an empty box of ice cream might be. In intentionally eating the 
piece of fruit I am not (nor is it my aim to be) essentially ‘airing’ my desire or letting 
it ‘come out’ in the open. Rather, I seem to be just acting out in a displaced way on 
my desire for ice cream, in an attempt to reach some (albeit partial) sense of fulfilment 
of my desire (note, not of release), through a displaced enactment of what it would 
take to satisfy it. No direct outburst of emotion or desire need actually be involved in 
the process. In fact in this example the only emotion seemingly being expressed at 
any stage is disappointment and perhaps resignation, not desire (ie. the emotion out of 
which it arose).
Similarly, I would now say, with the case of tearing the eyes out of a 
photograph of someone I am angry at. My destroying a representation of someone I 
am angry at, even if done because I am angry at this person or because I want to hurt 
them, is not necessarily in itself a direct releasing of anger but a mere case of acting 
out (albeit symbolically) on my anger at the person represented in the photograph. I 
could be doing this without letting out any anger at all, that is, carrying it out perhaps 
merely as a symbolic gesture to give myself some sense of closure on my desire. Or, I
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could actually be on the verge of letting go but purposely suppressing my emotional 
outbursts -  perhaps because I am afraid of how out of control I might get, or perhaps 
simply because I am the kind of person who has difficulties in letting out my 
emotions. Of course, on other occasions, my doing something like destroying a 
representation of someone I am angry at, might be something I do on purpose to 
provide myself with an opportunity or appropriate context in which to let my anger 
spontaneously come out. I might in fact find it easier to let out my anger in the 
process of symbolically acting out on it, than in the process of doing something less 
relevant (eg. walking down the street). However, allowing an emotion to come out, or 
doing something in order to allow an emotion to come out, is not itself a releasing of 
emotion, as we saw earlier when discussing the intentional control we have over our 
emotional outbursts.1 My anger may well end up being released simply in the 
particular aggressive manner in which I hack at the photograph, but it will not be 
released in virtue of my intentionally carrying out this displaced action out of 
emotion. Perhaps one could argue that in some cases doing things like destroying a 
representation of someone one dislikes is something one does entirely spontaneously 
rather than for the reason that one is angry or for the reason that one wishes to hurt 
them -  ie. one might just be lashing out at the photograph (just as one might at the 
real person) in a fit of rage. If so, that is, if the example in question is genuinely one 
of spontaneous, non-intentional, non reason-grounded behaviour from emotion, I 
would be more than prepared to call it a direct ‘expression’ of emotion -  or at least a 
borderline case. To the extent however that we are thinking of the action (as Goldie 
is) as an intentional action motivated by an emotion, it cannot it seems also be at the 
same time a direct expression of emotion. One’s emotion might be let out 
spontaneously in the process of carrying out such actions, but, the intentionally 
carrying out of them itself is not a direct manifestation of emotion. The point seems to 
remain that symbolic or displaced intentional actions out of emotion, when considered 
purely as such, are not (and are incompatible with being) themselves direct 
expressions of emotion.
This issue could no doubt be debated further, and various further 
ambiguous/borderline cases brought in. I will leave it aside though at this point, and, 
on grounds of greater plausibility, continue to take expressions of emotion to be
1 See p. 158 above
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essentially direct, spontaneous, involuntary, impulses from emotion, to be contrasted 
with actions motivated by emotions, the latter being performed because one feels a 
certain way, as opposed to for no reason at all like the former. One does not smile 
because one is motivated to do so by happiness; one just ‘does it’. And, if one does 
smile because one is happy (ie. for the reason that one is happy) one is not in virtue of 
that fact alone also venting one’s happiness in the process. And, so it will also be if 
one does anything else intentionally, no matter how much what one does (eg. smiling, 
or tearing the eyes out of a photograph) might be directly expressive of a specific type 
of emotion.
The important point to bear in mind here is that even on the present 
understanding of expressions (ie. as strictly involuntary forms of behaviour), symbolic 
intentional actions out of emotions can, in agreement with Goldie, be thought of as 
actions expressive of emotion. Tearing the eyes out of a photograph representing 
someone one is angry at does in fact seem to be directly suggestive of anger, or of 
desire to hurt the person represented, or as Goldie puts it, expressive of a ‘wish’ to 
hurt them. Recall, an action’s being expressive of a type of emotion requires only that 
there be some kind of direct conceptual link between the course of action taken 
(damaging a representation of someone) and the type of emotion in question (anger at 
the person represented, or desire or wish to hurt the person represented). Standing in a 
direct conceptual relation to a type of emotion however or being expressive of a 
certain type of emotion does not in itself turn that which has this expressive character, 
automatically into a direct expression of emotion. The latter depends essentially on 
how one’s behaviour arises from one’s emotion, ie. spontaneously and involuntarily 
or in a reason-based, motivated manner.
Moving away now from actions out of emotion, and from expressions of 
emotion in behaviour, as well as from the general phenomenon of emotional 
expressiveness in behaviour, music, colours, etc., the time has come to focus more 
narrowly on the case of expressions of emotion in consciousness, and in particular, 
armed with the above conceptual framework and distinctions, on the emotionally 
expressive ways in which our emotions, in manifesting themselves in consciousness, 
come to transform the world from our perspective, this world which is to provide us 
with direct evidence of ourselves as having specific emotions.
7.2 Manifestations of emotion in consciousness
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An obvious first way in which our emotions seem to manifest themselves in 
consciousness is in sensation. When we are afraid, angry, happy, in love, etc. this can 
often result in our coming to have a wide range of sensations, such as feeling flushed, 
unable to breathe, having chest pains, feeling faint, or, in less extreme cases, in our 
just feeling physiologically aroused in some vague and generalised way. This is in 
fact such a common part of our everyday experience of emotion that it has been 
thought by some to lie at the very heart of what it is to have an emotion. According to 
William James for instance, emotions do not just sometimes manifest themselves in 
sensations, but they essentially are sensations, specifically sensations caused by the 
perception of visceral disturbance or other physiological change.1 For a number of 
reasons though frequently raised in the literature, this does not seem to be the best 
way of thinking of the nature of emotions, nor indeed to be the best way of thinking of 
how our emotions in many instances even just manifest themselves in consciousness.
For one thing, as pointed out by Cannon,2 specific visceral disturbances do not 
correlate accurately with specific types of emotions. One same state of arousal or 
physiological disturbance may on different occasions be associated with a number of 
different emotions, and conversely, different states of arousal may be associated at 
different times with the same emotions. In fact, physiological arousal states are often 
not associated with (nor even accompanied by) any emotional states at all. Feeling 
one’s heart beating very fast for instance, may be associated equally well on different 
occasions with fear, love, surprise, or with just having done some intensive physical 
exercise. Similarly, feeling flushed may be associated with being embarrassed or 
angry, or on the other hand with just being hot. And, perhaps most strikingly, having 
chest pains and being unable to breathe can be associated on occasion with extreme 
anxiety, yet on other occasions with one’s just having a straightforward heart attack. 
In other words, an account of the nature of emotions along James’s lines that focuses 
primarily on the ‘sensation’ and ‘visceral’ aspects of our emotions will ultimately be 
unsatisfactory (a) in being unable to adequately distinguish between different types of 
emotions, and (b) in being also unable to adequately draw the line between emotions 
and non-emotional sensations caused by the same visceral disturbances.
1 See (James 1884)
2 See (Cannon 1929)
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Beyond Cannon’s objections, a ‘sensation’ account of the nature of emotions 
also faces a number of other problems. First, insofar as emotions are on this view 
essentially conscious states, there will be little room made for the existence of non- 
conscious or repressed emotions, say, repressed feelings of guilt, or resentment, or 
desire, that most of us feel do exist and can be identified through observing people’s 
patterns of behaviour. This is a problem that will be shared in fact by any account 
according to which emotions are essentially conscious episodes, whether sensations, 
judgements or perceptual experiences. Another problem, more specific this time to a 
‘sensation’ account of emotions, is that it will it seems leave out the whole cognitive 
dimension of our emotions. Emotions are states we generally think of as potentially 
directed towards a wide range of external objects, events, states of affairs, etc. and not 
just towards our bodies and our bodily states. One can feel resentment towards 
another person or happy about some external state of affairs, or afraid that some 
outside event might occur, and so on. Might there be ways around these problems?
Perhaps one could try to accommodate the cognitive element by incorporating 
it somehow on the side of the causes of emotions, as done sometimes for instance by 
‘appraisal’ theorists in the recent psychological literature.1 That is, one could perhaps 
say that emotions themselves are merely bodily sensations, though they are sensations 
specifically caused by particular world-directed cognitive states (eg. evaluative beliefs 
or judgements), the latter being relevant to their individuation. Taking this kind of line 
though would leave in place the problematic idea that in having an emotion, at the 
conscious level, one’s attention is essentially directed towards one’s visceral states. 
That is, taking this line would be to hold on to the view that the conscious content of 
our emotional experiences is still the same as that of sensations.2 Yet, when actually 
considering the conscious content of our emotional experiences, it does not seem that 
in most cases of feeling angry or happy or in love the focus of our conscious attention 
is primarily on our body or bodily states. Rather, when afraid of something or happy 
about something, or in love with someone, our attention tends to be focused (if on 
anything at all) out on the world, and in particular on the objects of our fear, 
happiness, love, etc. In being afraid of a rat for instance I will tend to be more focused
1 Appraisal theories will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.
2 I am contrasting here the conscious content o f an emotional experience with the intentional content o f the 
emotion itself -  the latter o f which may be cashed out in a number o f ways, and most relevantly need not actually 
correspond (most obviously in the case o f unconscious states) to anything one actually has present to mind in 
having this state at any particular time.
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on the rat than on the fact that I am trembling. It is only in very unusual cases that our 
attention, in having an emotion, will be turned in the first instance towards our bodily 
states. An example might be that of having a repressed feeling of anxiety, which may 
result in one’s having an anxiety attack, yet which might, in being repressed, manifest 
itself in consciousness merely as awareness of chest pains and inability to breathe, 
often in fact to the point of being mistaken for a purely physiological state -  ie. a heart 
attack. The conscious phenomenology of emotion is however not generally the typical 
phenomenology of awareness of visceral change. Our feelings of guilt tend to 
manifest themselves in our being completely absorbed by the wrong actions we have 
committed, rather than with our current bodily states; our feelings of fear tend to 
manifest themselves in our having in mind the objects of our fear rather than the fact 
that we are trembling or can’t breathe; and, even feelings of so called free-floating 
anxiety in most cases manifest themselves in consciousness primarily in world- 
directed concerns and worW-directed perceptual and cognitive focus, rather than in 
self-focused feelings of physiological discomfort.
This brings us back to a point mentioned earlier. As noted in the 
neuroscientific literature, emotions do not just give rise to particular arousal 
symptoms and sensations, but they manifest themselves to a great extent also in 
directing our attention -  ie. in determining the salience of certain things rather than 
others in the environment, in making certain past events stand out in our memory, in 
leading us to imagine certain scenarios rather than others, and in making us envisage 
particular possibilities and possible courses of action when deliberating about what to 
do.1 Thus, not only are emotions themselves not mere sensations, but mere sensations 
do not seem to be the only mental phenomena in which emotions manifest themselves
1 When these points are made in the neuroscientific (or indeed philosophical) literature, they are usually made 
within the context o f concerns about the function o f our emotions in our mental lives and specifically in our 
decision-making processes. According to Damasio (1994) and De Sousa (1987) emotions play the crucial and in 
principle indispensable role o f bringing to an end lengthy deliberative processes, and o f sometimes supplanting 
such deliberative processes altogether in decision-making circumstances where time is o f the essence. The idea is, 
first o f all, that without emotions automatically directing the focus o f our attention to certain things rather than 
others and to particular courses o f action rather than others, we would be unable in some cases to ever stop 
deliberating and come to a decision. Then, the idea is (according to Damasio in particular) that not only do 
emotions save us from decision-making deadlocks, but the possible courses o f action that our emotions direct our 
attention to tend to be the very ones we should be attending to, that is, the most rational or adaptive courses o f  
action for us to take. I have doubts about the idea o f our emotions being in principle indispensable in getting us out 
of decision-making deadlocks (eg. could we not use methods such as tossing a coin instead?). I also have doubts 
about the idea o f emotions always drawing our attention in practice (let alone in principle) to what is most relevant 
or most adaptive (eg. does a phobic fear o f feathers make us focus on what we should be focusing on?). 
Nonetheless, it does seem true to say that, for better or for worse, emotions do determine the focus o f  our attention 
to a great extent, be it in perception, memory, or thought. They do not therefore just manifest themselves in self­
focused sensations, but also often in giving rise to specific world-directed conscious episodes and in presenting 
certain courses o f action to us as the ones to take.
178
in consciousness. This is of course not to deny that sensations are amongst the many 
ways in which our emotions might manifest themselves in consciousness, sometimes 
even on their own, as in the repressed anxiety attack case mentioned a paragraph 
back. But, it seems that they cannot be, and indeed are not (purely as bodily 
sensations) the only kinds of direct effects that our emotions have on our mental lives, 
nor therefore the only contexts in which our emotions might come to find expression 
in consciousness. That this is so is fortunate moreover in that the ‘sensation’ aspect of 
our emotional experiences is not an aspect of the ways in which our emotions find 
expression in consciousness that could explain our ability to know our own emotions 
directly on the basis of looking out at the world. In fact, even if we did base our 
knowledge of some of our own emotions on some form of inference from (or indeed 
direct perception of) our arousal symptoms and sensations, this way of knowing our 
own emotions, being based essentially on data explicitly about ourselves and our 
states, would not explain how it is that we actually can, as seen in chapter 6, also 
sometimes come to know our own emotions on the basis of evidence that is in the first 
instance about the world.
But, one might now ask, can the newly introduced fact that emotions manifest 
themselves in conscious episodes other than sensations, ones directed towards the 
world, do the trick? It is not immediately obvious that it can. After all, the mere fact 
that I am finding my attention continually drawn to certain things rather than others 
may well give me (if even that) a clue to the fact that I have some emotion or other 
towards that which I am continually drawn to, but, it will not in itself tell me what 
emotion I have. Moreover, even to the extent that it will be able to tell me this, the 
road to knowledge will be essentially inferential and based again on evidence 
explicitly about myself and my states -  evidence about what I am thinking about, what 
I am looking at, where my attention is continually drawn to etc. -  rather than being 
based on evidence in the first instance about how the world is from my perspective. 
The solution to our puzzle therefore remains still to be found.
Before moving on though, it should be stressed that what has now clearly 
become the issue, and what we need to explore in order to solve our puzzle, is not 
what emotions themselves are but the different ways in which our emotions manifest 
themselves or find expression in consciousness, and this for two reasons. On the one 
hand, it has been denied above that emotions can themselves be conscious episodes of
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any kind.1 Yet, on the other hand, what we clearly need to identify is something about 
the conscious phenomenology of looking out at the world in having emotions, since 
this is supposed to be the starting point of our knowledge of our own emotions. What 
we therefore need to examine, if not our emotions themselves, is nonetheless their 
contribution to our experiences of the world. But now, if this is what we are looking 
for, ie. if what we are looking for is to uncover a specific way in which our emotions 
are expressed or transpire in our world-directed conscious experiences, we might first 
want to know what kind of states the supposedly ‘expressed’ or ‘transpiring’ emotions 
themselves are. In other words, to make a brief aside, what are emotions, if not 
conscious episodes of some form? In what follows, and in light of the criticisms 
raised here of the views that they might be some form of conscious episodes (eg. 
sensations or judgements), the following broad assumptions will be made.
I am taking it, and will continue to do so in what follows, that emotions are in 
the first instance dispositional states, ie. dispositions to behave in various emotion- 
specific ways and to have a wide range of other conscious episodes and non- 
conscious states that are characteristic of the type of emotion in question. Importantly 
though, in saying that emotions are essentially dispositional states, and in particular, 
in assuming that a tendency to have a wide range of specific conscious and 
behavioural episodes is conceptually and/or causally constitutive of having these 
dispositional states, I do not mean to say (as Ryle would for instance) that to have 
emotions just is to have particular patterns or sequences of states. On the contrary, I 
am assuming emotions to be, put in Wollheim’s terms, somehow ‘psychologically 
real\ that is, to be internal states of some kind in virtue o f which we are disposed to 
behave, think, experience the world, etc. along certain patterns. My smiling for 
instance is not just constitutive of my being happy, but my being happy is also what 
caused me to smile. My emotions can be appealed to to explain why I am smiling. On 
this understanding of emotions in other words, it still makes sense to speak of our
1 In this chapter it has been argued that emotions cannot be sensations, and in chapter 6 arguments were put 
forward against cognitivist theories o f emotions according to which emotions are particular forms o f evaluative 
judgements or (along similar cognitivist lines) perceptual experiences o f the world as having evaluative properties 
such as o f desirability, blameworthiness, etc.
2 See (Ryle 1966). Ryle o f course speaks only o f behavioural dispositions, but the principle is the same.
3 See (Wollheim 1999, ch. 1)
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emotions as causing their expressive manifestations,1 as motivating (ie. standing as 
reasons for) our actions out of them, as being reflected or mirrored in certain complex 
experiences or transformations of the world from our perspective, and indeed as 
themselves transforming the world of our experience in ways that reflect them (often 
in all their structure and complexity -  eg. by transforming different aspects of the 
world in different ways). And, all of this can be said while still thinking of these 
various states as causally and/or conceptually constitutive of having the emotions in 
question. The fact that certain episodes are constitutively linked with having an 
emotion does not, that is, mean that they must in some sense just be equated with the 
emotion -  quite on the contrary if we are speaking of the constitutive link as a 
causally or conceptually or rationally constitutive one, rather than as one of identity 
or constitution. So, to sum up, emotions will be assumed to be essentially states in 
virtue o f which we are disposed to behave in various emotionally expressive ways, 
disposed to attend (be it in memory, thought, perception, imagination, etc.) to specific 
objects/ events/ states of affairs relevant to our concerns, and ultimately, we will see, 
to have our perspective on the world ‘transformed’ or ‘coloured’ in various emotion- 
specific (ie. emotionally expressive) ways.
With this conception of emotions in mind, we can now return to our main task; 
that of uncovering a way in which our emotions might manifest themselves in 
consciousness, at the world-directed level, such that knowledge of our own emotions 
based directly on looking out at the world might be possible. So far, we have seen that 
emotions can manifest themselves in behaviour, in sensations, and in giving rise to a 
wide range of episodic conscious states such as distinctively focused perceptual 
experiences, episodes of recollection, imagination, particular fantasies, individual 
thoughts (perhaps recurrent thoughts), obsessive dreams, and so on. None of this 
however seems to help explain how it is that we are able to come to know our own 
emotions by just looking out at the world -  ie. without having to consider in the first 
instance any facts about ourselves and our mental states. If our puzzle about self- 
knowledge is to be solved, our emotions will have to be found to manifest themselves 
somehow not just in our coming to have world-directed states (ie. in our coming to 
attend to the world, in perception, memory, imagination, etc.), but also essentially in
1 The causal interaction between emotions and expressive conscious episodes can o f course also go the other way 
around. A sudden emotional conscious episode might establish a lasting emotional disposition, which may then in 
turn come to manifest itself in various future emotionally expressive episodes.
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altering the way the world itself comes to appear to us from our conscious point of 
view in having these states. And, something along these lines was in fact already 
suggested in the first section of this chapter.
In discussing expressions of emotion in behaviour, it was noted that emotions 
do not just manifest themselves in distinctive episodes of behaviour but also often 
(and sometimes exclusively) in the manner in which the behaviour is carried out (eg. 
loudly, aggressively, very fast, etc). Similarly, it was then anticipated, it would also be 
for the case of manifestations of emotion in consciousness.1 That is, it was already 
suggested that in a somewhat parallel way, when it comes to expressions of emotions 
in consciousness, our emotions do not just manifest themselves in our coming to have 
particular conscious episodes that we might not have otherwise had, or in our 
attention being drawn to specific aspects of the world rather than others, but also to a 
large extent in the way in which the world towards which our attention is directed in 
these conscious episodes is itself experienced/ remembered/ imagined from our point 
of view. The example used was that of a remembered event, which, it was suggested, 
would figure in one’s memory experiences very differently according to whether one 
felt embarrassed about it or proud of it, etc. What should we make of this claim, ie. of 
the claim that emotions manifest themselves, amongst other things in the way the 
world appears to us from our conscious point of view?
Phenomenologically, to start with, it rings true. Not only does it seem true 
phenomenologically (though this of course needs to be articulated further), but it also 
seems to fit well with many of the things we actually say when describing our 
emotional experiences. As noted in some of the recent psychological literature by 
authors such as Fry da and Lambie & Marcel, when trying to get someone to 
understand exactly how we feel, we often describe aspects of how the world seems to 
us, or of how the world has come to seem to us (eg. gloomy, alienating, bright, open, 
welcoming, etc.) rather than pointing to anything explicitly about ourselves and our 
mental states (eg. our feeling down, unhappy, overwhelmed, elated, etc.).2 Often in 
fact, without even noticing, we find ourselves describing how we feel in mixed terms, 
that is, mixing descriptions of the world as it seems to us with more reflective claims 
explicitly about ourselves as feeling this or that way. But now, one might ask, how
1 See p. 167 above
2 See (Frijda 1989); (Lambie & Marcel 2000)
182
can describing the way the world seems to us possibly be an appropriate way of 
answering a question about how we feell
Whether an emotion is reported more in one way or the other tends to vary 
with a number of factors such as the context of the report, one’s attentional habits (ie. 
whether one tends to attend more to oneself and to one’s mental states or to the 
world), what type of emotion one is describing -  eg. anger apparently tends to be 
reported in more world-oriented terms, whereas depression is more commonly 
reported with greater reflective mention of oneself as feeling this or that way. Having 
said that, it still remains that both types of reports are often produced in answer to the 
same question, ie. in answer to a question essentially about one’s emotions. It must 
therefore be that somehow describing how the world seems to us can be informative 
about how we feel. To put things differently, if we do instinctively find that 
describing the way the world is for us phenomenologically can constitute a direct and 
appropriate way of answering a question about our emotions, it must be that these 
descriptions actually are (as are more explicit second-order statements) somehow 
directly expressive of the emotions we are trying to get across. It is only the way in 
which we are getting the message across perhaps that is different -  in the one case by 
stating what emotions we have, and in the other by getting our audience to take on our 
point of view and thereby ‘see’ how we feel, where ‘seeing’ how we feel involves 
reading off our emotions from certain expressive ways the world appears to us from 
our point of view. In fact, if we assume (as it is plausible to do so) that the 
descriptions of the world we produce in response to questions about how we feel do 
have some basis in phenomenology (ie. if we assume that they do not just designate 
specific emotions as a matter of linguistic convention), it must be that, not just the 
descriptions of the world, but the very ways the world appears to us that we are trying 
to get our audience to visualise, are (like certain pieces of music, or colours, or forms 
of behaviour) themselves directly expressive of the emotions in question, from within 
our own outward-looking point of view, a point of view which we can invite others to 
take on.
That the world is phenomenologically transformed in such ways in emotion 
experience is by no means unheard of in the literature and is perhaps most vividly 
described by Sartre.1 He describes for instance a case of suddenly seeing a face
1 See (Sartre 1962)
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behind a window, which, in one’s being terrified by it, appears to one not as a face 
behind a window, and so as a face at a safe distance, having to get through a locked 
door to get to one, etc. but as an immediately and primitively terrifying face, framed 
by the window (not kept away by it), immediately acting upon one at a distance 
(without requiring any means to do so), and so on. The world in Sartre’s example in 
other words ceases to be experienced as a utilizable and deterministic world, and 
comes to be seized instead as a ‘horrible’ ‘non-utilizable whole'. In Sartre’s phrase 
‘the world of the utilizable vanishes abruptly and the world of magic appears in its 
place’1 -  a description of the world-directed phenomenology of fear that does indeed 
seem quite reminiscent of the experience of sudden horror. There may of course be 
aspects of the world-directed phenomenology of emotion experience that Sartre 
describes in this and other examples that we may identify with more than with others. 
Nonetheless, whatever is to be made of the specifics of Sartre’s position (which will 
be discussed in further detail below), the simple idea that our perspective on the 
world, or the world from our perspective, is somehow phenomenologically 
‘transformed’ or ‘coloured’ (or in pathological cases we might say ‘distorted’) in 
emotion experience does seem plausible, and is indeed not a view held solely by 
Sartre.2
Wollheim for instance also states such a view quite explicitly. In the context of 
distinguishing between beliefs, desires and emotions, he writes: ‘If belief maps the 
world, and desire targets it, emotion tints or colours it’. He too in other words seems 
to endorse (though he does not spend as much time articulating it -  his interests lying 
elsewhere) some form of the view that our emotions affect not just our behaviour, our 
sensory states, and our attentional focus, but also, and perhaps primarily, the world as 
it appears to us.
Most recently, in the psychological literature Lambie & Marcel also put 
forward the view that there is a distinctive wor/af-directed phenomenology of emotion
1 (Sartre 1962, p.90)
2 Strictly speaking, according to Sartre emotions do not colour or transform the world o f our experiences -  they 
are transformations o f the world. Emotions, for Sartre, are essentially ‘ways o f apprehending the world’, and in 
particular, they are apprehensions o f the world under the mode o f the ‘magical’ (ie. the non-deterministic, the non­
utilizable, the absolute, etc). For present purposes though (since we have denied that emotions are themselves 
conscious episodes o f any kind), Sartre’s view can be taken simply as a proposal about the phenomenology o f  
emotion experiences, without our having to assume that this is all there is to emotion.
3 (Wollheim 1999, ch.l p l5)
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experience in addition to the seZ/^focused phenomenology of emotion experience 
more commonly noted in the rest of the psychological literature. Lambie & Marcel go 
even further than just advocating this view and describing some of the distinctive 
phenomenological transformations undergone by the world. They make the further 
claim that these world-directed emotion experiences and our self-directed emotion 
experiences are often (as suggested to an extent by the indifference with which we 
report our emotions in world-focused and self-focused terms) just two sides of the 
same coin. At the first-order non-reflective level, in having an emotion, our attention 
tends to be primarily turned towards an emotionally transformed world, which we can 
describe as such. But, by a simple shift in our attention we can, instead of attending to 
this emotionally transformed world, attend to ourselves as feeling the corresponding 
emotion towards it. For example, we can shift from focusing on the impellingness of 
an object to ourselves as feeling an urge to get it -  the two types of experiences being 
essentially attentional counterparts of each other.1 In such suggestions we may already 
see emerge a possible solution to our puzzle about emotional self-knowledge, that is, 
a possible account of how awareness of ourselves as feeling a certain way towards the 
world might already be implicitly or ‘pre-reflectively’ present also in our awareness 
of the world. For this insight to generalise though, what holds for the case of desire 
for an object will have to be shown to hold also for more complex emotions and to 
occur in correspondingly more complex transformations of the world. In any case, we 
can say that there clearly are elements already in the literature on emotion that point 
towards a solution to our puzzle -  even though they are not put forward for that 
specific purpose.
Despite these sometimes insightful descriptions however of the 
phenomenology of emotion experience to be found in the literature (which we will 
return to in detail later), neither Sartre nor Wollheim nor indeed Lambie and Marcel 
(ie. the prime advocators so far considered of the view that the world is 
phenomenologically coloured in emotion experience) actually seem to provide any 
direct account of what it is, in general terms, for the world to be ‘emotionally
1 Regarding fe lt urges to do something, it has been argued by some, Frijda in particular (See Frijda 1989), that felt 
action urges (at the conscious level) or action readiness (more generally) is a crucial component o f emotion and o f  
emotion experience. Frijda sometimes goes so far as to take emotions to just be states o f  action readiness. The 
insight contributed by Lambie & Marcel however is that o f  pointing out that this action readiness does not just 
manifest itself in consciousness as a fe lt urge to act, but also crucially in the worW-directed phenomenology o f  
emotion experience, ie. as an experienced impellingness or luring power o f  the object. A similar idea is present 
also in Sartre, when he speaks o f  the world being immediately experienced as requiring things o f  us or as making 
demands upon us. (Sartre 1962)
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coloured’, that is, in particular, what it is for the world to be coloured in distinctively 
emotional tones as opposed to just being transformed in some way or another. They 
all seem to assume (or their silence on the matter seems to suggest) that a colouring of 
the world is distinctively emotional simply in virtue of the fact of being caused by an 
emotion, or in virtue of the fact of being of a kind usually associated, as a matter of 
empirical fact, with the having of a certain type of emotion. Sartre for instance would 
most likely say that for a transformation of the world to be distinctively emotional, it 
must just be a transformation of the kind he describes as actually occurring in 
emotion, ie. a transformation into the ‘magical’, where the world comes to be 
perceived as a ‘non-utilizable whole’, as acting upon one directly at a distance, as 
potentially making demands upon one, etc. This kind of answer however still leaves 
us without a general understanding of why these kinds of transformations should 
count as emotional transformations while other transformations also associated with 
or caused (perhaps even systematically) by the same emotions might not do so, such 
as some emotionally-neutral perceptual hallucinations for instance.
Sartre, as indeed Wollheim and Lambie & Marcel do not explicitly address 
this question, perhaps primarily in that their interests lie elsewhere. Sartre is interested 
essentially in reaching an account of why the world comes to be transformed in the 
way that it does in emotion, suggesting ultimately that it is us who (somehow 
intentionally, even if not fully consciously) transform the world into the magical as a 
strategy for dealing with a world experienced as difficult. In being afraid for instance 
of a ferocious animal coming towards us, he argues that we suddenly transform the 
world into a ‘magical’ world, so as to thereby justify a would-be ‘magical’ solution to 
our problem -  eg. fainting or closing our eyes as a way of annihilating the oncoming 
animal and thereby getting ourselves out of this otherwise inescapable situation. 
Wollheim in turn, in a slightly different way, is also interested essentially in the origin 
of the emotional colourings taken on by the world in emotion, rather than in providing 
an in principle analysis of what it is for the world to be emotionally coloured in the 
first place. His aim though is primarily to identify a non-intentional psychological 
origin of these emotional colourings in desire -  specifically in the satisfaction or 
frustration of a preceding desire. Lambie & Marcel in turn spend much time first of all 
describing the various ways in which our emotions actually transform the world (in 
light of, amongst other things, the wide range of available data about how we describe 
the way the world appears to us in emotion experience) but they leave, like Sartre and
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Wollheim, essentially unanswered the question of what makes the transformations of 
the kind that actually occur in emotion experience distinctively emotional 
transformations, rather than wow-emotional, say, purely visual transformations caused 
by these same emotions. Let us therefore take on this question ourselves.
What is it, in general terms, for an emotion to give a specifically emotional 
tone to the world from our perspective? What is it in fact for the world to be 
emotionally coloured whether as a result of emotion or as a result of anything else (eg. 
a psychoactive substance, a cognitive evaluation, or a direct trigger from the 
environment)? And, in particular, given the latter question, can it actually be said that 
there is nothing more to the world’s being coloured in a specifically emotional tone, 
than for the tone or colour taken on by the world to be directly caused by an emotion 
one now has -  thus implying that if qualitatively the same phenomenological 
transformation were not caused by a prior emotion, it would not be an emotional 
transformation of the world?
Intuitively, merely causing a transformation or being in some other way 
associated with an emotion at the physical level (as seen for the case of behaviour) 
does not seem to be enough, nor indeed necessary, to make the transformation or 
colouring a distinctively emotional one. First, certain episodes of ‘emotional’ 
transformations of the world (such as those described by Sartre for instance) may 
actually occur prior to one’s having any established emotional disposition that might 
have been causally responsible for it. One’s fear in Sartre’s example might have 
kicked in with the transformation of the world into the magical, at the sight of the face 
behind the window, rather than having preceded it.
Next, and conversely, some emotions might, amongst other things, actually 
cause (or be in some other direct physical way associated with) phenomenological 
transformations of the world that we would not think of as specifically ‘emotional’. 
To see this, consider a case of a person Mary for whom, let us suppose, things start to 
appear blurry whenever she feels anxious. Anxiety in Mary in other words tends to 
result in the appearance of the world undergoing a very specific phenomenological 
transformation from her perspective. And yet, despite this systematic correlation 
between the hazy appearance of the world from her perspective and anxiety in her, it 
is far from clear that such a transformation (even though by hypothesis caused by her 
anxiety) is one that we would intuitively want to call an emotional transformation of
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the world or an expression (as opposed to a mere ‘manifestation’ or mere ‘effect’) of 
her anxiety in consciousness. So, what might be missing?
What seems to be missing is the same as what was missing from non- 
emotional manifestations of emotions in behaviour (eg. twitching in some unusual 
way as a result of being angry). That is, what seems to be missing is some form of 
direct conceptual link or direct meaning relation between the way one’s emotion is 
manifesting itself (ie. in this case in making the world appear out of focus), and the 
type of emotion thereby manifesting itself in the transformation of the world (ie. in 
this case anxiety). There does not, that is, seem to be any direct meaning relation 
between the world’s appearing out of focus and one’s being anxious, just as there did 
not seem to be any such direct meaning relation between twitching in some unusual 
way and being angry. On the other hand, there does seem to be some form of direct 
meaning relation between a face’s appearing in the kind of way described by Sartre in 
his example and the feeling of sudden horror, much in the way that there was seen to 
be between smiling and being happy or between having an ‘angry’ type of look in 
one’s eyes and being angry. Put differently, experiencing the world in the sort of way 
described by Sartre (to stick to the same examples) in feeling sudden horror does 
seem to be somehow directly expressive or evocative or suggestive of the feeling of 
sudden horror, whereas experiencing the world as blurry does not in a any obvious 
way seem to be directly expressive or directly evocative of anxiety.
With the conceptual framework and distinctions (eg. between expressions and 
expressiveness, between expressions and mere manifestations, etc.) set up in the first 
part of this chapter, we may now have a way of articulating in less metaphorical terms 
(than by speaking of ‘emotional colourings’) what exactly it is for the world to take 
on a distinctively ‘emotional tone’ from our perspective. For the world to take on a 
distinctively emotional colour is, we might now say, essentially for it to be 
phenomenologically transformed in a way that is directly expressive or directly 
suggestive or directly evocative of a specific type of emotion. This may occur as a 
result either of an underlying emotion we already had from before (ie. in which case 
the transformation would constitute a case of direct expression (ie. of expressive 
manifestation) of our emotion in consciousness), or, as a result of something else, 
such as an external trigger (the sudden appearance of someone at the window), a 
cognitive evaluation (our having come to the conclusion that all is doomed), or 
perhaps simply as a result of our having ingested some psychoactive substance (eg. a
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depressant, too much alcohol, etc.). Fear, joy, depression, etc. may in other words 
arise either with a sudden emotional transformation of the world from one’s point of 
view, or, the emotional transformation of the world might be a manifestation of an 
underlying emotion one already had, which might have now come to be expressed in 
this way the world appears to one. Either way, in ‘emotionally coloured’ experience, 
the world appears in a way that is directly expressive of how we feel, thus beginning 
to shed some light on how we might be able to read off specific types of emotions 
directly from the way the world seems to us. Having said that, a crucial problem still 
remains.
The world’s appearing to us in a way that is directly expressive of a specific 
type of emotion is not in itself enough to tell us, from our strictly outward looking 
point of view, and without our having to bring in any further assumptions about what 
is usually associated with the world’s being phenomenologically transformed in this 
way, that we ourselves (or indeed anyone else) actually have the type of emotion of 
which the appearance of the world is directly expressive. To see this problem more 
clearly, consider the following imaginary scenario.
Suppose for the sake of argument that sadness in me tends to result quite 
literally in my coming to experience the world as tinted in a shade of blue (ie. as if 
seen through a blue filter). Suppose also that we agree that the colour blue is a colour 
directly expressive of sadness, in the way that red is of anger, or in the way that 
certain musical modalities are suggestive of joy and optimism. What follows then is 
that when I am sad I tend in effect to start seeing the world in a shade that is directly 
expressive of sadness, in fact in a shade that I directly recognize as expressive of 
sadness from within my own outward looking point of view. Yet clearly, the world’s 
appearing blue to me does not in itself seem to say anything directly about whether I 
myself am actually sad. All that is implied by the blue appearance of the world from 
my perspective is that the world looks sad to me or has taken on a form that is directly 
expressive or evocative of sadness from within my point of view. This neither 
explains how, nor shows that, the appearance of the world from my perspective 
contains implicit in it reference to myself as being sad. In fact, even if it were true that, 
as a matter of empirical fact, I could not be seeing the world as tinted in blue unless I 
was actually sad, this would still not make the world’s appearing blue to me constitute 
a possible direct ground for self-ascribing the emotion. At the very least, in order to 
make this self-ascription, I would have to make the additional assumption that the
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world appears blue (or in any other manner directly expressive of sadness) to one only 
when one is oneself sad, ie. the assumption that certain types of expressive 
phenomenological transformations of the world are always linked to the having of the 
thereby designated emotion. I would not though be able to come to the conclusion that 
I am sad non-inferentially, ie. on the sole basis of how the world appears to me. 
Although there may be a direct conceptual relation between the blue appearance of 
the world and sadness in general, there does not seem to be any direct conceptual link 
between the blue appearance of the world from my perspective and my being sad.1
Thus, to solve our puzzle about emotional self-knowledge, that is, the puzzle 
of how we are able to self-ascribe emotions directly on the basis of looking out at the 
world, this world will have to be shown to be transformed in emotion experience in a 
way implicit in which is already reference not just to a general type of emotion but 
specifically to ourselves as having an emotion of that type. Earlier on (in the first part 
of this chapter), it was pointed out that such things as pieces of music or colours or 
even forms of behaviour could be expressive of certain types of emotions in virtue of 
properties entirely independent of the mental states of any particular person, that is, in 
virtue of entirely ‘objective’ properties of these phenomena themselves -  the type of 
music, the colour shade, the forms of behaviour, etc. If authoritative knowledge of our 
own emotions based directly on how the world seems to us is therefore to be possible, 
the phenomenological transformations of the world effected by (or in some other way 
associated with) our emotions must not just be emotionally expressive in the ways 
that pieces of music, lighting effects, or colours are. They must, that is, not just be 
directly expressive of specific types of emotions, but also directly (ie. not by way of 
any inference or identification assumption) expressive of ourselves as having these 
emotions.
Put differently, and as mentioned at the very beginning in the introduction to 
this chapter, the world will have to be shown to be not just emotionally tinged by our 
emotions, but emotionally tinged in implicitly self-world relational colours. The aim 
of the next chapter and final aim of this thesis will be to show this.
1 A very similar problem arose, recall, for cognitivist theories o f emotion. Apart from the general reasons there 
were for rejecting cognitivism as an account o f what emotions are, a more specific problem arose also for 
cognitivism as providing a solution to our concerns about self-knowledge -  ie. when taken merely as an account o f  
how emotions find expression in consciousness. Much like in the present example o f  the world coming to be tinted 
in blue, it was noted that coming to experience the world, or particular aspects o f  it or particular objects in it, as 
having general emotion-specific properties such as o f  being ‘frightening’, ‘desirable’, ‘lovable’, ‘praiseworthy’, 
etc. was not enough to tell us, simply on the basis o f looking out at the world, that we ourselves had the 
corresponding type o f emotion, eg. fear, desire, love, etc.
190
Chapter 8: Emotions, desires and hodological space
The final task before us in this thesis is this: to arrive at a concrete account of 
how we are able to self-ascribe our own emotions directly on the basis of looking out 
at the world. Doing this however, we have seen, will require showing essentially two 
things -  first, that and how having an emotion can be seen to transform or ‘colour’ the 
world as experienced from our perspective in a way that is emotionally expressive, 
and second, how it can be seen to do so in a way that is specifically expressive of 
ourselves as having an emotional attitude towards the world. Having done the first of 
these two things to some extent in the last chapter, our main challenge in this chapter 
will be to do the second.
To anticipate, this will be done in what follows essentially by appealing to the 
idea of our experiencing the world, in having emotions, in terms of ‘hodological 
space’ (ie. as making specific demands upon us, as to-be-acted-upon in specific ways) 
and/or as directly acting upon us in various ways -  these being, we will see, (a) 
distinctively emotional and motivational ways of experiencing the world, and (b) 
ways that contain moreover implicit in them reference specifically to ourselves as 
having specific emotional or motivational attitudes towards it. Some insight into this, 
and support for the view that there are indeed such self-world relational elements in 
emotion experience, can I believe be found to start with in some of the recent 
psychological literature, and in particular in so called ‘appraisal theories’ of emotion. 
This chapter will therefore begin by first considering some of this literature. It will 
then move on to connect key claims made by appraisal theorists with discussions 
along similar lines in the philosophical, neuroscientific and other parts of the
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psychological literature, aiming to ultimately show how these discussions can be 
appealed to to provide a concrete solution to our puzzle about the self-ascription of 
emotions.
8.1 The appraisal theory of emotions
In it’s original form, the core suggestion of the appraisal theory of emotions 
pioneered by Lazarus and Arnold,1 is that emotions (generally construed as episodic 
states or processes of some form -  though not necessarily conscious ones) always 
arise somehow through the mediation of appraisals of external events (ie. as opposed 
to directly from the events themselves, or directly from physiological or neural 
causes), and in particular, through the mediation of appraisals of these events in 
relation to one’s own concerns, priorities, desires, and felt coping potential. In other 
words, in the first instance, the appraisal theory of emotions is a theory of the 
elicitation and differentiation of emotional responses. It suggests that emotions are 
elicited by appraisals of events, and, that these eliciting appraisals (rather than the 
events appraised) are what determine what specific emotion as opposed to any other 
will ensue. Next, the appraisal theory makes also a very particular claim about the 
kinds of appraisals that are involved in this elicitation of our emotions, suggesting that 
they are essentially relational appraisals, ie. appraisals of events and circumstances in 
relation to our own interests, goals, and so on.
Now, the main advantage of, and motivation for, the adoption of this view 
over all other theories of the causes of emotions, was at its origin that by introducing 
the above kind of intermediate causal layer between external events and emotions, the 
view would be able to render intelligible, on the one hand, how the same events or 
external stimuli can sometimes elicit on different occasions (and across people and 
cultures) very different emotional responses (ie. in that different people may appraise 
the same events differently; they may have different concerns in relation to these 
events, etc.), and, on the other hand, how different events can elicit across people and 
populations sometimes the same emotional responses (different events may be of 
similar concern and importance to different people; they may therefore, although
1 See for instance (Arnold 1960), (Lazarus 1982) and (Lazarus 2001 in Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone eds. 2001)
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different, be evaluated similarly by them, e tc). How might this relate however to our 
concerns about self-knowledge?
At first sight, such a theory may seem to place the relational element in the 
entirely wrong place. That is, inasmuch as the appraisal theory is a theory essentially 
of the causes of our emotions and not therefore a theory of anything that is involved 
in actually having an emotion or in experiencing the world in having an emotion 
(which is what we are looking for), it is not immediately obvious how it might be of 
any direct relevance to our purposes, that is, how it might be able to provide us with 
an answer to the question of how looking out at the world in having an emotion can 
constitute direct evidence for how we now feel.
Not all versions of the appraisal approach to emotions however are theories 
strictly of the causes of emotions. In response in fact to a wide range of difficulties 
that have been raised (often by appraisal theorists themselves) against the appraisal 
theory in its original form, a number of different versions of the view (ones for that 
matter better supported by the available psychological data) have emerged, many of 
which in the end can, we will see, provide us with some valuable insights into how we 
are able to have first person authoritative access to our own emotions.1 A number of 
the more recent versions of the appraisal theory actually maintain that appraisals are 
not just the causes of emotions but often also constituents of emotions and of emotion 
experiences. These versions of the theory may therefore have something to tell us 
about how the way the world is for us in having an emotion can contain implicit in it 
reference to ourselves as having it. In order to see how they might do so though, it is 
worth looking first at some of the problems with the theory in it’s original form that 
these more promising versions have evolved to address.
A first difficulty faced by the appraisal theory in its original form (ie. in the 
form ‘no antecedent appraisal -  no emotion’) is that, in a number of cases, emotions 
do not actually seem to be caused by antecedent appraisals. Many emotions seem to 
arise directly from external stimuli such as sudden positive or adverse circumstances. 
Anger or irritation for instance may on occasion arise directly from, say, someone’s 
stepping on one’s foot or from one’s hitting one’s head against the kitchen cabinet.2 
Fear may similarly arise directly from being suddenly attacked from behind; joy as a
1 For a selection o f  different versions o f  the appraisal approach to emotions see (Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone eds. 
2001)
2 This example is taken from (Frijda & Zeelenberg 2001)
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direct result of having taken some psychoactive drug; depression as a direct result of a 
naturally occurring chemical imbalance in one’s brain, and so on. Of course, one 
could try to argue that even in these cases an intermediate appraisal is involved; only 
it is extremely quick and not conscious, and so for that reason appears not to exist. To 
insist though in this way on the existence of a mental process that is neither conscious 
nor in any other way manifest whether in one’s behaviour or otherwise would it seems 
just be to assume without argument that the appraisal theory in it’s strongest version is 
correct. To point this out is of course not to say that the emotions in the above 
examples may not sometimes arise with appraisals or with sudden changes in one’s 
evaluations of the circumstances one is in. To insist however that the appraisals in 
question occur in these cases strictly prior to, and as the mediating causes of one’s 
emotions seems somewhat unjustified.
Even taking for granted that at least in some cases particular appraisals (or 
particular patterns of appraisals) do occur prior to one’s emotional responses and are 
causally responsible for the latter, a second problem arises. In such cases where 
eliciting appraisals are present, it is not clear that these appraisals always figure solely 
as the causes of one’s emotions (ie. as the mere triggers of one’s emotions, thus 
essentially ceasing at the point at which the emotion begins -  or, put differently, 
ceasing at the point at which one begins to be disposed in the ways constitutive of 
having the relevant type of emotion). Most of the available psychological data 
suggests (as indeed does mere introspective reflection) that although certain appraisals 
may indeed occur prior to one’s feeling a certain way and be causally responsible for 
how one feels, they may also, and often do, persist throughout the emotional 
response, constituting even an essential aspect of what it is to be feeling an emotion of 
that type -  ie. being depressed for instance may be said to involve by its very essence 
appraising the world as ‘uninviting’, as ‘devoid of interest’, etc. Moreover, such 
emotion-constituent appraisals may it seems on occasion actually differ from the 
appraisals that initially triggered the emotion -  eg. the appraisal that gave rise to one’s 
depression may not be the same appraisal as that (or those) involved in one’s now 
being depressed. Finally, other appraisals may be purely consequents of one’s 
emotions, arising only subsequently out of one’s current emotions, and perhaps 
constituting essentially part of another emotion -  eg. one’s feeling depressed may 
have led one to feel angry and to thereby appraise things in ways constitutive of being 
angry.
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Thus, to sum up, not only may some emotions it seems be caused by things 
other than appraisals (eg. directly by external events or neural causes), but, even when 
appraisals are involved, they need not it seems always figure strictly as the causes of 
one’s emotions. As pointed out by Frijda & Zeelenberg in fact, the actual empirical 
psychological data usually appealed to (ie. generally verbal reports) in support of the 
emotion-antecedent appraisal view does not actually allow for very clear 
disentangling between instances of antecedent, constituent, or consequent appraisals.1 
Appraisals may it seems be any, or all, of these three. That is, as put by Roseman & 
Smith, ‘appraisals may be causes of emotions, components of emotions, as well as 
consequents of emotions’,2 a view now generally acknowledged by most appraisal 
theorists. Certain versions of the appraisal theory (ie. most of the more recent 
versions) may thus in the end actually contain some important insights for us into how 
the way the world seems to us in having an emotion might, as needed, provide us with 
a direct ground for self-ascribing this emotion -  at least in that these versions of the 
appraisal theory are proposals not just about what causes our emotions, but also about 
what is involved in some cases in our actually having these emotions. Even so though, 
a third problem remains both with respect to our concerns about self-knowledge and 
for the appraisal approach more generally.
On the face of it, whether appraisals are claimed to be antecedents or 
constituents of emotions, the picture seemingly painted by appraisal theories 
(sometimes referred to as ‘cognitive appraisal theories’) can seem somewhat 
unrealistically cognitivistic. It seems to assume, that is, a far greater degree of 
complexity and sophistication to be involved in having emotions or in their elicitation, 
than actually does seem to be involved in most cases. For one thing, the terminology 
of ‘appraisals’ or of ‘cognitive appraisal processes’ immediately suggests that what is 
being claimed is that certain complex evaluative judgements or complex processes of 
propositional reasoning are involved in the elicitation of emotions or in the having of 
emotions. Yet, clearly, no such processes and no such fully articulated propositional 
evaluations are always involved, be it prior to having emotions or in the course of 
having these emotions. To insist otherwise would just seem to be to go against all 
available evidence and common sense, not to mention that, specifically in relation to
1 See (Frijda & Zeelenberg 2001); see also (Frijda 1993) for a discussion o f  how some appraisals may even be post 
hoc rationalisations o f  how one felt or o f what made one feel a certain way.
2 (Roseman & Smith 2001, p. 15)
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our concerns about self-knowledge, it would be to make very little progress on the 
already rejected cognitivist theory of the manifestation of emotions in consciousness 
discussed in chapter 6.
. Sensibly however, very few appraisal theorists (Reisenzein being perhaps the 
only one)1 actually have such a strictly cognitivistic understanding of appraisals in 
mind. Despite the misleading terminology of ‘appraisals’, most appraisal theorists use 
the notion of ‘appraisal’ in a far looser sense, meaning by it not an ‘evaluative 
judgement’ but only some form or other of ‘stimulus coding’.2 This coding may take 
any number of forms -  propositional, analogue, conscious or unconscious. The crucial 
idea behind appraisal theories is not one regarding the level of cognitive 
sophistication that must be involved in the coding of the events perceived, but the idea 
that emotions involve (or are caused by) not just the perception of events or the 
reception of external stimuli, but that they essentially involve (or are caused by) a 
coding of these events, objects, or external stimuli in terms of, or in relation to, one’s 
own concerns, desires, aims, felt coping potential, etc. This, moreover, is an idea held 
not solely in the psychological literature, but one shared by philosophers such as 
Sartre (and, as we will see, by neuroscientists and other psychologists), that life is not 
a matter of mere perception of mind-independent objects and events; we also have 
things to get done, aims, concerns, and feeling about various external objects and 
events around us, and we tend to see things directly in relation to these aims, desires, 
concerns, etc. -  ie. as means or as obstacles to them, as open or closed paths, as 
possibilities or impossibilities, and so on.
As far as most appraisal theorists are concerned, the so called process of 
appraisal may be an entirely immediate and unconscious one,3 or, where it is a 
conscious process, it need not be a fully articulated, propositional, one. Many 
appraisal theorists in fact go so far as to argue that when the process is conscious, the 
kinds of appraisals that are distinctive of having emotions and of their elicitation are 
essentially immediate, non-propositional, perceptual appraisals. Frijda for example 
stresses in a number of places,4 that in actual fact, the kinds of appraisals that produce
1 See (Reisenzein 2001)
2 This term is taken from (Le Doux 1989)
3 See (Frijda 2001); also (Roseman & Smith 2001)
4 See for instance (Frijda 1988) and (Frijda & Zeelenberg 2001)
196
and sustain emotions or that are involved in actually having emotions or emotion 
experiences are specifically not ‘appraisal judgements' but ‘appraisal experiences'. He 
argues on the basis of experimental data that propositional information tends in fact to 
be emotionally inert in a way that analogue experiential content is not.1 Evidence for 
this, he suggests, can be found for instance in experiments involving people suffering 
from phobic fears (ie. irrational or seemingly inappropriate or disproportionate fears). 
The data on the treatment of phobias, he points out, suggests that when it comes to 
curing sufferers of such fears, methods of live modelling (ie. methods involving 
various forms of direct perceptual confrontation with the objects of one’s fear, or 
parallel confrontations in visual imagination, memory experience, etc. -  trying to get 
people to see things differently) are far more effective than are more cognitive 
treatment methods (ie. those involving such things as trying to talk people out of their 
fears, say, by making them come to acknowledge that there is nothing of direct threat 
to them in small spaces, large crowds, spiders, feathers, etc). Most sufferers from 
phobias would already acknowledge without the need for talking into, that there is 
nothing dangerous or truly threatening about the objects of their phobic fears; it is 
rather that they cannot help seeing these things, somehow primitively (and in some 
absolute sense)2 as just to-be-avoided, as threatening one (even if at a distance, 
without any obvious means), etc. As Frijda puts it, when it comes to emotion (though 
he admits to not being entirely clear about why this is so) ‘knowing means less than 
seeing’, ‘words mean less than tone of voice’, and, ‘feeling means more than 
knowing’.3
This appears to be so even in less pathological cases. When someone 
accidentally steps on another’s foot for example, this can immediately trigger a 
feeling of anger or hostility, manifesting itself (in part at least) in the perpetrator’s 
striking one primitively as to-be-blamed or as to-be-hit, although one does not 
actually believe them to be blameworthy or deserving of any act of revenge. 
Similarly, in irritation, say, at someone blocking one’s view at the cinema, one may 
come to experience this person primitively as affronting one although one does not
1 See (Frijda 1988); also (Bridger & Mandel 1964); (Bandura 1977) and (Lang 1977) for the experiments 
themselves.
2 By ‘absolute’ I mean not relative to some context, ie. not ‘at time t’ or ‘in the present circumstances’ or ‘given 
that snakes are poisonous’ etc.
3 (Frijda 1988 p.275 in Jenkin, Oatley & Stein eds. 1998). See also (Frijda and Zeelenberg 2001)
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believe them to be in any way even aware of one’s presence behind them. In other 
words, the kinds of appraisals that seem to be most crucial to the having of emotion 
experiences and the making of which may even seem to entail that one does have the 
emotions in question, are essentially ‘appraisal experiences' (ie. experiences of things 
directly as this or that, or as directly acting upon one, or as immediately calling for 
certain courses of action on one’s part, etc.) rather than, and often independently 
from, ‘appraisal judgements' (ie. judgements that things truly are one way or another, 
or that one ought to act in this way or that way, or that someone/something really is 
acting upon one in this or that way).
Along a similar vein, Magda Arnold also makes this point1 (though she is 
motivated more specifically by the lack of control we seem to have over our 
appraisals in emotion) that appraisals in emotion (or in the elicitation of emotions) are 
essentially forms of perceptual experiences. Appraisals are, she stresses, emotionally 
‘intuitive’ assessments of the here and now and not deliberative rational processes or 
reasoned judgements. Also along these lines, Lambie & Marcel make the point of 
clearly distinguishing between ‘evaluative judgements’ on the one hand and 
‘appraisal-awareness' of the world on the other, the latter of which they take to 
constitute a distinctive aspect of the way in which specifically emotional states 
manifest themselves in consciousness. And indeed, intuitively, the link between 
appraisal awareness and emotions seems to be far tighter than that between appraisal 
judgements and emotions.
To put the same point by way of an example taken earlier from Sartre, 
although one could it seems judge that a face behind a window is threatening and that 
one ought to avoid it without being afraid, it is far less clear that one could directly 
experience the face primitively as terrifying, or directly as threatening one, or 
primitively as to be avoided, without actually feeling fear. The same point comes up 
also in an example by Goldie of how the world might appear to one upon looking 
down, in fear, from the edge of a steep cliff. He writes: ‘The edge looms large in your 
gaze, and somehow seems to be pulling you towards it... ’ despite your not believing 
it to actually be pulling you anywhere nor being any larger that it is.3 It is
1 See (Arnold 1960)
2 See (Lambie & Marcel 2000)
3 (Goldie 2000 p. 76)
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experiencing the world in this way that is crucial to the feeling of fear, he suggests, 
quite independently from what one believes.
Goldie’s example, incidentally, is interesting in more ways than one. It 
illustrates first of all, as intended, this point about how the way one experiences the 
world can come apart from how one actually believes it to be, and how it is only the 
former which is truly essential to the feeling of an emotion (ie. one may believe that 
the ground below the cliff is pulling one towards it and that the edge is dangerous 
without feeling fear; but it does not seem that one could truly experience the edge as 
luring one towards it, or the ground as calling one to jump, or the open space 
primitively as to-be-leapt-into without actually feeling fear). This same example 
however also illustrates another point, made earlier on in this chapter, about how we 
often tend to describe our emotions in mixed world/self focused terms. The example 
reads more fully: ‘The edge looms large in your gaze, and somehow seems to be 
pulling you towards it...you imagine yourself [...] suicidally throwing yourself over 
the cliff; you feel faint [...] you tremble, feel a damp sweat’, etc. Goldie’s manner of 
capturing the experience of fear is it seems a classic case of mixing somewhat 
indiscriminately descriptions of the way the world appears to one and descriptions of 
how one oneself feels in order to relate one’s emotion, thereby suggesting again that 
certain ways the world appears to one can be as expressive (ie. as suggestive, 
evocative, etc.) of particular emotions as can be more explicit self-focused 
descriptions. Certain ways in which the world strikes us in emotion, that is, seem to be 
themselves already somehow distinctively emotional, or emotionally expressive.
To round up our discussion of appraisal theories, we have seen that many 
appraisal theorists, like many philosophers and other psychologists, when speaking of 
‘appraisals’ or of ‘appraisal processes’ in emotion, actually have in mind appraisal 
experiences rather than appraisal judgements, and that they have these appraisal 
experiences in mind moreover not just as being the causes of emotions but often as 
being ways in which we experience the world from within our point of view in having 
emotions. Adding to this then the claim (shared by all appraisal theorists) that the 
appraisal experiences involved in (and distinctive to) emotion are essentially 
self/world relational appraisal experiences (ie. appraisals of the world in relation to 
our own concerns, interests, desires, etc. and in particular appraisals of the world as 
calling for certain actions from us and as acting upon us in various ways) emotional 
attitudes more generally), the appraisal approach to emotions can truly be seen to
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point towards a picture of what is involved in having emotions very much along the 
lines of what we need to solve our puzzle about emotional self-knowledge. Recall, 
what we need is an account of the way in which (a) we experience the world in having 
an emotion, that is (b) implicitly self/world relational, and more specifically (c) 
implicit in which is a distinctively emotional self/world relation or emotion!world 
relation, not just a cognitive or perceptual one.
What remains now to be done is for us to get clearer about this idea of there 
being a way in which we experience the world that is directly relational upon our 
concerns, desires, felt coping potential, and emotional attitudes more generally. What 
might experiencing the world in this way actually amount to? Before that though, it is 
worth considering some further support (beyond that provided by appraisal theories) 
for this view that we do in fact experience the world in such an implicitly 
emotion/world relational way.
8.2 Solving the puzzle
That we experience the world in having emotions in a way that is distinctively 
relational upon our current concerns, aims and coping potential is held not just by 
appraisal theorists but comes up also in a number of other places, in the philosophical 
literature (in Sartre in particular), in various other parts of the psychological literature 
(in Lambie & Marcel for instance) but also strikingly in the neuroscientific literature, 
in particular in the literature regarding the role of our emotions in reasoning and in 
decision making.
Earlier on in this thesis,1 it was mentioned that neuroscientists such as 
Damasio as well as other authors inspired by similar neuroscientific findings (eg. De 
Sousa) argue that what is important to us, what we are concerned about, what aims we 
have, and more generally how we feel about various things (whether we are afraid of 
x, in love with y, angry about z, etc.), determines to a great extent what our attention 
is turned to, or, as they put it (in more world-oriented terms), it determines the 
salience of certain things rather than others in our perceptual experiences, in our 
memory experiences, in our visual imagination, and so on. To the extent that this is 
so, it immediately points to already one clear way in which the phenomenology of
1 See footnote on p. 178 above
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different people’s experiences might differ in accordance with what they are 
concerned about, what they desire, and more generally with how they feel about 
various things. Different aspects of the same environment may, for instance, figure in 
the foreground of my attention and only in the background of your attention. Certain 
things that I am afraid of will be more salient from my perspective than from yours 
who are not afraid of these things and vice versa.
Of course, the mere fact that the phenomenological salience of certain things 
rather than others is determined by our emotions, desires, and concerns is not yet 
enough to show that the fact of our having these emotions actually spills into the 
conscious content of our experiences. But, as noted earlier in discussing the 
neuroscientific literature, this is not the only kind of phenomenological transformation 
pointed out by neuroscientists to be incurred by our emotions on the world from our 
perspective.
Both Damasio and De Sousa make the additional and in their view crucial 
point that depending on, say, whether we have a favourable or unfavourable attitude 
towards something, or depending on such things as whether we are afraid, angry, in 
love, guilt-ridden, etc. certain things will not just come to stand out 
phenomenologically more than others in our experience, but these salient aspects of 
the environment will come to stand out in specific ways, in particular, and amongst 
other things, as calling for certain courses of action on our part -  eg. as immediately 
to-be-avoided, as to-be-obtained, as to-be-kissed, etc. Particular courses of action 
themselves may also come to strike us immediately as the ones to take, or as not to 
take and so on. In other words, on this view, the world comes to strike us directly, in 
having emotions, in ways that somehow already reflect various motivational attitudes 
constitutive of our emotions. Certain paths just immediately come to strike us as to- 
be-followed, certain others immediately as to-be-avoided, and so on, these all being 
ways of experiencing the world which, first of all, clash somewhat with our ordinary 
understanding of how the world really works (ie. on a physicalistic world picture, 
inanimate objects or paths do not make demands upon us) and, in so clashing, may 
come to be seized by us directly as expressive of ourselves as standing in some 
distinctively ‘action-ready’ relation to the world rather than of the world as literally 
pulling us into action.
Importantly, according to this same neuroscientific literature, and as was 
argued by appraisal theorists, the above ways in which we come to experience the
201
world in emotion are clearly not supposed to be ways in which we come to judge the 
world to be on the basis of reasons. Rather, they are supposed to be ways in which we 
directly experience the world, or in which the world directly strikes us. The crucial 
idea behind Damasio’s and De Sousa’s views is in fact that the essential function of 
our emotions in our mental lives, and in particular in our decision making processes, 
is that of supplanting processes of rational deliberation and supplanting reasoned 
judgements, thereby (a) saving us from getting caught up in inadaptively long 
deliberations in circumstances where coming to a quick decision is of the essence, and 
(b) saving us also from potential decision-making deadlocks in situations where pure 
reason would not favour either of, say, two equally acceptable options. When an 
unidentified object for instance comes quickly towards us, the attitude of fear and its 
constitutive manifestation in our experiencing the oncoming object primitively as to- 
be-avoided, is on this view supposed to save us from the unfortunate consequences 
that would follow from our stopping to reason for too long through the options. And, 
in situations of rational deadlock, a more favourable gut feeling towards, say, one of 
two routes equal in length to the bus stop (and its manifestation in our experiencing 
the one route as just the one to take) is supposed to prevent us from getting stuck in 
the absurd situation of deliberating forever about something so mundane.
If emotions are indeed to play the above roles in decision making (which they 
do seem to play in many cases -  even if just as a matter of contingent empirical fact), 
they must result not just in our coming to make certain reasoned judgements in 
particular circumstances, but in our directly experiencing certain paths as to-be-taken, 
certain suspicious people as to-be-avoided, certain objects as to-be-dodged, and so on. 
This being so would moreover be very much along the lines of what we need to solve 
our puzzle about self-knowledge -  ie. we need to identify ways in which the world 
directly strikes us in experience such that there might be implicit in it reference 
already to ourselves as standing in some distinctively emotional or motivational 
relation to it.
Damasio and De Sousa actually go somewhat further than just suggesting that 
emotions do, as a matter of contingent empirical fact, supplant our deliberative 
processes, ie. in the sense of just happening to determine our decisions instead of 
reason. They argue additionally that these decisions that our emotions lead us to 
make, and that manifest themselves as felt demands upon us from the world, are also 
the most rational and most adaptive decisions for us to make. In some cases, the idea
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is that emotions actually lead us, somehow by their very nature, to the very same 
decisions that more lengthy deliberative processes of reasoning would do -  only much 
faster and more effectively. And, in other cases, their idea is that without emotions 
manifesting themselves in our seeing certain things as just to-be-done, it would be in 
principle impossible for us to get out of particular decision-making deadlocks. Put 
differently, according to Damasio in particular, our emotions not only supplant 
reasoning in some cases but play (a) an in principle indispensable role in avoiding 
decision making deadlocks, and (b) constitute by their very nature a fast-track route to 
the most rational and most adaptive courses of action.
For a number of reasons however, which it is not entirely relevant to go into 
here, I do not believe that these strong claims can stand up to scrutiny. Very briefly, 
rational decision making deadlocks could it seems be avoided in a number of ways 
other than by the use of gut feelings or emotions. For example, one could toss a coin 
in some cases, apply an arbitrary rule in other cases (eg. ‘always pick the item most to 
the left of you when choosing from identical copies of an object’), or apply a well 
tested rationally derived rule (eg. ‘never speak to strangers in dark streets at night’) in 
yet other cases. Furthermore, not all decision making deadlocks could it seems be 
avoided even with the use of emotions. Some decision making deadlocks may in fact 
be caused by emotions -  eg. two simultaneous emotions may be pulling one in 
opposite directions -  and require reason this time to be broken out of. Finally, it is 
also far from clear that doing what ‘feels right’ will always lead to the most rational 
(only faster) or most adaptive courses of action. Phobic fears, depression, 
overexcitement, etc. may all lead one, quite on the contrary, to highly irrational, 
/^adaptive, or disproportionate courses of action.1
Despite these shortcomings of De Sousa’s and particularly Damasio’s views, 
what seems difficult to deny is that, as matter of contingent empirical fact, our 
emotions do to some extent make us see the world in the ways described by them, 
regardless of how rational or adaptive this might be in particular cases. Our emotions 
do make certain paths just come to be seen by us as to-be-followed, others as to-be- 
avoided, shoes as to-be-resoled, a partner primitively as humiliating us or an
1 It may o f  course be that many emotions are evolutionary adaptations, and so states which led to adaptive 
behaviour in the environment in which they evolved. This does not however mean that having these emotions in 
the present environment (or for that matter in all instances in the past environment) will always lead one (let alone 
do so in principle) to act in the most rational or adaptive ways.
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adversary as to-be-punished} something we long for as to-be-obtained, someone we 
are angry at as to-be-blamed or as to-be-hit, someone we are attracted to as to-be- 
touched or as to-be-kissed, etc. If our emotions did not make us experience their 
objects in these ways, much of our behaviour (eg. in cases where we did not in fact 
toss a coin, or have a ready rule to apply, or have the time to engage in rational 
deliberation) would be difficult to account for. And, this is a view supported to 
varying degrees of explicitness not just by neuroscientists, but as we have seen by 
appraisal theorists and a number of other psychologists and philosophers as well.
Both Lambie & Marcel and Sartre, to introduce some of their technical jargon, 
describe the above type of phenomenology of emotion experience as experiencing the 
world in terms of a form of ‘action’ space, or as they put it ‘hodological space’ 
whereby the world is not experienced just as a world of objects and events distinct 
from ourselves bearing various general properties, but also as a usable world, one 
affording various possibilities for action,2 and crucially as a world not just affording 
possibilities for action but requiring certain things of us, making specific demands 
upon us, having various imperatives for us attached to it (as a world of paths 
experienced as open or closed-off, or indeed as to-be-followed or as to-be-avoided, 
etc.), these all being reflections of various motivational and emotional attitudes we 
might have towards the world. A situation may be felt not just as avoidable but as to- 
be-avoided', a person not just as a possible target but as to-be-attacked; a course of 
action (even an unreasonable one, eg. washing one’s hands continuously) as just to- 
be-carried-out, and so on. This way of experiencing the world distinctive to emotion, 
to introduce another piece of technical jargon, is also sometimes referred to as 
‘gerundival’. A gerundival experience is, put simply by Lambie and Marcel, ‘an 
experience a subject has of an object whereby the object strongly implies or impels an 
action that should be performed with regard to itself. Examples of such ways of 
perceiving the world are essentially cases such as those already mentioned of directly 
experiencing, say, a pet as ‘to be stroked’, a cake as ‘to be eaten’, a person as ‘to be 
kissed’ or as ‘to be attacked’, shoes as ‘to be re-soled’, and various other things as 
simply to-be-acted-upon in various specific ways.
1 For a detailed discussion o f the example o f  jealousy (ie. an example o f  a complex, multifaceted emotion) see 
(Goldie 2000, ch.8)
2 This is suggested for instance by the theory o f ‘ecological optics’ (Gibson 1979)
3 (Lambie & Marcel 2000, pp.66)
204
Crucially, all the authors who discuss this (amongst which those mentioned 
here, ie. Sartre, Lambie & Marcel, Damasio, De Sousa, and many appraisal theorists) 
take these distinctively emotional or motivational ways of seeing the world, ie. in 
terms of ‘hodological space’ or ‘gerundival perception’, not just to be cases of 
experiencing aspects of the world as having general gerundival properties or as 
having general or in principle imperatives attached to them, but as demanding things 
specifically of ourselves. That these requirements experienced as imposed on us by 
the world contain an implicit or parenthetical ‘by me’ is stressed for example quite 
explicitly by Sartre, as well as by Lambie & Marcel, and is also clearly manifest in 
some of the central claims made by Damasio and De Sousa, particularly in relation 
again to the role that experiencing the world in this way is supposed to play in 
decision making.
For example, if as suggested by Damasio and philosophers such as De Sousa 
emotions are to play an effective role in supplanting lengthy deliberative processes, 
and in getting us immediately to act in effective ways in situations of rational 
deadlock or in cases where time is of the essence, it must be that our coming to 
experience, say, an oncoming object as to be avoided, actually be a case of our 
directly experiencing the oncoming object not just as to be avoided in general, but as 
to be avoided in a particular way, ie. by our moving, rather than, say, by our moving 
someone else. Similarly, in cases of desires that manifest themselves in our 
experiencing someone as, say, to-be-kissed or as to-be-hit, etc. the demand must 
contain an implicit ‘by me’ if it is to immediately give rise (without the need for 
reasoning or further premises) to the appropriate action. The desires or demands in 
question would not be satisfied if not effected by oneself. And, incidentally, it never 
seems to happen that one is left wondering whether a demand experienced as imposed 
by the world in emotion experience is actually made upon oneself or on someone else. 
The fact that the demand is made upon oneself is implicit already in the type of action 
required of one, ie. that of moving or kissing rather than that of moving someone else 
or getting someone else to kiss one’s beloved.
In this way of experiencing the world (ie. as making certain direct demands 
upon us, as having immediate imperatives for us attached to it) is clearly a way in 
which we might directly experience the world from our point of view in having 
emotions that is (a) distinctive to emotion experience, and (b) distinctively expressive 
of ourselves as standing in a specifically motivational relation to the world. In
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essence, the idea that can be derived from the above literature here is that, in emotion, 
the world comes to be transformed not just into a world of objects bearing various 
general gerundival properties -  ie. with certain things being experienced as to-be- 
avoided generally speaking, particular people as to-be-hit on general principle, 
particular objects as to-be-obtained in the sense of being ‘worth obtaining’ -  but 
rather, into a world of objects having imperatives distinctively for oneself attached to 
them. This is precisely what we need to solve our puzzle about authoritative self­
ascription of emotion.
Furthermore, moving on now somewhat beyond emotion-induced experiences 
of the world in terms of ‘hodological space’, another closely related (and similarly 
relevant to our purposes) way in which the world can be seen to be 
phenomenologically transformed by our emotions, highlighted by Sartre and Lambie 
& Marcel as well as by other authors in the philosophical and psychological literature 
discussed here (eg. Goldie and Frijda amongst others), is by coming to be experienced 
not just as demanding actions of us, but also in turn as directly acting upon us, and in 
particular as acting upon us in what Sartre would call ‘magical ways’1, that is, often in 
entirely unmediated, absolute ways. Inanimate objects may for instance come to be 
experienced as luring us towards them or as repelling us at a distance. Mere 
‘situations’ may come to be experienced as physically pressuring us or suffocating us, 
and so on. This need not be taken as a pathological way of seeing the world (except in 
extreme cases, where one is so caught up in one’s emotional experiences that one 
comes to believe them), but rather, as Sartre suggests, as just one of the many ways in 
which we apprehend the world, this time a way of apprehending the world distinctive 
to emotion rather than mere cognition, and again a way of experiencing the world 
which contains implicit in it reference to ourselves as standing in a particular relation 
to the world (or it to us).
As mentioned earlier, and very much in line with Sartre’s position but also 
with the many other views explored in this chapter, we do not it seems just perceive 
things or receive information from the world; we do not just experience the world or 
‘code it’ in a detached physicalistic way (ie. as a world of objects bearing various 
general properties and interacting roughly in accordance with the laws of physics).
1 By ‘magical’ ways we can understand ways which clash with our ordinary physicalistic understanding o f  how the 
world works and o f  what is possible.
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We also have things to get done, particular concerns, interests, aims, feelings, and, as 
a consequence, we tend to see things (at the conscious level or at a more unconscious 
level, explicitly or implicitly) directly as means or obstacles to these aims and 
interests, as possible or impossible options, as open or closed paths, as inviting/ 
uninviting/ alienating situations, as situations to-be-avoided or to-be-leapt-into, that is, 
as having various other specific imperatives for us attached to them, and indeed as 
acting upon us directly in various ways -  as pressuring us, as affronting us, as luring 
us, and so on.1 To put things differently, we seem to experience the world, or specific 
events, circumstances, etc. not just in a detached way but often very much in relation 
to ourselves, as addressing themselves to us, as requiring things of us, as acting upon 
us, and generally as very much revolving around ourselves. This, it seems, is the 
specific contribution that our emotions make to our experience of the world. These 
ways of experiencing the world can moreover be seen to be in a sense directly 
expressive of ourselves as having specific emotional attitudes towards it, thus also 
beginning to make sense, as needed for our purposes in this thesis, of how we might 
be able to self-ascribe our own current emotions directly on the basis of looking out at 
the world, ie. directly on the basis of the way the world appears to us 
phenomenologically.
One question still remains though, namely that of why we tend to read the 
contents of our emotional experiences as directly expressive of ourselves as having 
particular emotional attitudes towards the world rather than as expressive of the world 
as actually having strange powers over us. What makes such ways of seeing the world 
directly suggestive, from our perspective, of ourselves as having particular emotions, 
rather than suggestive of the world as actually revolving around ourselves, that is, as 
actually being the way it seems in emotion experience, ie. the face at the window as
1 I have been appealing to a great extent to Sartre’s intuitions about the phenomenology o f  emotional experiences 
here, and there are indeed some obvious affinities between the present proposal and Sartre’s position in (Sartre 
1962). As has probably become clear by now though, these affinities hold more in spirit than in substance. 
Amongst Sartre’s views which are not, and need not, be endorsed on the present picture are for example (a) his 
view that experiencing the world as, say, terrifying or as acting upon us in some way involves or implies actually 
believing it to be so; (b) his view that apprehending the world in these ways is what having an emotion is; or (c) his 
view that emotional ‘transformations’ o f the world into the ‘magical’ are essentially intentional strategies to cope 
with a ‘difficult’ world. The latter view would in fact go directly against the present understanding o f these 
phenomenological transformations o f the world as cases o f  experiencing it in ways that are non-intentionally 
expressive o f  an emotion -  not to mention that, taking these transformations as strategies to cope with a difficult 
world would also give rise to a number o f  other problems not faced by the present proposal, such as that o f how to 
make room for cases o f  positive emotional transformations o f  the world, in particular when the world is not 
difficult. Having said that, Sartre does provide some insightful descriptions o f  the phenomenology o f  emotion 
experience, which, taken purely as such, can be appealed to and endorsed without having to take on any o f  his 
more controversial claims.
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actually acting upon us at a distance, the person we love as actually having cast a spell 
on us, the ground below the cliff as actually calling us to jump etc? How is it that we 
do not, that is, like in cases of perceptual hallucination for instance (where the world 
is also somehow phenomenologically transformed), tend to take our emotionally 
transformed experiences at face value?
Well, in some cases at least, we do it seems take these experiences at face 
value. Error is clearly not ruled out, nor is it intended to be, on the present account of 
how we come to know our own emotions. The frequency of error, recall, was one of 
the crucial differences between our knowledge of our own emotions and our 
knowledge of our own cognitive states that we needed to make room for in solving 
our puzzle about mental self-ascription for the case of emotions. And, on the account 
put forward here, error is indeed possible.
One can on occasion get so caught up in an emotion that the way the world is 
experienced from one’s emotional point of view is indeed confused with the way the 
world actually is. In what we would generally consider to be pathological cases, we 
might get so caught up in, say, jealousy, fear, anger, lust, etc. that we might loose 
touch with our more detached physicalistic understanding of reality and come to 
believe that things actually are the way our emotions present them to us -  eg. a person 
we are in love with as having cast a spell on us, a partner we are jealous of as actually 
betraying us although we have no evidence for it, and in paranoid fear, against all 
evidence again, a person as actually out to get us and so on. These are all highly 
pathological cases though. Usually, the degree of projection is not so extreme. It may 
however still occur to some lesser extent in ordinary cases, and so lead one to be 
accordingly more or less inclined to either attribute emotions to oneself (say, anger or 
anxiety), or to self-ascribe primarily physical symptoms alongside making evaluative 
judgements about the world.
Moving away from pathological cases though, failures to correctly identify 
what emotions we have may also arise, on the present account, from a number of 
other factors, such as from the fact of the existence of mixed emotions, whereby the 
world comes to strike us in many different ways at once, in ways that may not 
necessarily fall under a single emotion category, or as making conflicting demands 
upon us, ie. in ways expressive of different emotions towards the same object 
simultaneously, and so on. This may make it in the end quite difficult in many cases
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for us to judge immediately and with accuracy, simply on the basis of attending to the 
objects of our emotions, that we have particular emotions rather than others.
Finally, in cases of emotions that are highly structured and complex, eg. guilt 
about feeling angry about y, surprise at not feeling happy about something we 
expected to feel happy about, etc. the process of uncovering our emotions may require 
much more time and effort than the process of seizing certain other patterns (eg. very 
simple patterns of transformations of the world, or ones that we have experienced 
many times before) as directly expressive of specific emotions. That is, there is the 
phenomenon to be taken into account of emotions manifesting themselves not singly, 
but in a wide range of states, and often in particularly complex, multifaceted and 
structured ways. Grasping a particular complex transformation of the world (eg. 
where certain aspects strike one as to be acted upon in various ways, certain other 
aspects as acting upon us in various ways, etc.) as a manifestation of a single type of 
emotion might thus often be far from immediate, tending to be perhaps most 
immediate in cases where the same patterns have been experienced many times 
before, thereby eventually coming to be seized by one immediately as reflecting a 
single unified emotion.
As mentioned above however, the fact that so many forms of error are possible 
on the present picture of how we come to know our own emotions is no disadvantage 
of this view. It is on the contrary a virtue of the present proposal that it is able to 
accommodate the high susceptibility to error that is characteristic of our knowledge of 
our own emotions, and an even greater virtue of it that it can accommodate this and 
explain it without having to reject the view that we base our judgements regarding 
how we feel in a wide range of cases directly on the way the world seems to us. It 
even turns out, on this account, that it is precisely because of the sometimes complex 
ways in which our emotions manifest themselves in the way the world seems to us, 
that the process of self-ascribing our own emotions can often be a lengthy one and 
one particularly prone to error. At the same time, it is also on this account precisely 
because we self-ascribe many of our own emotions on the basis attending to the 
world, that our self-ascriptions of emotions can often be far more immediate and 
authoritative than our ascriptions of emotions to others. Self-ascribing our own 
emotions on the basis of how the world appears to us remains something that others, 
not directly seeing the world from our perspective, are not in a position to do. Our 
knowledge of our own emotions thus remains accounted for as being first-person
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authoritative (or at least different in kind from our knowledge of the emotions of 
others) in a wide range cases, and indeed as being so much in the same way as is our 
knowledge of our own cognitive states, yet without leaving unaccounted for the 
important differences that do clearly exist between our knowledge of our own 
cognitive states and our knowledge of our own emotions.
To tie together the central claims made here about the way in which we 
experience the world in emotion, what has come to light is that our emotions can, 
following recent discussions in the psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical 
literature, be seen to manifest themselves in our conscious world-directed experiences 
(a) in a way that involves implicit or pre-reflective reference directly to ourselves as 
standing in a particular relation to the world (or the world to us); (b) in a way that is 
distinctive to emotion experience (only in emotion does the world sometimes take on 
a ‘magical dimension’, ie. appearing as acting upon us in various ways, as making 
specific demands upon us, etc); and (c) recognizably as being a way of experiencing 
the world that originates to a great extent from ourselves and from our own attitudes 
towards it (in that it is often in great conflict with our beliefs about how the world 
really works -  ie. about it being a physicalistic world of objects bearing various 
general properties and not truly revolving around ourselves, not truly making 
demands upon us, not truly acting upon us directly in ways we don’t take to be 
physicalistically possible, and so on); and, in the end (d), in a way that (possibly as a 
developmental result of all of the above factors) actually strikes us directly in a way 
that is immediately expressive or suggestive or evocative, from our point of view, of 
ourselves as feeling certain specific emotions towards it.
Put succinctly, this chapter has shown that and how a concrete account can be 
put forward of how self-ascribing our own emotions on the basis of attending to the 
objects of our emotions out in the world is possible, thereby ultimately also enabling 
the traditional problem of self-knowledge for emotions, and not just for cognitive 
states, to be solved, ie. the problem of accounting for the special access we seem to 
have to many (even if not all) of our own emotions. More than that, in appealing to 
key aspects of the recent psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical literature on 
emotion and emotion experience, this chapter has not only allowed us to make more 
concrete sense of our earlier conclusion that world-directed consciousness must 
involve an implicit form of self-consciousness, but also shown this conclusion to 
converge with, and be very much backed up by, discussions and data entirely
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independent from the theoretical considerations about self-knowledge initially driving 
it in this thesis.
To conclude, this investigation of self-knowledge has brought to light 
essentially two things. First, on a purely theoretical level, it has shown in the initial 
chapters that the special kind of self-knowledge we have must, given its distinctive 
features, be rationally based on the way the world or the objects of our self-ascribed 
mental states appear to us from within our own conscious outward-looking point of 
view. Then, more concretely in subsequent chapters, it has suggested how evidence of 
ourselves as having the relevant mental states can indeed be seen to be present already 
implicitly in the way the world strikes us at the first-order level -  both in cognition 
and in emotion. Drawing these two strands together, that is, on the one hand our 
theoretical conclusions regarding the possibility and nature of introspective self- 
knowledge, and on the other our suggestions regarding the phenomenology of world- 
directed consciousness, this thesis has shown that, and how, the path towards 
understanding immediate authoritative self-knowledge lies ultimately in a deeper 
understanding of world-directed consciousness, and in particular of world-directed 
consciousness as involving at the same time an implicit form of self-consciousness.
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